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THE PHILIPPINE STORY

THE
Philippine Story

by David Bernstein



Farrar, Straus and Company

NEW YORK • 1947

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TO MY MOTHER

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INTRODUCTION

WHEN THE INDEPENDENCE of the Philippines was proclaimed in July, 1946, America's experiment in the Pacific came out of the laboratory. For the first time in history, a great Western power had acquired a colony, made a promise of ultimate independence, assisted the inhabitants in learning the ways of self-government, and then kept the promise without bloodshed.

The experiment has not, of course, been perfect. It built upon many mistakes and perpetuated many injustices. It supported the principle of political independence but basically ignored the parallel need for economic independence. It permitted the sugar barons and the wealthy businessmen to prosper mightily while thousands of Filipino tenant farmers lived in virtual peonage. It maneuvered into power, as President of the independent Republic, a leader able and energetic but tainted by collaboration with the enemy during the war.

On the other hand, by 1941, it had raised the Philippine standard of living above any other in the Orient. It had taken a people crushed by three and a half centuries of Spanish rule and given them widespread literacy, improved public health, expanding prosperity, and cause for self-respect. To the Filipinos, with

their mixed Malayan-Spanish heritage, the experiment brought an understanding of civil liberty, of fair play, free speech, political controversy—ideas still incomprehensible to most other Orientals. It had also given them a piece of the American legend of opportunity; the faith that a man born in a log cabin or a *nipa* shack can become president, professor, or sugar baron if only he tries hard enough. And the result is the closest thing to political democracy in the Orient.

This experiment was not quite out of the laboratory stage when World War II put it to a premature test. It emerged battered but triumphant. Alone among the colonial peoples of the Orient, the Filipinos had freely stood up to the Japanese, conducting enthusiastic guerrilla operations and harrying the enemy constantly and often effectively.

Most Filipinos who resisted the Japanese did so because they believed they were fighting for the United States. Fundamentally, perhaps, they were fighting for a prewar *status quo*—for stable government, material luxuries, libertarian ideas, expanding opportunity—which they associated with American policy.

When Philippine liberation came, in 1944 and 1945, the experiment resumed. But it had been set back disastrously. The cities of the Philippines were almost entirely wiped out. Productive power was in ruins. Almost two-thirds of the total physical wealth—excepting only the land itself—was gone. Everything was damaged or destroyed, not least the morale of the people. In such an atmosphere, Philippine independence became a reality.

During the war, the United States had made many promises to the Filipinos. Keep your courage up and stand firm, America said, for we shall redeem your freedom and restore all that has been destroyed. With liberation, the Filipinos sought fulfillment of these pledges. They have so far been put off with half-measures.

But half-measures will not rebuild an economy that is fully destroyed. By the end of 1946, almost two years after liberation and half a year after independence, Manila was still in ruins. There had been virtually no reconstruction. The economy of

the country was still shattered. Of the great export crops, only copra was being shipped out in any important quantities. Money was pouring out of the country, non-productively, to buy staples like rice and even, ironically, sugar. The morale of the people was still low. It was now more dangerous to walk alone at night in downtown Manila than it had been two years ago. The people were too depressed to depend upon themselves for salvation.

And now, inevitably, they look to the United States for help, not only to meet the immediate emergency, but also for the long-run job of establishing an economy which will stand on its own feet. For answer, they have received a promise of war damage compensation and an offer of a free trade relationship which cannot be permanent.

It is not enough. If there is not more, there will be disaster in the islands. The carefully nurtured democratic system will die of malnutrition. The Filipinos will suffer from the dry rot of a colonial economy in which a few men may wax rich but the majority must live in sustained poverty—a colonial economy without even the protection of a mother country. And we may discover that our friends in the Philippines have become bitterly anti-American.

Through the years, America has won the affection of many Orientals because of our Philippine record. Now we are on the verge of emptying this reservoir of good will. If we do not help the Philippines to assume its rightful place in the world community, we shall surely destroy the faith of the submerged millions of the Far East. In a restless, suspicious peace, can we afford to lose more prestige than we have already lost?

Failure in the Philippines now will threaten America's entire position in the Orient. It will weaken our defenses, before the world has succeeded in building a collective peace in which nations need not worry about their defenses. It will lay us open to one more point of attack by the Russians, who tactlessly keep rummaging through our dirty linen.

Failure to meet our responsibilities in the Philippines might be more than a question of national honor. It might conceivably be a matter of American dollars—and of American lives.

On the other hand, success in the Philippines will mean that a pattern of freedom has been clearly drawn for colonial peoples everywhere. Already, in Indonesia, a faltering attempt at imitation has begun. If the Philippine experiment works, the problem of the world's subject peoples may well be settled peacefully.

This book is an attempt to analyze the background, failures, accomplishments, and implications of the experiment itself. Inevitably, it must cover—however briefly—the economic background of the country, and something of its history. But its final focus is on the present crisis in Philippine-American relations, a crisis all the more dangerous because most Americans are not aware of its existence.

The truth about the Philippines is that we have not yet kept our promise to the Filipinos—and that, for our own sake as much as theirs, we had better do so before it is too late.

THE PHILIPPINE STORY

I

BACKGROUND

IN A RAPID SUMMARY of Philippine political geography, orthodoxy demands facts and figures: The archipelago consists of 7,083 islands, of which more than half have no names. In 1939 there were 16,000,303 Filipinos, speaking eight distinct languages and eighty-seven different dialects. The climate is tropical and the natural resources great. The distance by water from Manila to New York via the Panama Canal is 11,364 nautical miles.

These statements of encyclopedic fact, while accurate, are misleading in themselves.

For example, the fact that there are more than seven thousand islands in the Philippines requires clarification. The country as a whole is a chain of islands, of which the largest and most thickly populated lie very close to one another and form a single unit. The northern part of this unit is the great, meandering, fertile island of Luzon. In the center is the Visayan group—Leyte, Samar, Bohol, Cebu, Negros, Panay. To the south is Mindanao, the Moro island, big as the state of Indiana. These islands, together with Mindoro and Masbate, which are close

to Luzon, contain almost nine-tenths of the total area of the Philippines and more than nine-tenths of the total population.

It is theoretically possible—as the late Manuel L. Quezon intended to prove in 1942, had the war not wrecked his plans—to travel by car from the northernmost tip of Luzon to the southernmost village of Mindanao, by way of Samar and Leyte, and spend no more than a few minutes on any overwater ferry crossing. The trip would take one through the very heartland of the Philippine unit. Not all the islands, of course, lie so close together. Neither are the tinier islands very important—certainly not the four thousand notoriously nameless ones.

The transportation links that bind the unit are interisland shipping and air lines. In prewar years, both of these were increasingly active in the Philippines. The war eliminated the air lines; it destroyed 95 per cent of all Philippine shipping. This has meant a virtual paralysis of transportation throughout the archipelago. Mindanao was, for example, said to be overflowing with rice in April, 1946, while people in Luzon and the Visayan group were close to famine. Not until interisland shipping and air transportation are fully restored, and operating on an economic basis, can the geographical unity of the Philippines be realized in fact as well as in theory.

The nerve center of this insular unit is the city of Manila. Before the war, Manila was a handsome, expansive, sunny capital. For centuries it has dominated a centralized economy, government, and culture in a way that Americans can hardly understand. It is the great administrative capital, the chief port and transfer point, the financial center, the commercial focus, the cultural leader, the show place, of the islands. It is almost everything except the geographical center of the archipelago. It is so much a focus of Philippine life that many people tend to forget that at least 90 per cent of all Filipinos live outside their capital.

Just before the war, Manila's population was 623,362, more than four times the size of the next largest city, Cebu. Since the

war, the city's inhabitants have swollen in numbers to more than a million, huddling in makeshift habitations half-hidden in the rubble.

II

Within a 2,500 mile radius of Manila are all of the Philippines, plus Indonesia (including Java, Sumatra, and Borneo), western New Guinea, most of Japan, most of Korea, most of China (including the entire coastal area), French Indo-China, Formosa, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and Burma.

Within this great circle live nearly one-third of the world's population. From it come about 90 per cent of the world's rubber, 90 per cent of the world's hemp, 70 per cent of the tin, almost 25 per cent of the antimony, over 60 per cent of the tungsten, 65 per cent of the rice, 55 per cent of the copra, 20 per cent of the sugar, and over 10 per cent of the cotton.

Astride the principal trade routes running through this great circle, the Philippines commands the shipping lanes running east and west between North America and tropical Asia, and north and south from northern Asia to the southwest Pacific and on to India. The mainland of Asia is only a few hundred miles away across the China Sea, with Indo-China due west, and Hong Kong an overnight trip to the northwest. By air, Manila is less than two days from San Francisco; by sea, less than three weeks.

Insular nations lying off the coast of continental land masses possess trading possibilities limited only by their resources and their energy. The insular British have played the role of middleman ever since the days of Elizabethan expansion. The insular Japanese established a similar role for themselves almost from the moment Commodore Perry opened Pandora's lacquered box; and even now, in defeat, they count on resuming their commercial activities with help from the United Nations.

Far-flung trade is also the Philippine destiny—if the insular Filipinos are able to fulfil it.

In the pre-Spanish days, the archipelago was very close to being a trading center for the entire southwest Pacific area. But

when the Spaniards came, they brought with them a program of artificial restriction and channelization. They sought at first to monopolize Philippine trade; but in the process they strangled it. When new ideas about colonial economics began to circulate during the nineteenth century, Spain made a feeble attempt to restore the old commercial activity in the Philippines. But as a mother country Spain was too weak and planless, and the archipelago was unable to recover after centuries of stagnation. Even after the opening of the Suez Canal, which shortened the route to European markets, the islands assumed no substantial role as a Pacific middleman. Meantime, to the north, the Japanese, quick to exploit their emergence from isolation, were acquiring an ever increasing share of the world's trade.

Under the American regime, a new prosperity came to the Philippines. It was the result of a free trade policy launched in 1909 and continuing, with some changes, to this day. But, despite the great improvement in standards of living which it brought to the archipelago, the policy was, in its way, dangerous to the best interests of the Filipinos. It pegged the entire Philippine economy on the ups and downs of American business cycles. It entrenched four great export crops to the exclusion of a more healthy agricultural diversification and it prevented self-sufficiency.

Most of all, free trade served to continue, in a different way, the restrictive policies of Spain. By fencing the Philippines within the American tariff structure, it kept the country out of the world's competitive markets. In effect, free trade has artificially prevented the Philippines from assuming the role which geography would seem to have reserved for the archipelago. Thus, through four centuries, Spain and America have combined to prevent the Philippines from becoming the Britain of the Orient, or at least of tropical Asia.

III

The islands are rich. They are rich, most of all, in agricultural possibilities. Yet, even before the war, they were nowhere near

self-supporting in the way of food, largely because of the Spanish and American economic policies.

The most important subsistence crops are *palay* (rough rice), corn, and *camotes* (sweet potatoes). *Palay* was raised on about 43 per cent of all cultivated land in 1938, making the Philippines over 95 per cent self-sufficient in rice. (In 1946, as a result of the war, the country was no more than about two-thirds self-supporting in rice.) The corn crop area is almost one-quarter that of rice; however, to Filipinos rice is nearly ten times more valuable than corn. Other subsistence crops include cassava (for tapioca), bananas, pineapples, papayas, mangoes, citrus and other tropical fruits, as well as eggplant, tomatoes, watermelons, cabbage, radishes, and cucumbers. Second only to rice in the national diet are the products of Philippine fisheries. The fishing industry has grown in a haphazard fashion, but with adequate planning it could be developed tremendously.

The war-created food shortages have been intensified by the disastrous wartime destruction of *carabaos*, the water buffaloes which are the work animals of the Philippines. Before the war, there were almost three million *carabaos*; in 1946 nearly 70 per cent of these were reported lost. Unless they are replaced by new animals or by machinery, it is probable that a full third of the arable land will remain uncultivated.

The great export crops are sugar, coconut products, abaca, and tobacco. Sugar is the most important. Indeed, to a dangerous extent, the country suffers from a sugar economy. The cane grows in every province, but thrives best in Negros, Luzon, Panay, and Cebu. It has been estimated that almost two million people are wholly or partly dependent on the sugar industry for their livelihood. Before the war, sugar accounted for nearly half the total value of Philippine exports. Since 1930, more than 99 per cent of these exports entered the free American market, and under the new Philippine trade legislation this will probably continue to be the case for another quarter of a century.

The ubiquitous coconut palm provides copra, the dried coconut meat which is crushed for oil valuable in the making of soap. The industry, second largest in export value, is centered chiefly

in Luzon. Normally, half the world's copra comes from the Philippines. Less than 20 per cent of the total crop is consumed locally. Of the rest, 85 per cent goes to United States soap manufacturers.

The Philippines has a natural monopoly on Manila hemp, made from abaca, a member of the banana family. This rope fiber swells less in salt water than any other marine rope. Before the war, average yearly production was 200,000 tons, with perhaps two million people dependent on it for a livelihood. The principal abaca areas are in Mindanao, southern Luzon, Leyte, Masbate, and Samar.

The fourth large export product, tobacco, is a major crop along the northwest coast of Luzon, and especially in the Cagayan Valley; it is also intensively grown in Cebu, Negros, and Panay.

In the Philippines is one of the world's last great stands of commercial timber. The woodlands often begin at the shore line, and stretch across the low country right to the mountain peaks. In the shadows of the tall trees is a tropical welter of lesser plants—sinewy rattans that stretch for hundreds of feet, rare orchids, and all the florid profusion of warmth and fertility. About three-fifths of the archipelago—over 43,680,000 acres—is covered by forests, and 90 per cent of these have commercial value. The trees, of course, are typically tropical, and there is much commercial hardwood, such as Philippine mahogany, especially suited to cabinet and construction work. Practically all forest lands are government property.

Mineral resources are not yet fully explored or exploited. Under the soil lies gold, silver, and copper, the newly important minerals like manganese and chromite, and perhaps even oil. By 1940 the mining industry had grown so fast that it ranked in value behind only two others, rice and sugar, and in exports it was second only to sugar. During the five years ending in 1940, gold production averaged 880,220 ounces, worth over \$30,000,000. This is a good deal more gold than Alaska has been producing in recent years. The cradle of the industry, and by far the most important producing area, is the Mountain Province

in northern Luzon, but gold is also mined in central and southern Luzon, Masbate, and Mindanao. Silver is usually mined as a by-product of gold, and in 1940 the production amounted to 1,394,700 fine ounces, valued at almost a million dollars.

Iron is mined in southern Luzon, Samar, and Marinduque, but there is a huge and untouched deposit of perhaps half a billion tons of low-grade iron in northern Mindanao. This deposit is owned by the Philippine Government, which before the war was considering erection of a smelter and small steel plant, with power from Christina Falls in northern Mindanao and coal from Malangas in Zamboanga Province.

Low-grade chrome ore was first discovered in 1922, in western Luzon, but not until several years later was it realized that this was probably one of the largest deposits in the world. The reserves are estimated at from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 tons. Higher-grade deposits are scattered all over the islands.

As the war started, copper was beginning to assume some importance, especially in northern Luzon. By 1940 the output was 9,200 metric tons, most of which went to Japan for smelting and refining. The figure, though small, was significant because only one other country in the Far East, Japan, seems to have any substantial copper ore resources. In the past, Japan has dominated the copper industry in the Orient. If additional copper ore is mined in the Philippines, and particularly if production is large enough to warrant establishment of smelting and refining plants, this mineral may become an important factor in the country's future economy.

Other known resources include manganese, lead, and a limited amount of coal; and there is the inadequately explored resource of hydroelectric power.

This rapid review of natural wealth clearly reveals the economic weakness of the Philippines. It exports raw materials and imports finished products. It does not, even in normal times, provide itself with many basic necessities which it could easily produce at home. But, unlike the banana republics of Central America, the Philippines is not necessarily caught in a trap from which it cannot escape.

It has sufficient mineral resources and potential power for development of light industries. Rice and fish production can surely be expanded to the point where Filipinos need import neither of their two basic foods. Professor Joseph Ralston Hayden pointed out a few years ago that "the uplands of Bukidnon would support enough cattle to supply the Philippines with beef (much of which is now imported) and leave a surplus for export." Cotton, coffee, tropical fruits, cigarettes, lumber, and a variety of other commodities can be produced in quantities at least sufficient for domestic needs, and often for export as well.

On the other hand, production of some Philippine commodities will have to be curtailed, sooner or later, unless new markets are located outside the United States. With the tapering off of free trade, for example, sugar must find a new foreign market or take a lesser place. With careful planning, copra, tobacco, and Manila hemp may be better able to readjust, and there may be a shift to such products as sisal, lumber, kapok, lumbang nuts (for tung oil), and others not yet even in the experimental stage.

Ramie is an especially promising possibility. It is a textile fiber which can be made into durable and attractive clothes, house furnishings, strong belting, and fabrics. Textiles made of ramie wear long, do not shrink, take dyes well. In the first eight months of 1939 the Philippines produced 2,500,000 pounds of ramie, of which Britain took three-quarters. There is a chronic demand for cheap textiles in the Orient, and ramie could well be a Philippine answer.

IV

The archipelago lies in the north tropics. It is not unbearably hot. Manila's hottest months, April and May, are by no means so oppressive as the damp, stifling, mildewy summer months in Washington, D. C. The temperature in Manila rarely goes below 60° Fahrenheit, but just as rarely does it reach 100°. The nights are rather cool, especially just before dawn. In the mountains—Baguio, for instance—the climate is cool and bracing, and in the highest mountains there is often frost.

This climate permits the Philippines to grow any tropical

product. In the mountains, sub-tropical and middle-latitude crops can be grown. With the possible exception of sugar, crops can be planted and harvested in any season, and there is no off-season for anything except in those localities which suffer from prolonged dry spells.

By and large, the mean annual temperature throughout the Philippines—and there are countless local variations in both temperature and rainfall—is between 75° and 85° , with no marked difference for any season. There is, in fact, a greater thermal difference between day and night than between the dry and wet seasons.

Typhoons occasionally rollick up from the south to blow houses over, uproot trees, push ships onto dry land, and ruin crops. The storm itself moves rather slowly, but its circular motion is so rapid that the winds often exceed 100 miles an hour. By now it is generally possible to predict the path of a typhoon, but predictions cannot do very much to safeguard crops from damage. Luzon lies within the normal typhoon belt, but the Visayan Islands and Mindanao are remarkably free from storms. The typhoons are more frequent than the hurricanes that sometimes plague the East Coast of the United States, but in the amount and kind of destruction they wreak there is not much difference.

The effect of Philippine climate is not at all like that of the wet tropics. True, the tempo is slower than in most parts of the United States, but climate is not the only cause of this. Food habits, social conditions, and the economic needs of the country all influence human energy. Nor should the slower tempo be confused with laziness. Many American soldiers in the Philippines came to believe that Filipino farmers were lazy because they were not tilling their fields in the middle of the day. Quite sensibly, they were resting in the comparative coolness of their homes; their work was done in the early morning.

II

THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

WHILE THE FILIPINOS may be divided racially into three broad groups (Negrito, Indonesian, and Malay) and many sub-groups, centuries of intermarriage and crossbreeding have mixed them up with centripetal force. They are certainly more homogeneous than the inhabitants of the United States. With the exception of a few thousand dwarfed Negritos, it would be hard to tell, by appearance alone, from which part of the country a Filipino comes. The best test—perhaps the only sure one—would be to find out what language he speaks at home.

Officially, the Census Bureau in the Philippines defines two classifications, and it is significant that these are religious. The Bureau divides Filipinos into a Christian and a non-Christian group. Christian Filipinos may speak any of a number of languages: Ilocano in northern Luzon, Tagalog around Manila, Visayan in the central part of the Philippines. But, by and large, they are much alike. They make up nine-tenths of the population. They dominate the country's politics, professions, business, and agriculture. The others, the submerged tenth, are the non-Christian Filipinos.

These non-Christians include some 60,000 woolly-headed

Negritos, a dwarf race roaming untracked mountains and forests; about 200,000 Igorots, a primitive people who, though primitive, conceived the Ifugao rice terraces of northern Luzon, one of the world's great achievements in agricultural engineering; and half a million Moros, so dubbed by Spaniards because it was the name they used for Mohammedans at home.

The Negritos and Igorots, along with a few other pagans, are gradually being engulfed by the encroaching wave of Christian Filipinos; in a few generations they may disappear entirely. The Moros, perhaps, will last, and one of the problems of the Philippines will be the development of healthy co-operation between Christian majority and Mohammedan minority. •

Minority problems always test a people's progress, and the Filipinos obviously have such problems. But, on the record, they have handled them at least as well as Americans have handled the minority problems of the United States.

II

Population-wise, the Filipinos increase fast. Their curve goes up sharply, and there has been a yearly excess of births over deaths, even during the war, amounting to about 300,000. At the time of the last census, January 1, 1939, the population was 16,000,303. It had been 12,598,066 ten years earlier, and only 7,635,426 in 1903. A century before, in 1800, there were probably less than two million Filipinos. By the time independence was proclaimed in July, 1946, the population was estimated at almost eighteen and a half millions. In 1980, it may be close to forty millions.

Here, as throughout the Orient, population is entering a period of explosive growth. The birth rate is high—encouraged by religious practices, by Catholic opposition to use of contraceptives, by an agrarian life which makes children an economic advantage to parents, and by a death rate that spurs people toward large families to overcome the losses.

But the death rate is gradually going down, and it is likely to go down even further in future years. The prospect of ex-

panding population is by no means so frightening to Filipinos as it may well be to Indians or Chinese. For the country is not overpopulated, nor will it be overpopulated if, in 1980, there are forty million Filipinos. There are vast and fruitful tracts of empty land awaiting colonists. In 1939, the overcrowded province of Cebu had a population density of 556 persons per square mile; but the entire island of Mindanao had less than fifty per square mile.

For the most part, this is a nation of farmers. They work the land on the central plain of Luzon, from Manila north to the wide coastal plain of Ilocos and south to the lowlands of Laguna de Bay; they farm the fertile Cagayan Valley in northern Luzon, and the Bicol plain amid the southeastern volcanic mountains; they grow their crops in Panay, in the rich cane lands of Negros, and on the open ranges of Mindanao. Seventy per cent of all male workers over ten years old are farmers. The next largest occupation group, aside from housewives, is that of workers in industry: 7.6 per cent.

Inland, the country is thinly settled, or even empty. More than half the land is considered capable of being farmed, but only 13.3 per cent was under crops in 1938. In 1939 there were more than one and a half million farms, of which 49 per cent were operated by their owners. The rest were run by part-owners and share-croppers.

Tenant farming is the curse of the Philippines. It spreads like a dank fog over the richest land, over the tall cane and the tobacco blossoms and the green rice shooting out of the water in central Luzon and the Visayans. Sometimes it takes a different but more hoary form: the great *haciendas* where farm laborers must hire themselves out to the wealthy *caciques* or to the religious orders that own the estates.

Most frequent type of tenancy is *kasama*, or share tenancy. Under this arrangement, the land is leased on shares, with part of the proceeds going to the laborer, part to the provider of work animals, and part to the landowner. Usually, the landowner furnishes not only the land but also the seed and the cash to keep the farmer alive until the crop comes in. Inevitably the tenant

runs deeper and deeper into debt, caught in a whirl of hard-bargaining landowners and gouging usurers, with no hope of freeing himself from debt-slavery. In Pampanga, one of the worst share-cropping areas, an average farmer may not receive, in actual value, more than 8 per cent return on the crop he has sown and reaped. When a Rice Share Tenancy Act was passed before the war to protect tenant farmers on rice lands, the landlords quickly managed to insert amendments which rendered the bill meaningless.

In the sugar areas, the landlords are usually guilty of absenteeism. Their prewar world was a whirl of big deals, polo fields, and visits to the Riviera; the war has killed all this, of course, but they look forward to its revival. Elsewhere the *caciques* hold sway. They are the people who own more land than anyone else in the village: one American observer described them as a cross "between an English country gentleman, an American ward politician, and a Spanish grandee." Their political power is great in the provinces.

"The tenants," wrote S. E. Macaraig in 1933, "are controlled in their choice of candidates for elective offices. The candidate of the *cacique* must be the candidate of the tenant. If the tenant does not vote in accordance with the wishes of the *cacique*, the tenant may be dismissed from his farm. Caciquism is an enemy of democracy because the laborers cannot get fair treatment and good wages for their labor . . . Caciquism is an enemy of democracy because the rich have an advantage over the poor in their representation in the legislature . . . Laws that militate against the *caciques* are passed by the legislature only with the greatest difficulty. But laws which favor the *cacique*, like those that provide better protection for property, can easily pass the legislature."

Taken all together, however, the prewar Filipino enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Orient, with the possible exception of the Japanese. This standard of living gave him many necessities which other Orientals have been forced to regard as unattainable luxuries. But by American standards, life was pitifully poor.

The average monthly income of all Filipinos employed in gainful occupations in 1939 was 29 pesos. (This amounts to \$14.50 per month; the Philippine peso is by law exactly equivalent to fifty American cents.) Filipino males in all gainful occupations earned an average of 35 pesos a month, and females an average of 15 pesos. *

On the farm, wage averages were much lower. The over-all monthly income in agriculture was 14 pesos—\$7 per month. Farmers and farm managers earned 36 pesos a month, while farm laborers earned only 12. In fishing the average income was 16 pesos a month. In mining and quarrying, one of the best-paying industries, the average was 56 pesos. Teachers earned 58 pesos a month; writers, editors, and reporters 141 pesos; retail tradesmen 59 pesos. Bankers received 416 pesos per month.

Before the war, of course, the cost of living in the Philippines was far lower than in the United States, so that these income figures were not quite so bad as they seem. Locally produced foods were cheap. So was locally manufactured clothing, and there was no need for expensive winter clothes. Housing, too, was inexpensive. Only the goods imported from the United States and other foreign countries were costly.

In education, the 1939 census revealed that almost 30 per cent of the 5,935,408 persons from five to nineteen years old were attending school. The majority of adults who had attended school at all averaged four years of education. (The American average is slightly over eight years.) Nearly half of all Filipinos over ten years old were able to read and write, and of these about one-third read at least one newspaper or magazine regularly. Only 1 per cent owned a radio set, 9 per cent used electricity in their homes, and one out of every four families obtained water from either a water-pipe system or an artesian well. (Figures for the United States, richest country in the world, show that 21 per cent of U. S. homes have no electricity and 31 per cent have no running water.)

Aside from literacy statistics, these figures have little to do with the postwar Philippines. They merely show what kind of life the country provided its people in a more normal time. They

reveal widespread poverty, by comparison with the United States, but there are few other countries which stand up well to such a comparison. The real contrast is with the rest of Asia, and particularly of tropical Asia. By 1931, the Philippine standard of living was estimated at 300 per cent higher than that of the peoples on the neighboring mainland. Thus the archipelago stood out as a land of opportunity and plenty. It was a good place to live. *

III

The most serious political and cultural handicap of the Filipinos is their lack of a common language. More Filipinos—about four and a half millions—speak or at least understand English than any other single language, but they rarely speak it at home. The next most widespread language—about four million adepts—is Tagalog, but few understand it outside the Manila area. Elsewhere the people speak Visayan or Ilocano or Bicolano or one of the other dialects. Most of these are related tongues, and it would be about as easy for an Ilocano to learn Tagalog as for an Italian to learn French. Spanish is spoken by no more than some 400,000 Filipinos, mostly the better educated and wealthy.

What this means is that the élite group does have a common language—English or Spanish—while most of the people must get along with dialects which cannot carry them very far in dealing with outsiders.

For years this problem has bothered Filipino leaders. Though there is a small body of literature in Tagalog and some of the other languages, the Philippine dialects cannot compare with the Western languages, or even with Chinese or Japanese, as vehicles for modern expression. They are flowery languages, principally because it is possible to transmit exact ideas only by means of the ellipsis and the allusion. In 1898 Apolinario Mabini, the revolutionary leader, suggested that Tagalog be the language of elementary instruction, with English and French taught in the higher grades; when English became "sufficiently diffused," he thought it should be declared the official language.

The Americans added English to Spanish as an official language, and established it as the language of instruction in the schools. This program of mass education in English has been a potent force in the advancement of the Filipino people. In no other subject area has education been so widespread; nowhere else have colonial Orientals been given such easy access to the disturbing ideas written in the languages of the West.

At first, however, American anti-imperialists bitterly attacked the use of English in the public schools. In 1903, Dr. David P. Barrows, the General Superintendent of Education, made his reply:

"The Filipino adheres to his native dialect in its purity, and when he converses with a Filipino of another tribe ordinarily uses broken Spanish. These languages are not destined to disappear or to fuse, nor are they destined to have a literary development. For common intercourse, as well as for education, the Filipino demands a foreign speech. To confine him to his native dialect would be simply to perpetuate that isolation which he has so long suffered and against which his insurrection was a protest . . . The advantage which the possession of the English language will give him is readily understood by the Filipino, and it is fortunate that the acquisition of the Spanish tongue was largely denied him and that it never won his affection. English is the *lingua franca* of the Far East. It is spoken in the ports from Hakodate to Australia. It is the common language of business and social intercourse between the different nations from America westward to the Levant. It is without rival the most useful language which a man can know. It will be more used within the next ten years, and to the Filipino the possession of English is the gateway into that busy and fervid life of commerce, of modern science, of diplomacy and politics in which he aspires to shine."

While more and more Filipinos took to English, they did not make it the language of the home. And their nationalistic pride encouraged them to defend the virtues of Tagalog. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, onetime President of the University of the Philip-

pires, remarked that "no foreign language, be it Spanish or English, or any other, can be the genuine vehicle of our inmost thoughts, our most intimate feelings. No foreign language can be the expression of our national soul." Yet he made his mystic argument in English.

At first, Manuel L. Quezon, the most ardent nationalist of them all, favored English as the universal language of the Philippines. In 1921, when he was President of the Philippine Senate, Quezon said:

"Of course, the English language has to be the official language of the Philippine Islands. It is out of the question to think of any of our native dialects for this purpose because we could not come to an agreement as to which one would be adopted . . . Besides, our native dialects have not the literature necessary for the education and intellectual training of our youths. If we have to pick up a foreign language English is the only language. It is the international language in the Far East.

"The English language is the best means of preserving democratic institutions in the Philippine Islands . . . If you want to have a clear notion and conception of liberty and freedom you have to get it through English literature."

Later he changed his mind. The Philippine Constitution of 1935 stipulated that "the National Assembly shall take steps toward the development and adoption of a common language based on one of the existing native languages." And on December 30, 1937, President Quezon proclaimed Tagalog as the "national language of the Philippines."

As the years pass, Filipinos will probably discover that it is one thing to legislate a national language into being, and quite another to make it the natural language of the people. Surely the decline of English would be a misfortune. Today the Philippines is in effect the third largest English-speaking country in the world. The current extent of English is a real asset, not only in government and commerce, but also in the ability to communicate with other nations. *

It will, perhaps, never be natural for a Filipino to talk to his

wife in English at home. But English has gone further than any other language in unifying the multilingual Filipinos. There is no practical reason why it should not continue to do so, comfortably supplementing the local dialects through the country.

IV

If language is the most obvious symbol of half a century of American sovereignty, then religion is the symbol of four centuries of Spanish sovereignty. Nearly four-fifths of the people are Roman Catholics; the exact proportion was 78.8 per cent in 1939.

The friars had indeed done their work well in the islands. They came with the conquerors, and they built churches, combated or absorbed local superstitions, converted the heathen. They established their religious orders to propagate the word and acquire the land. Today the Philippine countryside often seems a tropical version of southern Europe, with every village boasting its stone church or at least its religious ruins.

Under Spain, Catholicism was the only legal faith in the Philippines. After Spain was driven out, Church and State were separated, and freedom of worship assured. American Protestant missionaries swarmed into the islands, but the people remained Catholic. In 1939, only 2.4 per cent were Protestants, 4.2 per cent Mohammedans, 3.9 per cent pagans, and 9.8 per cent Aglipayanos.

The Aglipayanos, members of the Philippine Independent Church, are strongest in the Ilocano regions north of Manila. The sect was established soon after American occupation, by Father Gregorio Aglipay; it came as a climax to a long-simmering revolt against the Roman Catholic Church. Aglipay and his followers wanted to replace the Spanish friararchy with a Filipino hierarchy, and to create a church with no ties to any foreign organization.

Their million and a half adherents make the Aglipayanos a serious political influence, somewhat resembling the Mormons in Utah. Bishop Aglipay himself ran against Quezon for the

Commonwealth Presidency in 1935, polling 148,000 votes, about 14 per cent of the total.

As a religious faith, the Aglipayan Church combines patriotism with modernism and rationalism. Although there is much pageantry in its rituals, Latin is not used in the services, and Filipino heroes are revered instead of saints. The priests are not required to be celibate. The present Maximum Bishop, Santiago Fonacier, who ran unsuccessfully for the Philippine Senate in 1946, is married and has a large brood of children.

v

Anthropologists may subdivide the inhabitants of the Philippines into a bewildering variety of ethnic groups, but the real division is along class lines. And there are only two classes. One is the group of wealthy and educated Filipinos—the élite of the islands. The other consists of the impoverished share-croppers, small farmers, manual laborers—the *taos* who live out their anonymous lives in the provinces but make up the majority of the population of the Philippines. Between the two classes there is a deep chasm.

The first group includes the small but powerful clique of great wealth, but it also includes most of the “educated Filipinos,” the younger people who have grown up in an Americanized environment and have had some opportunity to absorb its heady influences. Taken together, they add up to perhaps 5 per cent of the total population. Among them are surprisingly few “pure” Filipinos. Some are pure Spanish, but mostly they are *mestizos*, Filipinos with part-Spanish or part-Chinese ancestry. They are generally landowners, businessmen, government officials, political leaders, professional men, or a combination of several of these categories.

Their eyes have been opened to the enormous opportunities promised by democratic capitalism in a land of natural wealth. They have also felt the subtle corrosion of discrimination, even in their own homeland. It is a combination that often leads to

impatience, maladjustment, hypersensitiveness, and extreme ambition.

The remaining 95 per cent of the people are not well enough off to indulge in the luxuries of maladjustment. They are the poor of the Philippines. In the remoter villages, their way of life is not much different from what it was four hundred years ago. Everywhere there is a startling sameness in their manner of living—in their houses, their clothing, their daily lives. Quezon once described them to the National Assembly:

"Has the progress . . . made by the Philippines benefited our poorer population? The poor still has to drink the same polluted water that his ancestors drank for ages. Malaria, dysentery and tuberculosis still threaten him and his family at every turn. His children cannot all go to school, or if they do, they cannot even finish the whole primary instruction, for one reason or another.

"Roads from his *barrio* or his little farm to the town there are none. Only trails are within his reach—trails that have been formed by the daily pressure of his bare feet and not because they have been constructed. As he works from sunrise to sundown, his employer gets richer while he remains poor. He is the easy prey of the heartless usurer because usury is still rampant everywhere despite legislative enactments intended to suppress it.

"That is, concisely speaking, the lot of the common man in our midst, after America's long endeavor to give to all fair opportunity in the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of life."

Despite Quezon's occasional concern over the lot of the disinherited Filipino, there has been on the whole very little in the way of organized reform. In the rice provinces of central Luzon, where tenant farmers have for generations been forced to live in a state of chronic misery, no basic progress has been made. Inevitably this region has been the center of radical protest, as it is today. Between the *tao* and the élite group there is not much in the way of a middle class. True, there are a few

small landowners, a few tradespeople, and their number is slowly growing. Many of these merchants are Chinese who have been part of the Philippine scene for centuries without becoming thoroughly assimilated.

But any visitor to the Philippines can tell at once that there are only two great groups that count. The distinction between them is neither race nor heredity, but wealth. And, because the Philippines is a land for young men with ambition, it is still possible for tropical versions of the Horatio Alger saga to be repeated over and over again. The poorest and most miserable share-cropper in Nueva Ecija has at least the theoretical assurance that his son can get primary schooling, receive (with luck) a higher education, and thereupon join the ranks of professional people. There is a satisfaction in this knowledge; but it does not ease the share-cropper's own poverty and misery.

VI

The typical educated Filipino—who, because he is typical, cannot possibly exist in reality—would be an alert, well-informed, uncomfortable, ambitious person looking at least ten years younger than he is. He has been educated in an American-type public school system. He can speak a fluent, accented English which is idiomatic but intangibly untrue. He has at least a smattering of Spanish. His radicalism may make him detest the Spaniards; his inferiority complex may make him more pliant with the arrogant Spaniards than with Americans. He reads newspapers and magazines published in English, and enjoys Hollywood movies. He has the normally exaggerated concept of the great wealth of the United States, and one of his dearest ambitions is to visit America. He reads American books and magazines, and keeps close track of American politics; he is not much more interested in the affairs of his neighbors in Indonesia than the average American in the affairs of Canada. He is an extreme nationalist, and dearly loves to see his own people excel, especially in competition with Occidentals.

He is aggressively ambitious, though his pride often makes him shyer than he would like to be. He no longer relies philosophically on the old Tagalog saying: "Life is short, and well I know it is only a minute long. Therefore, I want this minute to stay with me as long as it can, for who knows what may happen to me tomorrow?" More than most Orientals, he now wants to determine what will happen to him tomorrow.

He has strong family ties; there are few poorhouses in the Philippines because, as it is said, "every poor person is a relative to someone."

Intellectually, he tends to be literal-minded. He will take an argument or a chance remark more seriously than may have been intended. He is easy to insult, and he will harbor a grievance for a long time. He will work hard and steadily, but only if he can see a tangible end in sight. He is no planner, though often an easy improviser.

This kind of description of the typical educated Filipino can be highly misleading, for it is no more than a quick generalization. Fundamentally, the individual Filipino is simply a human being who happened to be born in the Philippines, usually with a *café-au-lait* complexion and high Malayan cheekbones. He has been subjected to a series of influences which make him different, from, say, the Canadian or the Peruvian, and also make him as a person different from other Filipinos—just as one American is different from another.

These influences include the history of the Philippines, the impact of Spanish rule and of the Catholic faith, the effects of nearly half a century of American education, public health techniques, and ideas about living conditions. They include the dominating personalities of men like José Rizal, Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, Manuel Roxas—as well as the American personalities who have left their mark, ranging from William McKinley to Franklin Roosevelt, from Taft through Harrison and Wood and Stimson and Murphy to MacArthur and McNutt. They include, further, the lingering effects of the double Filipino revolt, first against Spain and next against the

United States. They include the extremes of great wealth and greater poverty. Finally, and for the moment perhaps most important of all, they include the shock of the recent war.

VII

The war destroyed the doctrine that white Westerners are infallible. In the months of initial victories, Japan proved to the Orient that the West could be beaten. Too many Filipinos were temporarily convinced that Japan might win, for them ever again to accept the dogma of Western invincibility. True, Japan finally lost. But that was by virtue of our superior wealth and production in a struggle where, man for man, the Japanese soldier had no need to be ashamed.

It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the importance of the new attitude—at once more critical and more independent—toward the Occident. Change was on the way even before the war started. More and more, white residents in the Far East had begun to recognize that old-fashioned imperialism had reached its zenith in the nineteenth century and that it was now on the wane.

The presence, late in the war, of more than a million American troops in the Philippines speeded up the process. Our draft army was no more than a cross-section of the male population of the United States. GI's brought with them their prejudices, bluntness, and comparative riches, but they were Americans, and they broke down many of the social barriers between Filipinos and themselves. Thousands of Filipino girls learned more about America than anyone might have dreamed in 1941.

As for the Filipinos, they were undergoing a new and terrifying experience. They had seen the Japanese sweep through the country by early 1942, with only Bataan and Corregidor to salvage American prestige. They had been forced to submit to three years of enemy occupation, at times tolerant but more often vicious and tyrannical.

Most Filipinos somehow managed to retain their faith in ultimate deliverance. A few outstanding ones collaborated,

either politically or in the buy-and-sell racket, procuring war materials for the Japanese forces. But, by and large, most stood firm against the Japanese and loyal to America.

For three years they waited, looking to the time when they could resume their pleasant life, and build again. Finally, in October of 1944, American forces landed on Leyte, and the Second Battle of the Philippines began. It did not end until the liberation of Manila early in 1945. By that time, the entire country was in ruins. The cities were rubble. The farms, the factories, the government, the public works—all were in confusion, disorganization, and devastation. Inflation soared to new heights.

The people were demoralized. Instead of the fruits of victory, they tasted only its dregs. To them, victory meant total disaster. The millennium they had hoped for came, and it was worse than the Armageddon. For months after liberation, most people were depressed to the point of numbness. There was so much work to be done that no one knew where to begin. If the United States Army had not been present, with the equipment and the will to get to work, the corpses and the rubble would have stayed in the streets of Manila for a long time. On the blind, instinctive impulse of self-preservation, people somehow made crude shelters for themselves. But they were incapable of doing much more.

Every idea for rehabilitation included an almost hysterical plea for escape—generally to “study conditions in the United States.” Women with no homes to care for now escaped into long hours of sleep. Girls revolted against the Spanish chaperone system and went wild in the GI jeeps. Highly moral young men sought to excuse hijacking and black market operations as Robin Hood methods of bringing scarce supplies to the people. The government services were ridden with indolence, inefficiency, and graft. Group tensions became taut, and there was a noticeable increase in anti-Chinese feeling.

It was the inevitable aftermath of war.

III

THE SPANISH RECORD

IN THE BEGINNING were the little people. They were black, with flat noses, soft brown eyes, kinky hair, and tiny hands. They were less than five feet tall, and the women even shorter but their bodies were finely shaped. They wandered naked from place to place, occasionally stopping in the lee of a mountain to grow rice for a season, and then moving on. Mostly, they ate wild roots from the fields, and fish from the rivers, and deer and wild boar struck down by the canny arrow in the forest.

These were the oldest inhabitants. Their pygmy progeny can still be found in the far places of the islands; now they are known as Negritos, the "little black ones."

But it is not of the little black ones that the Philippine tale of creation boasts. It is related that when God decided to manufacture man, He fashioned the body carefully and put it in the oven to bake. After a time, He took out His first man, but the man had baked too long. The outer skin had burned, and his color was dark, and thus was the black man created. God tried again, and again He fashioned a body, and again placed it in the oven. But this time He was overcautious, for the second man came out underdone. The skin was too pale, and this was the

first white man. A third time God tried, and now He was most careful, and the body stayed in the oven not too long, not too little. And when He had finished with the third man, God said, "At last have I done well; for here is a man neither black nor pale, but healthy and brown." And that is how the Malayan Filipino was created. ✓

When the earliest Malaysans came out of the oven, many thousands of years ago, they wandered to the Philippines—but whether by land or by sea no one can say, for they may have come even in the antique time when the islands were part of the mainland of Asia. These Malaysans were taller than Negritos, with sharp faces, eyes set closer together, hair straight and black, and evenly baked skins taut on their bodies. They built homes in the treetops, and cooked food in bamboo tubes, for they had no pots. They were huntsmen, fishermen, crude husbandmen. They pushed the little people back, farther and farther into the mountains, with an urgency known well to our American pioneers who pressed against the Indians.

Some of the invaders traveled north, to the great Cordillera Central, where, through the centuries, they built their terraced gardens on the slopes, catching rainwater and sluicing it by flume and ditch to the hillside fields, saving each drop on one terrace so that it might be used again on the next below. Today, in the Ifugao country, you can see hundreds of these terraces in a single valley, rising one above the other from lowland to heights. Tending them are the pagans, children of the earliest Malaysans. Elsewhere there are the Igorots of Benguet, who mine for gold; the Tingians of Abra, who raise cattle and coffee; the many pagans of Bontoc; and the Bukidnons, Bagobos, Mandayas, Manobos, and Subanums, who settled in Mindanao.

After the early arrivals came others with a culture more highly developed and an energy more aggressive. These were sailors who mastered the coasts and the lowlands, driving into the interior. They were shrewd operators; all of Panay, it is told, they bought from the Negritos for one handful of gold and a single long gold necklace.

These men were the ancestors of the civilized Filipino of to-

day. They had some concept of government, religion, culture. They wore clothes, lived in houses, had a written language, made a heady wine, and enjoyed music. They had brought with them some of the Hindu influences from India; and even now some Tagalog words come from the Sanskrit. But, though the culture of India had spread into Burma, Siam, and Java, it was not strong in the Philippines. There is no Angkor Vat hiding its magnificence in the jungles of Mindanao, nor any Bali-like dance rituals in the villages of Leyte. It took a more potent force to sweep into the islands and change the life of the people. On the white Arabian steed of fanaticism came the Mohammedan missionaries, bringing knowledge as well as faith, for in their time they were the world's greatest sailors, explorers, and merchants.

By 1250 the Malayans of Sumatra were converted and, like their Arab mentors, burst from their small world over the face of the Indies, pushed to the western coasts of Borneo, and on into Mindanao and Jolo. Even now the Moro chieftains of Magindanao claim, with some documentation, that they descend from Mohammed himself.

Mohammedanism was still traveling northward when the Spaniards came. It had a foothold on Manila Bay, but in this region only the nobles had embraced the faith, and they had not yet established any single large state to compare with those of the Moro Sultans of Sulu and Mindanao.

There were probably less than half a million people in the islands in Magellan's time. Many islands were virtually deserted, with only a random sail on the blue waters offshore, or a canoe slipping into a mangrove swamp. In the Visayas, there was a thriving community, and there were villages on Luzon in the north as in Mindanao to the south.

The people had reached the Age of Porcelain, with the help of Chinese traders who had taught them also the art of mining, the manufacture of firearms and tools, the use of iron, lead, gold, silver. They were literate to the point of amazing the early Spaniards, one of whom reported: "So given are these islanders to reading and writing that there is hardly a man, and

much less a woman, that does not read and write in letters peculiar to the island of Manila, very different from those of China, Japan, and of India. . . . They have learned from us to write running the lines from the left hand to the right, but formerly they only wrote from above downwards, placing the first line (if I remember rightly) at the left hand, and continuing with the others to the right, the opposite of the Chinese and Japanese. . . . They write upon canes or upon leaves of palm, using for a pen a point of iron." They wrote songs and poems, songs of their ancestors and of their gods, for those who rowed the canoes and those who pounded the rice from the husk, for feasting and entertainment and for the honor of the dead. These were the lovely *kundiman* songs, accompanied by the wooden xylophone, the Filipino lyre known as *kudyapi*, the bamboo violin, the pipes, the drums, and the gongs.

Their faith was primitive and simple. They worshiped, unless the Mohammedans had been at work, the spirits of their ancestors, and all the natural wonders of the world: the sun and moon and stars, the rainbow through which warriors who died in battle entered heaven, the mountains and cliffs and trees and rocks and fields. They worshiped crows and crocodiles, and a mythical bird that was yellow and blue in color; for to kill one of these meant the sure fury of the gods. They believed in the life after death, with never-ending happiness in heaven for the souls of the brave and the good, and unending suffering in hell for the souls of the evil. Their priests and priestesses were versed in the arts of sacrifice and prayer, in the magical healing of the sick, and sometimes in the second sight into the future.

They were a courteous people, their respect for elders so ingrained that it is still a marked trait of the modern Filipino. They were a clean people; they washed their hair and anointed it with perfumed oils; they cleaned their teeth every morning and after each meal; and the Spaniards noted that they "bathed themselves at all hours for cleanliness and recreation."

Their villages were ruled by hereditary *datos*, and there were three levels of society. The freemen, who could own land, paid

no tribute to the *dato*, but accompanied him to war, rowed his boat, attended him in his house. The liberated slaves owned their homes, lived with their own families, tended the *dato's* rice fields and fish traps, built his house, served him when guests came. The slaves were slaves, though they were treated with a measure of consideration. Some had been captured in battle. Some had sold their freedom in a time of hunger. Mostly, they were debt-slaves; a man might become a slave for a three-dollar debt. Whatever the reason for their enslavement, the condition was hereditary. They belonged, like the cattle, to the *dato*. If a slave married a freeman, his first, third and fifth children were free, and his second, fourth, and sixth were slaves.

These people had some knowledge of the outside world. They traded with merchants from many parts of the East. About the beginning of the thirteenth century, a Chinese scribe named Chao Ju-Kua wrote: "The country of Mayi [Philippines] is situated to the north of Poni [Borneo]. About a thousand families inhabit the banks of a very winding stream. The natives clothe themselves in sheets resembling bed sheets, or cover their bodies with sarongs. Scattered through the extensive forests are copper Buddha images, but no one knows how they got there. When the merchant ships arrive at this port they anchor in front of an open place . . . which serves as a market, where they trade in the produce of the country. When a ship enters this port, the captain makes presents of white umbrellas [to the *datos*]. The merchants are obliged to pay this tribute in order to obtain the good will of these lords." From the Filipinos they took yellow wax, cotton, pearls, shells, betel nuts, and cloth, in return for which they offered porcelain, gold, leaden objects, brightly colored glass beads, iron cooking pans, and iron needles.

Traders from Borneo brought copper and tin, which had been purchased in China, as well as porcelain, dishes, and bells made in the Chinese fashion. They brought colored blankets from India, tempered iron lances, and knives. And in exchange for these they took away gold, slaves, wax, and a kind of small sea shell known as *sijueyes*, which passed for money in Siam and elsewhere.

The islanders lived in simple bamboo and *nipa* huts, often raised on piles above the damp soil. Their food was mostly rice and fish. They had emerged, ever so slightly, from the savage stage, but their life was still ruled by the terrors, the superstitions, the rituals, and the diseases of savagery. Yet it is probably safe to say that the average village of the pre-Spanish Philippines was astonishingly like what one might find today in one of the less prosperous barrios in the more remote regions of the archipelago.

II

To the islanders, Magellan's little fleet of sailing ships could not have been a very impressive portent. The captain-general himself was a sour-minded Portuguese, ambitious for power and riches and fame. His crew was a polyglot collection of Spaniards and Portuguese, Basques and Frenchmen and Sicilians and Englishmen, Flemings, Greeks, Italians, Germans, islanders from Corfu and Madeira and the Canaries, Negroes and Malays. Their passage across the Pacific had been long and miserable; there had been mutiny and starvation; when they sighted the east coast of Samar in March, 1521, they must have been a ragged, scurvy-ridden, dehydrated crew, with eyes bright and feverish. They landed on an islet south of Samar, and for the first time Filipino met Spaniard. Little fishing boats, up from Suluan, were idling offshore, and one *prau*, manned by nine islanders, came to greet them. These people had little food to offer. But they were friendly folk, and they brought a few coconuts, some oranges, a taste of palm wine, a chicken or two. The Spanish ships moved on, slowly, toward Cebu.

In the harbor they found a junk from Siam. The town itself was large; more than 2,000 earnest warriors, armed with lances, were on hand to resist a landing. But Magellan did not want to fight. He made a compact of friendship with the dato, Humabon, and promptly celebrated mass. The solemnity and color of the service made a deep impression on the Cebuanos, who were soon attracted to the faith. More than eight hundred were baptized, including Humabon himself. The Spaniards were now

spiritually prepared to establish a trading post, and began a brief but profitable commerce with the Filipinos.

Humabon, the Christian king and vassal of Spain, happened to be at war with the people of Mactan. Magellan was eager to help his coreligionist, and attacked Mactan with fifty men. At first, apparently, he had hoped to frighten the enemy into surrender. But "when the natives saw that we were shooting our muskets to no purpose," wrote Pigafetti, historian of the expedition, "crying out, they determined to stand firm, but they redoubled their shouts. When our muskets were discharged, the natives would never stand still, but leaped hither and thither, covering themselves with their shields. They shot so many arrows at us and hurled so many bamboo spears (some of them tipped with iron) at the captain-general, besides pointed stakes hardened with fire, stones and mud, that we could scarcely defend ourselves. Seeing that, the captain-general sent some men to burn their houses to terrify them. When they saw their houses burning, they were roused to greater fury. Two of our men were killed near the houses, while we burned twenty or thirty houses. So many of them charged down upon us that they shot the captain through the right leg with a poisoned arrow.

"Thus," wailed Pigafetti, rather hypocritically, "perished our guide, our light, and our support." The Cebuanos, dissatisfied with their protectors, killed Magellan's successor as leader, and the Spanish fleet fled southward. More than a year later, what was left of Magellan's expedition returned to Spain, one ship out of five, and eighteen men out of 234. They had encircled the earth, opened great new markets and trade routes to an expanding Spain, and cracked the Portuguese stranglehold on the riches of the East. The age of world-wide trade had begun; and the age of colonialism.

The Filipinos, of course, were hardly aware of these implications. But all the signs of the future were here—in the conversion on Cebu, a sign of the Catholic mission; in the musketry and house-burning on Mactan, a foretaste of Occidental brutality; in the "greater fury" of the islanders, a symbol of the Filipino spirit of revolt.

Magellan's ships left the Philippines (without Magellan); but other ships would come from Spain, carrying other men eager to spread the faith or gain great wealth, or, if they could, do both.

For the next three and a half centuries, these men ruled the Philippines. After the early years of colonial expansion, in which gallant and rather foolish young *conquistadores* subdued the country for God and King, the islands settled down to Spanish rule. For the Filipinos, it was a long and bitter apprenticeship, which in its own way served as preparation for the experiment to come. Two great influences stood out: the governmental practices and the religion of Spain. Each has left its mark to this day.

III

Power, of course, rested safely in Spanish hands. There was conflict between the King's men and the Church's men, and in the conflict there were often charges and countercharges of injustice to the Filipinos, but inevitably it was a struggle within the framework of Spanish supremacy.

The governors sent from Spain, or, for many years, through the intermediate authority of the Viceroy of Mexico, were more often greedy than not. They reigned with princely pomp and ceremony. They waged wars, made treaties, issued edicts. Their power was limited only by the Royal Audiencia, a body of men of good family sent out to form a colonial court. They were also, in theory, limited by orders from Madrid. On paper, the edicts and laws issued from the throne for their guidance stand high in the record of early colonial law. Collected in the *Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias*, they represent a fine paternalistic concern for the needs of the colonial subjects; unfortunately they were generally ignored in the colonies.

Perhaps the most influential control over the Spanish governors was the Residencia. Each new governor established a court, or Residencia, to examine into the conduct of his predecessor. All complaints were aired here, and often an outgoing governor would wind up in chains. All of the subdued griev-

ances, the jealousies, the rivalries, would at last come into the open. Governor Corcuera, for example, had been a great ally of the Jesuits and had, in their behalf, subdued the Moros. When his term ended, the Franciscans, Augustinians, and Recollects presented a bill of grievances to his successor. Corcuera was accordingly sentenced to five years of imprisonment, and all his property was confiscated.

To too many Spaniards, the islands were nothing more than a great drawing account, founded on the system of the *encomienda*. To deserving Spaniards the King awarded not parcels of land, but parcels of people who were, despite the paper protection of the laws, no better than slaves. They could be sold from one *encomendero* to another, and forced to work in mine and forest under conditions which inevitably produced a chronic state of alternating rebelliousness and resignation.

The *encomienda* system was normally marked by cruelty and greed, occasionally lightened by the naïve efforts of a new Governor just out from Spain or Mexico and burning with reformist zeal. The historian Zuñiga tells of a typical effort, made by Governor Santiago de Vera, who arrived in the Philippines in 1584, a year after a series of bitter Filipino revolts:

"As soon as he had taken possession of the government, he studied to put into effect the orders which he brought from the King, to punish certain *encomenderos*, who had abused the favor they had received in being given *encomiendas*, whereby he deposed Bartolome de Ledesma, *encomendero* of Abuyo [Leyte], and others of those most culpable, and punished the others in proportion to the offenses which they had committed, and which had been proven. . . ." But justice came too late to satisfy the Filipinos. They revolted, and the new Governor put down the rebellion with a brutality equal to that of his predecessors. *

Three years later, Filipinos in Leyte again revolted. In 1589, Cagayan rose, and many Spaniards were killed. Everywhere, from the earliest days of Spanish rule, there was this undercurrent of unrest, of violence, of abortive revolt, of ruthless Spanish counteraction. In 1621, there was the Tamblot Rebel-

lion in Bohol, and Bancao's Rebellion in Leyte. In 1645, there was a rebellion against the tribute system in Pampanga.

For the Spaniards demanded a yearly tribute of eight reales, equal to about one American dollar, from the heads of all families, payable in gold or goods. Often the *encomenderos* would cheat in the weighing of goods; often, too, they would delay collections until seasonal scarcity increased the value of produce which they insisted on pricing as of harvest time. Salazar, a bishop intent on exposing the evils of lay rule, reported that many Filipinos were sold into slavery when they could not pay the tribute, and that this punishment was visited even on "infants, the aged and the slaves, and many do not marry because of the tribute, and others slay their children."

Salazar pointed out that petty Spanish officials grew wealthy on tiny salaries, and that prices had become inflated in his time until whole towns became deserted as the people fled into the hills. Thus, through the years, graft, corruption, maladministration, and injustice flourished.

Once, in 1717, a man came out to clean up the place. Governor Fernando Manuel de Bustamante, an old soldier, burning with honesty, found 700,000 pesos' worth of defalcation in the official treasury, and arrested the culprits. Nearly every Spaniard in Manila was involved in the scandal, and Bustamante found himself alone in his clean-up campaign. The friars opposed him, the Archbishop defied him, and Bustamante was forced to order the Archbishop's arrest. A lynch mob, led by the friars, marched on the palace, broke in, and killed the Governor in cold blood, on October 11, 1719. The Archbishop proclaimed himself Governor and President of the Audiencia; the grafters were released from jail; the murderers went free.

Late in the Spanish era, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, Spanish rule improved. Plans were worked out for better administration, economic development, social reforms, educational advancement. Too many of these plans were never put into effect. Those that did materialize came slowly, with great opposition from both layman and clergy who feared all innovation. Corruption continued until Spain was driven out of

the archipelago. But a public building program did get started, about 1860, and the villages sported new and handsome plazas, on which fronted the picturesque town halls, the jails, the tiny schoolhouses, and the churches. Newspapers were finally permitted to publish, though under careful censorship. In 1863, a system of public primary education was decreed from Madrid; it was a form of religious instruction, but it was better than nothing for the Filipinos. Actually, where the system was carried into practice, it benefited only the moneyed Filipinos. The fisherman's child, and the farmer's, remained illiterate. Nevertheless, between 1867 and 1877, the number of schools jumped from 593 to 1,608, and enrollment from 138,990 to 177,113.

A class of comfortably fixed Filipinos did develop under the Spaniards. It began, perhaps, in the early days, when the task of collecting tribute fell upon Filipinos—who were hated by their countrymen and treated contemptuously by their employers. In the last century of Spanish rule, when trade restrictions ended, some Filipinos managed to establish a toe-hold in commerce. They were the few in each town who could build spacious homes, purchase a few luxuries, and send their sons to school to learn Spanish. Of such families the early ideologists of Filipino revolt were born.

From Magellan's time to the advent of Dewey, Spain taught the Filipinos more than she ever intended. They acquired from her the Latin system of justice, in terms of law and the judiciary; they also acquired mastery of the shrewd rationalization, the complicated justification of any act they wish to defend.

From the Spanish era, too, the Filipinos learned to fear authority so greatly that today they tend to swing with the pendulum from outright revolt to supine submission. They tend also to pay strict attention to the outward forms of authority; the sharp word from the President, the trappings of a political star-system, the formalities of state occasions.

The Spanish era taught them little of stable administration in government, or of executive planning, for it had little to teach. It led them to expect of their leaders a certain tendency toward financial advancement in office, and to look with no more than

mild scandalization upon the occasional peculations of public officials. Official dishonesty, where it occurs, is not a peculiarly Filipino trait; on the contrary, it was learned the hard way from three and a half centuries of Spanish rule.

On the other hand, the Filipinos did learn to expect courage from their leaders, and the leaders have in general lived up to this expectation. The people, by and large, have a national tradition for almost foolhardy bravery in a crisis. They respected the Spaniards for this trait, too; for it is a fallacy to assume that a man who is corrupt must also be craven. Whatever else may be said of the Spaniards, they were not cowards; since the golden days of Legaspi, they may have been greedy, shortsighted, arrogant, stupid, but they were not cowards..

IV

Andres de Urdaneta, erstwhile soldier and navigator, was the spiritual guide of the Legaspi expedition, the first to succeed in colonizing the Philippines. Urdaneta, an Augustinian friar burning with religious ardor, had been instructed "to unfurl and wave the banners of Christ, even to the remotest portions of the islands, and to drive the devil from the tyrannical possession, which he had held for so many ages, usurping to himself the adoration of those peoples."

For him and for those who were to follow him, the mission was rather easy. The primitive superstitions of the Filipinos had already been shaken by the winds of Islam. Here was a new faith backed up by boundless energy (as well as by force). The islanders made willing converts. Indeed, the churchmen were to find as much difficulty with their fellow-Spaniards, the civil rulers of the islands, as with the Filipinos. And troubles with the Filipinos were most often of the friars' own making. Back to Spain went the report: "There is not in these islands a province which resists conversion and does not desire it."

The Augustinians came first. In 1577, the Franciscans arrived. The Jesuits came with their protector, Bishop Salazar. (The Jesuits were, incidentally, penniless. Their robes had rotted on

the voyage from Mexico. They settled in a miserable little house near Manila. "So poorly furnished was it," says Chirino, "that the same chest which held their books was the table on which they ate. Their food for many days was rice, cooked in water, without salt or oil or fish or meat or even an egg, or anything else except that sometimes as a *regalo* they enjoyed some salt sardines.") The Dominicans came in 1587, and in 1606 the Recolects, or unshod Augustinians.

The friars swarmed over the islands, preaching and baptizing. They set up a few schools for boys, and in 1601 the Jesuits founded the College of San José. Santo Tomas, which continues to this day (it was used as an internment camp by the Japanese in World War II), was founded by the Dominicans in 1619 as a citadel of medieval orthodoxy. But education—certainly all higher education—was for Spanish pupils only.

The churchmen did not oppose the principle of separation of Church and State; they simply did not understand the concept. They were the progeny of the Inquisition. All was faith, or it was heresy. As they spread through the islands, they quickly took control of village life. *Encomenderos* might wax fat on slave labor, but the Church waxed even richer on its control of the minds and spirits of the simple people it had converted. Inevitably there was Filipino resistance to this new and insistent domination. On Bohol, in 1621, the islanders revolted against the Jesuits. The local friars had gone off to Cebu to take part in the fiestas celebrating the canonization of St. Francis Xavier. Quickly the rumor spread among the Filipinos that the old heathen god Diwata had come back to throw the Spaniards out. The islanders went wild, burned four towns, sacked the churches, speared the sacred images. The rebellion spread to Leyte, and would have spread further had not the Spaniards taken swift action. After the fighting ended, one of the heathen priests was tried under the rules of the Inquisition; he was, of course, burned to death.

Bohol was always a center of resistance to the Jesuits. Throughout the eighteenth century, it was worth a Jesuit's life to travel across the island. Not until the order was expelled from

all Spanish dominions, and the Recollects came to Bohol, were the Spaniards able to reclaim the island. (The Jesuits were always a political order, and in the brief period of English rule, after the English fleet took Manila in 1762, they were even accused of conspiring with the enemy. The plain truth was that they recognized no national distinctions at a time when nationalism was on the rise. All over Europe, in Portugal and France and Italy as well as in Spain, they were driven out; and the Society was suppressed by Pope Clement XIV in 1773. It was not restored until 1814. At the time of their expulsion from the Philippines, the Jesuits ran seven colleges, were the administrative rulers, at least on paper, of Bohol, Samar, and Leyte, and owned 1,320,000 pesos' worth of property. They were accused of commercialism, neglect of their spiritual duties, oppression of the Filipinos, opposition to the teaching of Spanish, and interference with the civil authorities.)

In the villages, the friars were supreme. They had built their great churches, their monasteries, and around these grew up the markets and trading shops of the Chinese and Filipinos. No matter was too trivial for the parish priest. No civil official dared oppose him. He controlled whatever public instruction was available, always alert to crush any liberal tendencies. He was indeed the real representative of Spanish power in the eyes of the villagers. It was said that in each friar the King had a captain-general and a whole army.

Though he was a member of an international religious order, the friar was always a Spaniard; and he had inherited the Spanish tradition of arrogance toward the subject race. No matter how devout a Christian he might be, no Filipino could possibly rise within the hierarchy of the Church. He was a second-class citizen with a second-class soul.

One day, about a hundred years ago, a young Filipino named Apolinario de la Cruz came down to Manila from Tayabas. He was a devout Catholic, eager for the monastic life, and he studied theology as best he could. He listened to so many sermons that he became an impassioned orator himself. He hoped to join one of the monastic orders, but because he was a Filipino he was

rejected. Instead he joined a religious order of Filipinos, called the Cofradia of San Juan de Dios, and eventually returned to his native province to establish his own order, the Cofradia of San José. The friars in Manila became alarmed, for his eloquence had brought him a large following, and his mind was independent. Convinced that latent Filipino leadership must be quickly suppressed in the interest of Spanish rule, they forbade him to establish the Cofradia and obtained an order that any Filipino who listened to his sermons would be jailed. Apolinario and his followers revolted. The Governor of Tayabas, accompanied by two Franciscans, led an attacking force against him in October, 1840, but they were badly beaten. Apolinario built a fortress and a chapel near Aliteo, established a new church, was elected Archbishop and later Supreme Pontiff, and awaited the Spaniards. This time they came in greater force, and after a bitter fight captured the young rebel. Apolinario was executed at the age of twenty-seven.

Though the young man had perhaps gone further than most Filipino rebel leaders during the Spanish era, his actions were typical of the whole spirit of Filipino revolt. In nearly all the sporadic uprisings which mark Philippine history, there seemed to be a reasonable willingness to come to terms with the Spaniards, to make progress within the Spanish framework. And, in each case, there was nothing but arrogant rebuff from the Spanish side. At that point, inevitably, Filipino patience would give out and rebellion begin.

As the years passed, resentment crystallized even more against the friars than against the civil government. In the late 1860's, a revolution in Spain had deposed Queen Isabella II and established a short-lived liberal government. General de la Torre, an honest democrat, was sent to Manila as Governor. He carried his convictions to their logical conclusions: he suspended the petty palace pomp and ceremony; he dismissed the traditional escort of halberdiers; he rode through town in civilian clothes. He tried to practice the theory of Spanish colonial law—that Spaniard and Filipino were equals. The Filipinos were delighted. The Spaniards were hardly so; and the friars were particularly

shocked, for they saw in this the seeds of heresy. La Torre's term was filled with trouble. He was not, like Bustamante, killed, but he was opposed at every step of his difficult way. His attempt at democratic reform ended when the liberal regime collapsed in Madrid.

But his administration had pointed up the reactionary influence of the friars. Filipino resentment was sublimated into a bitter anti-friar movement. A loose political organization developed, demanding that the Spanish friars be forced out of the parishes, to be replaced by Filipino priests (seculars). The organization was headed by two Filipino secular priests, Burgos and Gomez. After the monarchy was restored in Madrid, a strong effort was made to stem the tide of anti-friar feeling, but it was too late. The movement grew. It was a vague, talkative movement, demanding reform rather than revolt. But the Spanish authorities were frightened.

It happened that, in 1872, several hundred Filipinos serving as soldiers in the Cavite arsenal rebelled against their Spanish officers. They killed several Spaniards and shouted "Death to Spain!" A simultaneous revolt was to have taken place in Manila, but the plan had not been worked out carefully enough. The Spaniards seized on the mutiny to arrest all suspect Filipinos, including Fathers Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora. A Council of War condemned forty-one of the Cavite mutineers, who were shot on the Field of Bagumbayan on January 27, 1872. A few days later, the three priests were condemned to death on the garrote, a Spanish mode of execution by strangulation, in which an iron collar is tightened by a screw until the victim dies. The Filipino priests were thus murdered on February 27, 1872.

If any date can be set for so overwhelming a movement, this was the date when the Filipino struggle for freedom really began. It is significant that it had strong religious overtones.

But it would be dishonest to deny that the Church has made many solid and beneficent contributions to the Filipino people. It gave them not only a faith but also a code of ethics. It gave them a sense of community loyalty, built around the village church, and larger than the pre-Spanish family loyalty. It gave

them useful guidance in farming, in irrigation ideas, in architecture. But, most of all, it gave them a link with the West that no other Oriental nation enjoys. The Filipinos of today, like the Europeans and the Americans, think in the Judaeo-Christian idiom. This is one of the most potent factors in the Philippine experiment. It has made it possible for the people of the Philippines to absorb the Western concept of democracy and human dignity, and adapt it to their own traditions. If the friars failed during the time of their supremacy, it was the fault of the men and not of the faith they preached.

v

Before the Spaniards arrived, trading vessels from Luzon wove a network of commercial routes to the coastal towns of Mindoro, Cebu, and Mindanao. With the northeast monsoon came merchantmen from China and Japan, eager for barter. In other seasons, the changing winds brought vessels from the Moluccas, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and even from India, Siam, and Cambodia.

The Spaniards were delighted with the prosperous commerce they found, and promptly determined to monopolize it. Their greatest rivals were the Portuguese, for the discovery of the Philippines touched off a century of competition which wound up, ultimately, in a victory for the seafaring English who had agreed on no lines of demarcation with anyone. For a time, however, the two Iberian kingdoms had reached the point of splitting the world between them, with papal blessing and with a suspicious eye on each other's activities. Though the maps of the Western Hemisphere had been detailed enough to permit the Portuguese to take Brazil while all the rest of the Americas went to Spain, the Eastern half of the world was not so well known. Magellan had discovered the Philippines and, with it, a new route to the fabulous morsel known as the Spice Islands. And for years the two countries argued as to exactly where the dividing line ran.

There were others who coveted the archipelago, too. In 1574

a Chinese pirate named Limahong attacked Manila with sixty-two war junks, four thousand soldiers and sailors, and even women and artisans to begin the work of colonization at once. After desperate fighting, he was finally beaten off. Since the Spaniards wanted no repetition of this kind of danger, they sent two Augustinian friars to China to begin the work of conversion. Unlike the Filipinos, the Chinese promptly sent the friars back.

In the early years, the Spaniards looked upon their colony as little more than a staging area for further conquest. Their eyes were on the coasts of Siam and Cambodia, on the island of Formosa and the four great islands of Japan to the north, and on China itself.

Unconsciously they had recognized that the geographical position of their colonial archipelago had many strategic advantages, economic as well as military (for the two are normally complementary). By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Manila had surely become the most influential European city in the Far East. Spain had won out over Portugal, and had taken over her possessions in India, China, and the Indies; and of these, Manila was in effect the capital city. The Dutch had hardly entered the scene, and Portugal was not to win back her independence until 1640. From Manila the strands of empire reached from Goa, in India, to the mountains of Formosa.

"All that lies between Cape Singapore and Japan is subject to Luzon," wrote a contemporary historian. "Their ships cross the ocean to China and New Spain, and drive so magnificent a trade that, if it were only free, it would be the most extraordinary that the world could show. It is incredible what glory these islands confer upon Spain. The Governor of the Philippines treats with the Kings of Cambodia, Japan, China. The first is his ally, the last his friend; and the same with Japan. He declares war or peace, without waiting for the command from distant Spain."

In Manila Bay were the heavy-laden junks from China, carrying silks and brocades, furniture, pearls and gems, fruits, nuts, tame buffalo, geese, horses and mules, and all kinds of exotic

merchandise, "even to birds in cages, some of which talk and others sing, and which they make perform a thousand tricks; there are countless other gewgaws and knickknacks, which among Spaniards are in much esteem."

Each year, a fleet of cargo vessels, clinking with Mexican silver, braved the monsoons of the China Sea, returning from the mainland late in May. Later in the year came the Japanese ships from Nagasaki, heavy with wheat, silks, objects of art, and weapons. From Malacca and India came the Portuguese traders, with heady spices, and bewildered Negroes and Kaffirs to be sold as slaves, and all the produce of Bengal, India, Persia, and even Turkey. There were the Malayans from Borneo to offer their fine palm mattings, sago, slaves, glazed black earthenware.

The Chinese, impelled by the recurrent hardships and troubles of their homeland, and by their highly developed sense of commerce, flocked here. Chirino reported, "From China come those who supply every sort of service, all dextrous, prompt and cheap, from physicians and barbers to burden-bearers and porters. They are the tailors and shoemakers, metal-workers, silversmiths, sculptors, locksmiths, painters, masons, weavers, and finally every kind of servitors in the commonwealth." They were immediately resented by the Spanish, and there was constant bloodshed. In 1603, a wave of unrest resulted in the massacre of thousands of Chinese in Manila, and from then on there were restrictions on Chinese immigration and travel.

But even this was an inevitable part of the picture of Manila in its early heyday. For here was a sign of what might have been, if the Philippines had been permitted to develop into its normal geopolitical role in the Eastern world.

Instead, the trade restrictions came. The merchants of Cádiz and Seville feared that Oriental goods would flood the American markets and ruin Spain's export trade, and that a large flow of Mexican silver to the Orient for Oriental goods would mean less silver flowing to Spain for Spanish goods. Meantime, the Spanish Armada had met disaster at the hands of the English and, although she did not quite realize it yet, Spain's naval power

was gone. The English and the Dutch had come into their own. By 1595, the Dutch were in Java, and soon afterward the merchants of Amsterdam defeated a combined Spanish and Portuguese fleet to secure themselves in the Indies.

By now Spain was beginning to impose heavy limitations on Manila's trade. Filipinos were not allowed to leave their villages without permission of the Spanish authorities. The Spanish overlords insisted on high import duties and repressive inspections. Commerce was prohibited with all Western countries except Mexico, and even this could run only between Manila and Acapulco. Two vessels, operated at the expense of the Crown, were allowed to sail each year; later the number was reduced to one. The value of their cargo, each way, was strictly limited (though the Manila exporters were not above falsifying their shipping invoices). And even these commercial privileges were limited to the Spanish Governor-General, the friars, and a few other favored persons.

And so the slow, stately, heavy-laden, near-legendary galleons plowed across the Pacific each year, floating treasure houses piled high with Chinese porcelains, cottons, and silkstuffs from India and China, gold ornaments and silk stockings of the sheerest texture. The Manila galleon was, in truth, a symbol of the riches cut off from the rest of the world by Spanish cupidity.

To the freebooters of the open sea, it was an invitation to plunder. Thomas Cavendish, on his piratical way around the world, swooped upon the lumbering "Great St. Anne" off the southern tip of California, on November 14, 1587. The galleon mounted at least fifty or sixty guns, but, according to a bitter Spanish report, "our people sailed so carelessly that they used their guns for ballast." Cavendish found a rich cargo—122,000 pesos of gold and a great store of satins, damask, and musk. But his own vessel was already packed with plunder, and he was forced to burn the "Great St. Anne." Nevertheless, when he returned to Plymouth a year later, it is written that his sailors were clothed in silk, his sails were damask, and his topmast covered with cloth of gold.

Thus, the merchants in Spain, the rising power of England

and the Netherlands, and the shortsightedness of the Spaniards in the Philippines, were combining to suffocate the development of the archipelago. The final blow came from another side. There was a man named Koxinga, son of a Chinese pirate-politician and a Japanese mother. His father commanded a pirate fleet of more than 3,000 vessels, plying out of Formosa to prey on the traders in the South China Sea. When his father died, Koxinga took command of the fleet and tried to restore the Ming dynasty to China. His forces overran Fukien, Shansi, and Kwangtung, and he fought the Tartar fleet. But in the end the tide turned against him, and in 1661 he set sail for Formosa, with several hundred ships and 25,000 sailors. They besieged the Dutch fortress there for a year, and finally won control of the whole island. Koxinga proclaimed himself King of Formosa, and took the daughter of a Dutch missionary as a bride in his harem. From then on, his reign was one of peace, progress, and marked good sense. He encouraged agriculture, maintained a clean government, and tried to improve the lot of the peasants.

In the spring of 1662, he sent an Italian Dominican named Ricci to Manila to inform the Spaniards that he would attack if he was not paid tribute. Manila was in panic, for the fame and military prowess of Koxinga were well known. The Governor, Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, wrote a defiant reply and set to work on his defenses. All Chinese were ordered out of the city; afraid of massacre, they rebelled and were in the main massacred. All stone buildings on the outskirts of Manila were destroyed, for they might be used by the invaders during the siege. Spanish forces from all over the Orient were ordered back to Manila; the Spice Islands were abandoned; so were the presidios of Zamboanga and Cuyo. Manila's fortifications were rebuilt. Everything possible had been done. The enemy was awaited. But there was no attack. By the time Ricci had returned to Formosa, the amazing King Koxinga had died.

There was no attack, but the power of Spain had received a mortal wound. Manila was no longer the queen of the Orient. The China trade was ruined. Many of the outlying possessions—the Spice Islands among them—were never to be reoccupied. The

sovereignty of Spain was limited to Luzon and the Visayan Islands.

Manila had passed its zenith. Even the predatory English, who occupied it for a few months in the 1760's, put up no great argument to retain the colony when the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1763. The restrictions, combined with the decay of Spain as a world power, had long since done their work.

In 1765 Spain and Portugal agreed at last to recognize that it was not possible, despite the Pope's benediction, to divide the world between them. Spanish ships were now permitted to sail to Manila around the Cape of Good Hope. In a desultory burst of energy, a Royal Company was established, and there were many in Madrid who hoped it would rival the richly successful East India companies of the English and the Dutch. Part of the profits were to go to develop Philippine products, and in fact the new exports of indigo, tobacco, and sugar did begin at this time. But the spark of Spanish commercial energy did not burst into flame. The Royal Company never fulfilled the hopes of those who founded it, despite its monopoly of the Good Hope route. Even cutting the Mexican route, after the revolt against Spain, was no help. The last Acapulco galleon sailed to Manila in 1815. But the centuries of restrictions had done their work. Finally, in 1834, Manila was thrown open to foreign commerce, and the Royal Company petered out entirely.

As for the Filipinos themselves, they were not greatly affected by these vast historic changes. When Manila flourished, they did not benefit. They were the subject race, who received no share of the profits. They were the tillers of the soil, the builders of the ships, the carriers of the burdens, the impressed soldiery, the victims of oppression and disease and disaster.

To them Spain meant a petty despot who treated them like beasts. Dean C. Worcester, an American professor who visited the archipelago in 1887 (and who later served on the Philippine Commission), described a typical Spaniard in the province of Iloilo:

"The *commandante* at Concepcion was a believer in the famous policy of 'reconcentration.' It facilitated the collection

of taxes if taxpayers lived where they could readily be reached; so he ordered all the natives to take up their abode in the towns and villages, no matter how much it might inconvenience them. One of his favorite forms of amusement, as we learned from his own lips, was to ride about the country and fire the houses of those who failed to heed his admonitions. We one day saw him burn three native huts. He gave the inmates no warning, but in each case jumped from his horse, pulled a bunch of dry grass, lighted it and thrust it into the thatch, which burned like tinder. Those within jumped from doors and windows in their haste to escape. When a house was completely burned, he very courteously suggested that it might be well for its occupants to look for a site in town when ready to rebuild."

Where, in their ill-fortune, could these people turn? Some could look to the Church for solace, and some could wait obsequiously upon the Spanish masters in the hope of an additional grain of rice or moment of compassion. But most could do little more than survive, while underneath there smoldered the dangerous spark of repressed violence, the spirit of revolt that was so hard to restrain.

IV

THE AGE OF REVOLT

THE SPIRIT that had smoldered for so long burst into the open with the Spanish excesses of the 1870's—of which the execution of the three Filipino priests was the most dramatically stupid example, though by no means the only one.

In a more profound sense, the spirit of revolt had merely been touched off by these events. It was bound to come, as an inevitable result of the gradual economic resuscitation of the Philippines.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had not restored the islands to their early commercial splendor. But it did cut the steaming time from Manila to Barcelona down to thirty-two days, against the sailing time of from four to eight months around the Cape of Good Hope. It came at a moment when foreign traders were establishing themselves firmly in the Philippines.

By 1842 there were twelve foreign firms in Manila, of which eight were English, two American, one French, and one Danish. In 1782, only 30,000 piculs of sugar had been exported; in 1840 sugar exports had risen to almost 150,000 piculs; by 1857 it was more than 700,000. (In the Philippines a picul is roughly equiv-

alent to 140 pounds.) In 1830 less than 350 tons of hemp were exported; by 1858 hemp exports totaled more than 27,000 tons.

Foreign traders were bringing new energy, introducing farm machinery, advancing money to planters on their crops, helping develop new areas for cultivation. In 1856 Iloilo was opened to foreign trade; it was destined to become one of the world's great sugar ports. About this time, too, the first steam sugar-mill was set up in Negros.

Meanwhile, the character of the Spanish population itself was changing. Before the Canal, there were few Spanish civilians in the Philippines—several merchants; an occasional planter, often a descendant of the early *encomenderos*; and a few retired army officers. The Spanish troops were composed largely of Mexicans and Filipinos. Civil officials were sparse; in some provinces the only Spaniard was the provincial governor himself. Only the religious orders were comparatively numerous—and certainly influential.

The rather untrustworthy figures show that in 1848 there were altogether 293 Spaniards outside the Manila area, with 7,544 Spanish *mestizos* in the entire archipelago, including Tondo (as Manila province was called). This was indeed a tiny group to be entrusted with the task of ruling so large a country, and perhaps an excuse for Spanish arrogance can be found here. Only the bully can dominate a restless playground.

But now the Spanish population began to increase. Spain had lost most of her American possessions, and was soon to lose the rest. Colonial administrators were going jobless for want of colonies to administer, and they were often shipped to the Philippines by the harassed ministers in Madrid.

Thus, by 1870, there were said to be 3,823 Spanish-born Spaniards in the Philippines, of whom 516 were women; and 9,710 "Filipino-Spaniards," presumably including both Spanish *mestizos* and pure Spaniards born in the Philippines. A statistical résumé for 1898 raises the figure to 34,000—which is no doubt something of an exaggeration.

To the Filipinos it seemed as though Madrid was deliberately burdening the land. Shiploads of complaining carpetbaggers

arrived to criticize the climate as they assumed their miserably paid jobs. These minor officials exploited every opportunity to cheat the Filipinos, to exact graft in order to accumulate enough money to retire in comfort.

Meantime the administrative reforms were making difficulties. Many of these reforms were wise and useful; the tobacco monopoly was abolished, for example, and the provincial governments reorganized. But each new reform, however progressive, meant more taxes for the Filipinos and more Spanish office-holders to handle the work.

The burden fell most heavily on the *tao*, on the impoverished men and women on the land. But it was felt most keenly by a new and growing group of better-educated, wealthier people. The Spaniards had never been keen farmers, and as the generations passed they let the land slip into the hands of Filipinos, some of whom had by now acquired much wealth. To the irritation of the friars, they often managed to send their sons to the universities, and even to Europe for the higher studies. There were men who had gone to work in the offices of the foreign traders, and had learned the new ways of business. There were a few who managed to raise enough money to go into business for themselves, or to plant sugar or tobacco.

In many cases, these families were *mestizos*, part-Filipino and part-Spanish, sometimes with a Chinese strain as well. The full-blooded Spaniards tended to look down on their half-brothers, and many *mestizos* began to resent their lesser status. Occasionally, even island-born "pure" Spaniards identified themselves with this resentment.

By and large, the Filipino spirit of revolt was inflamed by such men as these—by what, for want of a better term, might be called the colonial middle class of the Philippines. This was the class that produced the Rizals and Aguinaldos, the Quezons and Osmeñas—as it had produced the three garroted priests, one of whom was a Spanish *mestizo* and another a Chinese *mestizo*. The peasants' role was to listen, to be inspired, to follow, and to fight. It was the common pattern of nationalism in colonial areas—not greatly different, indeed, from the revolt of the Bos-

ton merchants and Virginia planters against the arrogant, oppressive British a century before.

Feodor Jagor, a German scientist who traveled in the Philippines just before 1860, could even then see what was bound to happen. "The old situation is no longer possible of maintenance, with the changed conditions of the present time," he wrote. "The colony can no longer be shut off from the outside. Every facility in communication opens a breach in the ancient system and necessarily leads to reforms of a liberal character. The more that foreign capital and foreign ideas penetrate there, the more they increase prosperity, intelligence, and self-esteem, making the existing evils the more intolerable. . . .

"Government monopolies mercilessly administered, grievous disregard of the creoles and the rich *mestizos*, and the example of the United States, these were the principal causes of the loss of the American possessions [of Spain]; and the same causes are menacing the Philippines also. . . . *Mestizos* and creoles are not, it is true, shut out, as formerly in America, from all offices; but they feel that they are deeply injured and despoiled by the crowds of office-seekers whom the frequent changes of ministers at Madrid bring to Manila."

II

"The sleep had lasted for centuries," José Rizal was writing, "but one day the thunderbolt struck, and in striking, infused life. Since then new tendencies are stirring our spirits; and these tendencies, today scattered, will some day be united, guided by the God Who has not failed other peoples, and Who will not fail us, for His cause is the cause of liberty!"

José Rizal, more than any other man the symbol of the new tendencies in the Philippines, was one of the giants of the nineteenth century.

In a brief life he achieved recognition as a poet and physician, as an anthropologist, linguist, biologist, zoologist, engineer, and economist. He was also something of a sculptor, painter, and illustrator. Above all, he was a Filipino patriot.

Rizal was born in Calamba, near Manila, on June 19, 1861. His family was predominantly Filipino, though there were strains of Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish blood in his forebears. His parents were wealthy enough to send him to a Jesuit school, and later, for four years, to the University of Santo Tomas. From there he went to Spain. In Madrid, as a student, he began work on a novel that would expose the cruelties of Spanish rule in the Philippines. Moving from one university to another, in Paris, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Berlin, he kept adding to the manuscript, until at last, when he was twenty-six years old, the 200,000-word novel called *Noli Me Tangere* was published in Berlin.

Noli Me Tangere was a sermon in the form of a story. It bears an inevitable comparison with Mrs. Stowe's earlier book, which had done so much to inflame the abolitionist cause; and it is likely that Rizal had been influenced by *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Like Mrs. Stowe's novel, *Noli Me Tangere* is rather difficult reading today; it is not a literary masterpiece, but rather a great political document.

The book was smuggled into Manila, where literate Filipinos read it aloud to secret groups of the less educated, thrilling at its scenes of tyrannical Spanish friars, brutal officials, and arrogant men of wealth. They were less inspired by Rizal's attempt to show the Filipino some of his own defects. The Spanish censorship denounced it as seditious and anti-Catholic, and threatened to punish any Filipino caught with a copy. But it was like trying to stop the tropical typhoon.

Overnight Rizal was a hero to his countrymen. Here was a man who, in his twenties, had caught the voiceless emotions of his people and given them words—who had proven to the world that a Filipino could be as cultured and gifted, by Europe's own standards, as any Occidental. Rizal was still in Europe, moving from Vienna to Dresden and then to Rome, but now came news that his mother was rapidly growing blind. Her failing eyesight, when he was a boy, had impelled him to specialize in the treatment of the eye, and he came home to perform the delicate operation that restored her sight.

The Spaniards were fearful of Rizal, for his presence was like yeast in the dough of discontent. In 1888, they ordered his deportation. He went to Hong Kong and Macao, and then to Japan, where he mastered the language in a month (an incredible feat, as any who have tried to learn Japanese will agree). From Yokohama he sailed for San Francisco, and spent some time in the United States before moving on to London. At the British Museum he found Antonio de Morga's book, written in 1607, about the condition of Filipino civilization when the Spaniards first arrived. Rizal republished the work, pointing out that matters had not been greatly improved by three centuries of Spanish rule. In London, too, he wrote *El Filibusterismo*, in which, more plainly than before, he preached the need for progress from among the masses rather than a mere shifting of power to a Filipino élite.

Basically, Rizal was too intelligent to be a fiery revolutionist. He believed that freedom could be found within a Spanish framework, if Filipinos were truly treated as equals. He dreamed of his countrymen's regeneration, assuming, as they matured, an ever greater sense of responsibility. In *El Filibusterismo*, the old Filipino priest expressed Rizal's philosophy:

"We owe the ill that afflicts us to ourselves; let us not put the blame on anyone else. If Spain saw that we were less complaisant in the face of tyranny, and readier to strive and suffer for our rights, Spain would be the first to give us liberty. . . . But so long as the Filipino people has not sufficient vigor to proclaim, with erect front and bared breast, its right to the social life and to make that right good by sacrifice, with its own blood; so long as we see that our countrymen, though hearing in their private life the voice of shame and the clamors of conscience, yet in public life hold their place or join the chorus about him who commits abuses and ridicules the victim of the abuse; so long as we see them shut themselves up to their own egotism and praise with forced smile the most iniquitous acts, while their eyes are begging a part of the booty of such acts, why should liberty be given to them? With Spain or without Spain, they would always be the same, and perhaps, perhaps,

they would be worse. Of what use would be independence if the slaves of today would be the tyrants of tomorrow? And they would be so without doubt, for he loves tyranny who submits to it."

In 1892, Rizal was allowed to come back to the islands. He founded the *Liga Filipina*, whose aims were moderate indeed: union of the archipelago into a compact, vigorous, and homogeneous body; mutual protection in all cases of pressing necessity; defense against violence and injustice; encouragement of education, commerce, and agriculture; and study of such reforms as were vitally needed.

On this program, Rizal toured the provinces, talking to the educated and wealthy Filipinos. The Spaniards retaliated by searching the houses of his friends, and finally by clapping Rizal into the dungeons of Fort Santiago. Later they exiled him to the little town of Dapitan on the northwest coast of Mindanao. They accused him of having attacked, "directly or indirectly, the Catholic religion or the national unity"—and, in truth, there was a Masonic, anticlerical flavor to nearly all Filipino nationalist writing in those days.

The *Liga* was composed mostly of intellectuals. It did not satisfy the more ardent and revolutionary spirits, especially as the Spanish counteraction became increasingly harsh. To Andres Bonifacio, the Sam Adams of the Philippine Revolution, it smacked of compromise and vacillation, and Bonifacio soon created a new and more radical organization to appeal to all Filipinos, whether educated or not. This was the notorious *Katipunan*, and it was to play a crucial role in the rapid unfolding of revolutionary action.

Rizal, at Dapitan, still hoped for reform rather than revolt. He was in the ever difficult position of the liberal who places his faith in reason when the times are charged with emotion. He built a school in a picturesque spot near the town, and undertook the education of fourteen disciples. In July, 1896, a *Katipunan* leader named Pio Valenzuela came secretly to report that an uprising was in the making. Rizal said the plan was absurd and refused to accept revolutionary leadership, even though his

visitor pointed out that the Spaniards would implicate him anyway. Rizal commented that if anything should happen to him he would be able to prove his innocence. But, he said, "do not consider me, but our country, which is the one that will suffer." He insisted that the time was not ripe for adventures in revolt, because no unity existed among the Filipinos. He pointed out that there were neither arms nor ships nor trained fighting men. In Cuba, he said, where the insurgent resources were great, and where the people enjoyed the moral support of the United States, there had been failure after failure. He was certain that Spain would finally make concessions in the Philippines; he thought it best to wait.

A few months later, Rizal volunteered to serve as a physician in the Spanish Army in Cuba, where insurrection had broken into the open, and the Spaniards assured him safe passage for reasons of their own. He boarded the "España" in Manila Bay, and Katipunan leaders again visited him secretly, offering to free him by force of arms. Rizal insisted that he knew very well what he was doing, and that he did not approve of their actions. It was enough to convince the Katipunan leaders that their distrust of intellectuals was well-founded.

Rizal could have escaped from the Spaniards when his ship touched at Singapore, but again he chose to go on. However, despite the official promises of safety, the worried Spaniards decided to take him off the steamer in Singapore, and he was brought back to Manila.

The fever of revolt was high, and already there were signs of impending bloodshed. In the central provinces, rebels had clashed with Spanish forces. To the Spaniards, it seemed that terror was the only way to hold down the lid. In September of 1896, the government launched a policy of retribution. Suspects were imprisoned, tortured, put to death. Homes were raided daily, property confiscated. But these actions only stiffened the Filipinos; even the waverers were now convinced that compromise was impossible. There was fighting in Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Batangas, Laguna. By October, more than five hundred

Filipinos were in prison, and Fort Santiago was so overcrowded that on a single day fifty-six prisoners died of asphyxiation.

The Spaniards had lost their heads completely. Those who had striven for moderation were replaced by men whose only faith was force. Governor Polavieja took office on December 13, 1896, announcing that, "for the traitors, no punishment seems to me adequate and commensurate with the magnitude of the crime they committed against their king and country." He launched a new series of wholesale executions, with a permanent court-martial handing down sentences almost daily.

Into this atmosphere, in November, Rizal was returned to Manila to be tried secretly. The Spaniards reasoned that, with Rizal out of the way, the revolutionary movement would slacken. The prosecution argued that his novel, *Noli Me Tangere* (which had appeared in 1887), had reminded the people of their wrongs and caused them, nine years later, to take up arms against Spain; Rizal was the true instigator of the rebellion and therefore a traitor. During the whole trial, Rizal sat with his arms lashed together behind his back. But he was not tortured, though his brother Paciano had been subjected to the exquisitely modern refinement of an electric thumbscrew in the vain effort to force a confession that would implicate José.

There was no question as to what the verdict would be; Rizal was sentenced to death before a firing squad. But, even on the eve of execution, he was all intellect. He spent his last night writing a poem of farewell:

"I die just when I see the dawn break
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day."

And one hour before his death, Rizal wrote a last note to his brother. "I assure you, brother, that I die innocent of this crime of rebellion. That my earlier writings may have done something toward bringing it about, I would not entirely deny; but since then, I believe I have expiated the fault through my deportation . . ."

Early on the morning of December 30, 1896, Rizal was led to the place of execution. A Spanish physician took his pulse; it

was normal. He asked permission to face his executioners with no bandage on his eyes. The request was denied. He was shot in the back. But even with the bullets in his body Rizal managed to twist and fall face upward, in a last gesture of integrity.

III

Today the anniversary of Rizal's death is a national holiday in the Philippines. It is not so much a day of mourning, but rather a tribute of recognition to a great Filipino who, by his martyrdom, exploded the fury of his people into rebellion.

It was the final item on the unpaid bill of Filipino grievances—the civil, military, and religious abuses; the greed and corruption of the public officials; the exorbitant taxes collected by the friars; the property confiscations that swelled the rich estates; the Spanish contempt for Filipinos, and their persecution of intellectuals; the injustice of the courts; and the sickly, pervading smell of oppression.

The list was long and unanswerable. To a people who had suffered through centuries of suppression, and who were now learning a new self-esteem through the eyes of its Rizals, it was a list bound to foster extreme nationalism. Writers exaggerated the cultural glory of the pre-Spanish Tagalogs, called for unity with other Orientals against the wickedness of the Occident. Only the radicals felt themselves akin to the white Westerners, for they were friendly to the ultrademocratic Republicans in Spain itself. The Masonic lodges crowded new members into their ritualistic meetings.

Revolutionary leaders saw themselves as something more than politicians or soldiers; they were teachers. Their writings were studded with didactic passages. The creed of the Katipunan abounded in morality:

"Be they white or dark, all men are equal: one may be more gifted than another in knowledge, in riches, in beauty . . . but what difference can there be between them as man to man? . . .

"Defend the oppressed; fight the oppressor . . .

"The greatness of man does not consist in his being a king, in

having a high nose, nor in being white-skinned; nor does it rest on his being a priest in representation of God, nor on his holding a post among the great of the earth: man is great and truly noble, though born in the hinterland and his knowledge be limited to his mother-tongue, if his manners are under proper restraint, if his character, dignity and honor are unsullied; and he is equally great and noble who neither tyrannizes over, nor helps those who oppress, others; whose feelings flower into love of country, whose vigils are kept that her welfare be safeguarded."

The Katipunan was a secret society, patterned on Masonry, with degrees of membership, initiation ceremonies, symbolic names. Under the energetic leadership of Andres Bonifacio, it had a large membership in Manila and throughout central Luzon. Toward the middle of 1894, its leaders met secretly in a cave deep in the mountains of San Mateo and Montalban and, amid the shadows, scrawled a new slogan on the wall: "Long Live Philippine Independence!" It was the first time that the goal had been put into writing, the first cry of outright rebellion.

Andres Bonifacio, the Katipunan leader, was born in the Tondo district of Manila in 1863. His parents had been very poor, and he had held a succession of shaky jobs, peddling canes and paper fans, carrying messages for a foreign trading house, selling tar for his employers, and finally working as a warehouse watchman for Fressell and Company. His education was limited, but he read all the books he could find about the techniques of revolution. When the Spaniards raided his room, they impounded a pathetic little library that included biographies of American Presidents, books on the French Revolution, international law and religion, Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*, Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, Sue's *Wandering Jew*, and a volume on the ruins of Palmyra.

Earnest, fiery, impetuous, Bonifacio had harangued his way to leadership. He was a believer in action. With Emilio Jacinto, he commanded the rebels in the first real engagement with the Spaniards, at San Juan del Monte, on August 30, 1896. But his leadership was soon to be challenged by an even shrewder young man named Emilio Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo had been born in 1869 in the town of Kawit, Cavite. His family were rather well-to-do Chinese-Tagalogs, and he studied in Manila until his father's death forced him to come home and run the family farm. In 1895, after the mysterious death of a Spanish sergeant who had apparently been running him a close race for the affections of a handsome Filipina girl, Aguinaldo disappeared from Cavite. But he returned later, and at twenty-six was elected municipal captain of Kawit. He had become a convinced rebel, a Katipunian official, an ardent Mason. He gained a local prominence in August, 1896, when he raided the Spanish barracks in Kawit for guns and ammunition, and followed up by proceeding to the town hall to issue a manifesto. Since Cavite was the very heart of the revolt, Aguinaldo was looked upon as a most promising young man. He exploited his reputation quickly.

By October he was issuing florid decrees, as a General and acknowledged leader of the insurrection.

"Filipino citizens!" he shouted, "we are not a savage people; let us follow the example of European and American nations; now is the occasion for shedding our blood for the last time, that we may achieve our beloved freedom.

"The Spaniards, conquerors of the beloved land, accuse us of ingratitude and claim that, after they had civilized us, we would now express our gratitude to them by impairing their authority; this is a false and misleading argument. For the civilization brought to these Islands by Spain during the lapse of three centuries is superficial and, fundamentally, vicious, for she has tried to keep the masses in dense ignorance, to extinguish the fire that burns in the hearts of a group of Filipinos who, for no reason other than that they are educated, are the victims of persecution by the government. As a result, many have been deported and other tyrannies have been practiced. Moreover, in compensation for the great benefits we have received during three centuries, has not Spain been rewarded by our very blood and sweat—Spain which, not satisfied with shamelessly exploiting us, to our face calls us carabaos, drones, monkeys, and other vile epithets?

"Filipinos! . . . The time has come. . . . Let us march under the Flag of the Revolution whose watchwords are Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity!"

The words were stirring, as such words ever are to men whose hearts ache with resentment. But Aguinaldo was offering more than inflammatory language. He proclaimed a Central Revolutionary Committee to take charge of the war, raise an army of 30,000 soldiers, and defend the coming revolutionary government. He instructed the people in every town to elect municipal committees responsible for local affairs. He promised a congress "to deliberate on the question of raising men, foodstuffs, and war taxes."

Aguinaldo was laying down a practical outline of governmental responsibility. He offered himself to the surging, inchoate movement as a realistic man of affairs. And the movement responded eagerly.

While Bonifacio ranted and battled, Aguinaldo planned, conferred, mobilized political support among the key revolutionaries in Cavite. When, in March of 1897, the rebel leaders met to create a revolutionary government, he was the logical choice for President. Bonifacio, disappointed and jealous, walked out of the meeting in a huff. Some weeks later, Bonifacio was murdered by several of Aguinaldo's supporters.

Meantime, Aguinaldo had established his headquarters in a large *nipa* house in the village of Biak-na-Bato, as guerrilla warfare raged everywhere. For the benefit of foreign sympathizers, he rendered a litany of Filipino grievances:

"Contemplate our altars, stained by the religious orders which have converted the most sacred objects into means of enforcing shameless exploitation. Without regard for poverty, for morality, or for the public health, the friar thinks only of the gold he receives. The poor are treated with contempt and only the rich are blessed and receive the benefits of the Christian religion . . .

"Our tyrants rob us of the products of our land watered with the sweat of our forefathers . . . Behold the law trampled under foot, converted into a weapon to be used against rather

than in defense of the Filipinos; on all sides threats and bribes. The municipality degraded; the administration and treasury ruined by immorality and speculation. In the Government and high offices of the State, where the native is barred from holding office, arbitrary rule prevails, individual security depending not on natural right, but on the irresponsible will of any of those in authority. Error and deception abound in public instruction; in the schools and the press absolute tyranny; on all sides ignorance, dishonor, vice, and corruption."

Meantime, a provisional constitution was approved. It was rather a democratic document, clearly influenced by the United States Constitution, providing for a strong executive, universal suffrage, and basic civil liberties. A new cabinet was formed, with Aguinaldo as President.

The revolution had spread throughout the provinces of Luzon. But the Filipinos were not well enough organized, armed, financed, or experienced to consolidate their gains. The new Spanish Governor, General Fernando Primo de Rivera, was shrewd enough to realize that he could accomplish more by moderation than by force. He ended the brutal tactics of his predecessors, offered to negotiate. After protracted bickering, he managed to convince Aguinaldo that the revolt could not succeed.

On December 14, 1897, the Pact of Biak-na-Bato was signed. It was, in effect, an admission of defeat by Aguinaldo, though his own explanation was that it gave him time and money to reorganize the revolutionary cause. According to Aguinaldo, these were the terms:

"1st. I was to be at liberty to live abroad with such of my companions as wanted to accompany me, and I accordingly chose Hongkong as a place of residence, where the 800,000 pesos of indemnity were to be paid in three installments: 400,000 upon receipt of all the arms in Biak-na-Bato; 200,000 when the arms surrendered amounted to 800, and the final 200,000 when their total number amounted to 1,000, and after the *Te Deum* had been sung in the Cathedral of Manila as a service of thanksgiving.

"The month of February was set as the extreme limit of time for the delivery of arms.

"2nd. The money was all to be turned over to me in person. I was to be at liberty to come to such understanding as I chose with my companions and other revolutionaries.

"3rd. Before the Filipino revolutionaries evacuated Biak-na-Bato, the Captain-General, Sr. Primo de Rivera, was to send me two generals of the Spanish army, who were to remain as hostages until my companions and I reached Hongkong and the first payment of the indemnity, 400,000 pesos, had been received.

"4th. It was also agreed to suppress the religious corporations in the Islands, and establish autonomy in administrative and political affairs, but at the petition of General Primo de Rivera these conditions were not reduced to writing, as he said that they would be most humiliating to the Spanish Government, but notwithstanding, he pledged his honor as an officer and a gentleman to their performance."

Aguinaldo ordered his followers to lay down their arms, and with forty companions left Biak-na-Bato in a sort of triumphal procession to Sual, where he sailed for China. He arrived in Hong Kong on the first anniversary of the execution of José Rizal. The revolution had ended.

The Spaniards joyfully sang a *Te Deum* in the great cathedral in Manila. The Queen herself sent congratulations from Madrid. "Peace," wrote a Spanish journalist, "is a reality from Cape Bojeador to the Strait of San Bernardino; in the mountains and in the wilderness only the Negritos and the Igorots remain." Primo de Rivera proclaimed a general amnesty, distributed a few sly handouts to former rebel leaders. He sent Aguinaldo the first payment of 400,000 pesos, and forgot the rest. The reforms never reached even a paper stage. When some of the exiles returned to the Philippines, they were promptly clapped into jail.

To honest men it looked like a sellout, but it was not altogether clear who was selling out to whom. Apolinario Mabini, who was to be something of an Alexander Hamilton of the

Philippine Revolution, damned the pact as vicious from the outset, since both parties had acted in bad faith. In fairness to Aguinaldo, it should be said that the Spanish money was deposited in a Hong Kong bank, practically untouched until part of it was spent for arms after Dewey's victory in Manila Bay.

The incident established a pattern for Filipino politics which has often been repeated since then, and which has often bewildered outsiders. It was not a pattern of courage or integrity, but of inconsistent expediency which did not seem to compromise the ultimate objective. Whatever happened, the Filipinos would try again—whether or not the Spaniards kept their word.

It was not peace but a truce, and truces never last. Rebel forces were soon on the move in Zambales and Ilocos Sur. A man named Jocson repudiated the pact, plotted endlessly from a *barrio* in Caloocan, inspired street fighting and assassinations in Manila. Bulacan rose in revolt, and soon guerrilla bands were raiding towns in Pampanga, Laguna, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Camarines Norte. In central Luzon, municipal councils reorganized, and an assembly was called to launch a new revolutionary government. Cebu rose in revolt, and Panay.

Meantime, war between Spain and the United States had begun. A new Spanish governor tried to rally the Filipinos to the side of Spain, appealing to their religious faith and to their ignorance. The North Americans, he said, "pretend to be inspired with a courage of which they are incapable, considering it quite proper to substitute the Protestant faith for the Catholic religion which you profess, to treat you as so many tribes apart from the current of civilization, to grab your riches as if you were ignorant of your right to property, to rob you, finally, of those of your men whom they consider useful for the needs of their ships or for the pursuit of their agricultural and industrial enterprises. Vain purposes! Ridiculous boasts! . . . Filipinos! . . . Let us fight! . . ."

A few days later, the Archbishop Nozaleda followed up with his own warning that, if the United States should win, "desolation and ruin will fall upon our people; our temples will be trampled upon, the altars of the true God profaned, our religion

crushed. . . . We have the sweet consolation to believe that you will all respond to the call to repel our common enemy. . . . Subscribe to this holy war. . . ."

Manuel Quezon, describing his student days in Manila, recalls in his autobiography: "We were told, even from the pulpits, that Americans, unlike the Spaniards who Christianized the Indians in Mexico, killed the Indians living in the United States and took their lands. They assured us that victory for the invincible Spanish arms was a foregone conclusion. It was widely advertised that the entrance to Manila Bay on either side of Corregidor was so well mined that no fleet would dare enter unless it sought its own destruction."

But in the night of April 30, Commodore Dewey did brave the waters of Manila Bay. Half his fleet was inside the Bay by early morning, ready for battle, and at six o'clock the shells were flying. Admiral Montojo, aboard the 3,500-ton "Reina Cristina," directed his batteries against Dewey's flagship, the 5,900-ton "Olympia." But in a few minutes his own ship was in flames. He clambered aboard a small boat, clutching the Spanish flag, and continued to command his forces from the little "Isla de Cuba." At eight o'clock the firing stopped, to the astonishment of watchers from the shore, who could not determine which side had won. It was merely a lull, thoughtfully ordered by Commodore Dewey to feed his crews a hearty breakfast, and at eleven o'clock the battle began again. Within an hour, all the Spanish ships were sunk, on fire, or in flight. The Battle of Manila Bay had been won. The United States had come to the Philippines with a bang.

Where did the Filipino rebels stand? Most of them didn't quite know. A few favored Spain. Some others, who had read American history, were inclined to trust the Americans. Mabini, in a closely argued analysis, urged aloofness.

"Although the real cause of the war is and can be nothing but the inability of Spain to put down the rebellion in Cuba where the Americans possess valuable interests to protect," he wrote, "if the course of the war should prove unfavorable to Spain

(which is to be expected, in view of the relative strength of both nations), and, for that reason, the Spanish Government will be compelled to ask for peace, it is very probable that the Government of the United States would impose as a condition the independence of Cuba, and as an indemnity, a part of Spain or of this beautiful Archipelago.

"Should this come to pass, our situation would be most tragic, for, urged by duty and by our honor and welfare to guard the independence of our country, we should never consent to the dismemberment of this part and parcel of our very being.

"But, as we have not the material means or strength formally to offer resistance to either combatant, we must have recourse to ingenuity, stilling the fervors of the heart and submitting our acts to the coldest rationale and cerebration. . . .

"Let us all be sensible: the Americans, like the Spaniards as well as all European nations, covet this very beautiful pearl of the oriental sea; but we covet it more, not only because God has given it to us, but also because we have shed much blood for it."

IV

Emilio Aguinaldo was in Singapore when the Spanish-American conflict came to a head. He had come from Hong Kong, on his way to Europe. Through an Englishman named H. W. Bray, who had been a planter in the Philippines for many years, Aguinaldo was introduced to the American Consul General in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt.

Pratt, like Americans at home, was aflame with patriotism. He saw in the presence of Aguinaldo a golden moment for action, and he was perhaps eager to raise his prestige with the Department of State. (Some weeks later, before he realized that Washington was not pleased with his actions, he offered his services as adviser on civil affairs in the Philippines.)

On his own initiative, and certainly without instructions from Washington, Pratt saw Aguinaldo twice. What the two men agreed upon has been subjected to lively controversy ever

since—a controversy that was one of the chief excuses for the outbreak of the violent Filipino insurrection against the United States.

According to Aguinaldo, Pratt “assured me that the United States would grant much greater liberty and more material benefits to the Filipinos than the Spaniards ever promised.” For this, Aguinaldo was to go back to Hong Kong, meet with Dewey, return to the Philippines, and lead his countrymen in a new revolt against the Spaniards. Aguinaldo says he pressed for a more specific definition of the benefits to accrue to the Filipinos. Pratt checked with Commodore Dewey in Hong Kong, according to Aguinaldo, and was authorized to promise “that the United States would, at least, recognize the independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States Navy.” Aguinaldo says he asked Pratt for a written promise, but the Consul General replied “that there was no necessity for entering into a formal written agreement because the word of the Admiral and of the United States Consul were in fact equivalent to the most solemn pledge, that their verbal promises and assurances would be fulfilled to the letter and were not to be classed with Spanish promises or Spanish ideas of a man’s word of honor.”

Pratt’s version was contained in a series of dispatches to Washington. On April 28, 1898, he reported on his first interview with Aguinaldo. “At this interview,” he wrote, “after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement which though absent from the Philippines he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage and having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet then at Hongkong and obtained the assurances of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our Consul General at Hongkong,

“ ‘Aguinaldo insurgent leader here, will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.

“ ‘Pratt’

“The Commodore’s reply reading thus,

“ ‘Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

“ ‘Dewey’

I received late that night and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo who with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer ‘Malacca’ which left here on Tuesday the 26th.”

Of his second conversation with Aguinaldo, Pratt reported: “I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey’s direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of civilized warfare.

“To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our Commander should direct.

“The General further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines, for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a Government of their own, in the organization of which they would desire the American Government’s advice and assistance.

“These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.”

In his next-to-last paragraph, Pratt did clearly admit that the question of Philippine independence was discussed. Indeed, he sent the State Department a clipping from the Singapore *Free Press* of May 4, 1898, which described the two conferences in great detail, and which Pratt characterized as in the main accurate. The newspaper reported that Aguinaldo had “declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend giving to Cuba.” The

newspaper added that Pratt coincided "with the general views expressed during the discussion," clearly implying that he had given Aguinaldo some reason to assume that the United States favored Philippine independence.

As for Aguinaldo's desires, the *Free Press* quoted them in detail: "General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrious population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the Government in the new state of things."

Belatedly, on June 17, Secretary of State William R. Day cabled Pratt in code, "Avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents."

Pratt now realized, for the first time, that he had gone too far, that his initiative had got him into trouble (later he was quietly eased out of his post). He replied nervously, "I neither have nor had any intention of negotiating with the Philippine insurgents, and in the case of General Aguinaldo was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore Dewey. My

action in the matter was indeed limited to obtaining the assurance of General Aguinaldo's willingness to cooperate with our forces, communicating this to Commodore Dewey and, upon the latter's expressing the desire that he should come on as soon as possible, arranging for the General to do so."

A few days later, he expanded on his denial, this time in a message direct to Secretary Day. "I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines," he insisted, adding: "I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the Government in no way whatever and, in the course of our conferences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him, General Aguinaldo, for the furtherance of any plan of his own nor that in accepting his said cooperation it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward."

On the evidence, Aguinaldo's belief that Pratt received Dewey's authorization to promise American recognition of the Filipino aspirations would seem to be totally unfounded. None of Pratt's telegrams to Dewey made any reference to political commitments.

On the other hand, it is quite clear that the matter was at least mentioned during the secret meetings. Probably the two men, who had to converse through Bray as interpreter, had more than a language barrier between them. Pratt was ambitiously intent on putting Aguinaldo in touch with Dewey and consolidating the Filipino revolutionaries in the American cause. Aguinaldo was equally intent on getting American assurances of recognition of Philippine independence.

In their anxiety to achieve their divergent aims, it is probable that the two men simply agreed with one another on subjects that did not seem to be of immediate personal concern, without, perhaps, realizing the implications. When Pratt remarked that he had no authority to commit the United States, Aguinaldo paid little attention. And Pratt, a conscientious consul but no diplomat, must have nodded pleasantly as the Filipino leader told him of the aims of his movement.

Months later, the interpreter Bray, who took part in both conferences, cabled Senator Hoar in Washington: "As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American Government through the Consul at Singapore, I frankly state that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to this."

If Pratt did make such a commitment, even indirectly, he was apparently not aware of it himself—and he certainly had no authority to do so. On the other hand, a commitment made by mistake, in the heat of negotiation, is a commitment nonetheless, and Aguinaldo took it very seriously indeed.

v

In mid-May, General Aguinaldo and several of his advisers arrived in Cavite on board an American naval vessel. There Dewey conferred with him (says Aguinaldo) on American recognition of Philippine independence as well as on plans for a Filipino uprising against Spain. For, in all these weeks since the great naval victory, the Americans had been unable to occupy the archipelago, or even the city of Manila.

Aguinaldo, bursting with energy, appealed to his countrymen to renew their war against the Spaniards, explaining that he had made peace at Biak-na-Bato on conditions which the Spaniards had repudiated.

He hastily organized a provisional government, with himself as dictator. He promised that, after victory, a republican constituent assembly would be called and a new government established. Quickly the rebels occupied town after town in Cavite. Dewey himself admitted that "the insurgents fought well." Bataan rose, and like clockwork the revolt spread through Bulacan, Laguna, Tarlac, Pampanga, Batangas, the entire North, the Bicol provinces. Unit after unit of Spanish troops surrendered. In June, the rebel leaders in Kawit proclaimed the independence of the Philippines, and the signers of the proclamation included one American, L. M. Johnson, an artillery colonel.

By this time, virtually all of Luzon was in the hands of the Filipinos—with the exception of Manila itself, where the Spaniards had entrenched themselves.

The insurgents were ready to organize an effective governmental structure. Aguinaldo turned to Mabini for help. Born in Batangas in 1864, of poor parents, Mabini had studied in Manila, earning his way as a tutor. He was a brilliant law student, for he knew that revolutionary movements inevitably turn to lawyers for leadership. He had served his time in Spanish prisons, and only a paralytic stroke had saved him from execution.

Mabini was a logical planner who placed his faith in strong, centralized authority. He persuaded Aguinaldo to abolish the dictatorship, replacing it with a new revolutionary government of which Aguinaldo remained President. A congress of provincial representatives was created, but it was granted only an advisory function.

By August, meanwhile, Dewey and General Merritt were ready to demand the Spanish surrender of Manila. They did not bother to inform their suspicious Filipino allies, and when the Spaniards submitted to Merritt, the Filipinos were left out entirely.

The Filipinos were outraged. Clearly, the United States, with all its vaunted democracy, was no more willing to free the Philippines than reactionary Spain had been. Hotheads were all for attack. Mabini was cautious. "We have not yet finished the war with Spain," he said soberly, "and we must not provoke another with America. We are not in a condition to conduct two wars."

Aguinaldo still hoped to negotiate with the Americans. He sent Felipe Agoncillo to see President McKinley in Washington. The interview was pleasant enough, but accomplished nothing. Agoncillo traveled to Paris for the peace conference, but he succeeded only in filing protests as the delegates arranged for cession of the Philippines to the United States. When Agoncillo returned to Washington, he was coolly ignored by the American officials.

Meantime, Aguinaldo had established his temporary capital

at Malolos, figuring that, in case of hostilities, western Luzon would be safest. After two months of debate the Malolos Constitution was finally approved by a Revolutionary Congress.

The main controversy raging around this Constitution had focused on a proposal to give Catholicism the status of a state religion. The liberals opposed this furiously, and finally won out by a slight majority. In general, the Constitution provided for ministerial responsibility to a one-chamber parliament, with the President subordinate to the legislators. There was a lengthy list of individual rights and liberties, together with provisions for local and provincial autonomy, and arrangements for continuing legislative control even during congressional recesses.

Aguinaldo, on the advice of Mabini, opposed the Constitution because of its curtailment of his powers as President. He suggested a series of amendments restoring these powers, declaring, "I hope that you will realize that I should have ample powers to keep me un-influenced by the changes in public opinion and to give me force and energy with which to evade difficulties and to prevent, by the adoption of rapid and opportune measures, the absolute predominance of brute force." But Aguinaldo yielded in the end, signing the Constitution on December 23, 1898.

Mabini, who had been in effect Aguinaldo's prime minister, was by now the political head of the government, taking a special interest in foreign relations. Aguinaldo was unanimously elected President, and soon Congress was enthusiastically debating legislation covering all the complicated problems of government.

The Americans paid no attention to these events. After the Treaty of Paris was signed, President McKinley issued a proclamation of "benevolent assimilation," announcing that the destinies of the Philippines had passed into the hands of the United States. "It is the duty of the army of occupation," he declared, "to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we have come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in their business, and in their personal or religious liberty."

On January 4, 1899, General Elwell S. Otis issued his first proclamation as Military Governor:

"I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention of the United States Government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Philippines to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington . . .

"I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of order and law will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world."

This was, surely, more liberal than the Spanish colonial policy. But to the Filipinos it was an outrage. The time had passed when anyone had the right to treat their country as a "province," whether favored or not. They had proclaimed their independence; they had established their own constitutional government. They wanted no outsiders.

Aguinaldo was furious. "General Otis," he said, "styles himself . . . the Military Governor of the Philippines, and I protest a thousand times and with all the energy I possess against such authority." In Manila, the Military Governor's proclamations were torn off the walls, and copies of Aguinaldo's protest posted in their place.

In Cavite, hundreds of women signed a document, addressed to General Otis, declaring "that after all the men were killed off they were prepared to shed their blood for the liberty and independence of their country." Cooler heads suggested a conference with the Americans, and for weeks negotiations dragged on between Filipino leaders and American officers. The Filipinos proposed that American forces, for the time being, remain only in Cavite, in Manila, and around the bay.

They insisted that no reinforcements be brought in, and no further territory be occupied. They pointed out that sovereignty always sprang from the will of the people, from the consent of the governed—as America's own Declaration of Independence had insisted. It was a rational argument; but reason had little strength against armed force. Finally, General Otis broke off the negotiations completely.

Now the streets of Manila were tense. Everyone knew that bloodshed was inevitable. This was the moment for the inevitable incident. It came on the night of February 4, 1899, when shots were exchanged between American and Filipino troops in a Manila suburb.

At once Aguinaldo issued a formal declaration of war. The Philippine Insurrection had begun. It was to be a bloody and brutal struggle.

In Washington, within a few hours, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris. Mabini suspected that President McKinley had been hoping for just such an outbreak in order to force the treaty through.

The American experiment in the Philippines had started. It was hardly an auspicious beginning.

V

THE EXPERIMENT BEGINS

HALF A WORLD AWAY, in America, a young country had come to realize its new explosive power. Frontiers had been pushed to the Pacific, and there was no more free land to be given away. But commerce and heavy industry were expanding. The people took pride in a new and less self-conscious culture. In the name of liberty, they had defeated Spain, and now they sought the good fruits of victory.

The strange, mysterious, profitable Orient beckoned. John Hay was championing the "open door" in China, to the delight of the British. Now, in addition, came the promise of a more direct share in the wealth of the Orient, via the Philippines. It would chagrin the Germans, perhaps, but again the British would be enthusiastic. London newspapers advised us to solve our Negro problem by using colored troops to police the Philippines as the British used Sikhs in their Oriental colonies.

Not all the near-hysteria of the time could be traced to Hearstian jingoism and sinister avarice. There was a sincere, naïve, aggressive, missionary spirit in the land. Many truly wished to help unhappy Cuba, and saw in the Philippines vir-

gin soil for America's civilizing mission. In the process, of course, we would enrich ourselves. "The pacification of the Philippines," cried the eloquent Chauncey Depew, "gives a market of ten millions of people. It will grow every year as they come into more civilized conditions and their wants increase."

In the White House, William McKinley was wrestling with the angels. Later the President described his struggle to a delegation of Methodists:

"When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little help. I thought first that we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night it came to me this way—I don't know how but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the very best we could for them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the Chief Engineer of the War Department (our map-maker) and I told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States [pointing to a large map on the wall of his office], and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President."

For specious and immoral reasoning this would be hard to equal. Catholic Filipinos were to be Christianized; and it would be cowardly and dishonorable to give back to Spain a large archipelago over which neither the United States nor Spain had, at the time, any real control whatever. As for Filipino unfitness for government, that was a matter of opinion. In any event, at the peace conference in Paris, the American emissaries fulfilled McKinley's vision at a price of \$20,000,000, in the interests of the Filipinos themselves, "for whose welfare," said McKinley, "we cannot escape responsibility."

Not all Americans, of course, had swung to the new imperialism. Some were afraid of it because of xenophobic dislike of the unruly little foreigners. To the liberals it was inconceivable that a democracy would willingly assume sovereignty over a subject people. The hastily formed Anti-Imperialist League reminded Americans of Lincoln's words: "No man is good enough to govern another without that other's consent." William Jennings Bryan was determined that this should be the crucial issue of the 1900 election campaign.

To make sure the issue would survive, by a weird and incomprehensible rationalization, he advised Democrats in the Senate to vote for ratification of the treaty with Spain, including annexation of the Philippines. For a time it looked as though the treaty would go through only if it were accompanied by a promise of ultimate Philippine independence, but this notion was finally defeated by the deciding vote of Vice-President Hobart. It was the outbreak of hostilities with Aguinaldo that convinced the last wavering Senator, and ratification managed to squeeze through without a single vote to spare.

The Democratic Party, meeting in Kansas City in the summer of 1900, declared: "We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration. It has embroiled the Republic in an unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of its noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position

of having crushed with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government.

"The Filipinos cannot become citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot become subjects without imperiling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization, or to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give to the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from foreign interference such as has been given for nearly a century to the Republics of Central and South America."

When the voters went to the polls, however, they either saw no turpitude or condoned it. More important, they were well pleased with the party that had brought them victory in war and prosperity in peace. McKinley won handily. Bryan's strategy had been good, in that he chose his own battlefield. It was bad, in that he lost the battle. The Philippines was ours to keep, whatever the Filipinos might say.

Meantime, a political pattern had been set which was to be followed, by and large, from that time to this. However thin the line of demarcation between the Republican and Democratic Parties may at times have been on other issues, there has always been a clear distinction on Philippine policy. The Republicans have rarely denied the principle of ultimate independence, but they have always avoided the definite commitment; even McKinley remarked that "the Philippines are ours, not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government." But only William Howard Taft ever went far beyond the basic Republican policy, when he was in Manila; and he changed his views when he became more and more immersed in orthodox Republicanism after his return to Washington.

The Democrats, on the other hand, have always pushed for speedy fulfilment of a definite promise. In Woodrow Wilson's time, when Francis Burton Harrison served as Governor-General in Manila, the extent of Filipino participation in government was greatly broadened. In Franklin D. Roosevelt's

time, the date for independence was established and the Commonwealth regime installed. In Harry Truman's time, the independence of the Philippines became a reality.

But the thread of liberalism was deeper than party politics. Underneath the prim vice-regal methods of Republican governors, the asinine airs of American businessmen in Manila, the arrogance of American military and naval officers, there was a layer of American idealism that could never be entirely obliterated. At worst, the American by nature could offer only a poor imitation of the British *raj*. And he was not always at his worst. An America of many paradoxes offered to the bewildered Filipinos its catalogue of contradictions, in which self-interest, liberalism, rudeness, and consideration tumbled over one another endlessly.

II

In the Philippines, the war against the Americans raged fiercely. "Either independence or death!" cried Aguinaldo. Each side accused the other of committing atrocities. But American power was overwhelming. At no time did the Filipinos have more than 40,000 rifles, with virtually no artillery at all. Against them were pitted as many as 85,000 American troops. The *insurrectos* slowly retreated northward, and in the end they scattered into wide-roving, half-organized guerrilla bands. Their councils were divided; Aguinaldo even caused the death of his best officer, General Luna. Finally Aguinaldo was forced into the remote mountains of the east coast of Luzon, where General Funston managed to capture him. The rebellion had ended for the fiery, unpredictable man who was its very spirit; he soon swore an oath of loyalty to his erstwhile enemy.

With Aguinaldo's surrender the backbone of revolt was broken. Malvar and a few others tried to carry on, but soon they too gave up. Aguinaldo himself, though still a young man, lapsed into relative obscurity. For the most part he was faithful to his oath of allegiance to the United States, spend-

ing his time near the lunatic fringe of Philippine politics and as an occasional darling of the American military set in Manila. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines, he achieved the ultimate in anticlimax: he collaborated with the enemy.

III

The first Philippine Commission arrived in Manila in March, 1899. It was headed by Jacob Gould Schurman, the respected President of Cornell University, and the other members were Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan, who had traveled widely in the Philippines as a scientist; Charles Denby, a former Minister to China; Admiral Dewey, and General Otis. Within a few days, the Commission announced that the supremacy of the United States would be fully enforced. It guaranteed civil rights to the Filipinos, promised that the United States would promote their welfare and progress, assured protection against exploitation, and proposed an honest civil service in which Filipinos would participate. The tax system would be fair and the administration of justice "pure, speedy and effective." There would be new highways, railroads, public works, and public schools, and general promotion of Philippine trade. Filipinos would enjoy "the greatest autonomy and the greatest liberty compatible with the high purposes and the obligations which the United States had contracted with the most civilized nations of the world."

The Schurman Commission did its best to reduce Filipino resistance by explaining the American position. But it was hard to hear its calming words above the nervous echoes of gunfire from the hills and forests of Luzon. By January, 1900, the Commission returned to the United States with a lengthy report, and among its conclusions were these:

"1. The United States cannot withdraw from the Philippines. We are there and duty binds us to remain. There is no escape from our responsibility to the Filipinos and to man-

kind for the government of the archipelago and the amelioration of the condition of its inhabitants.

"2. The Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, and if independence were given to them they could not maintain it. . . .

"4. There being no Philippine nation, but only a collection of different peoples, there is no general public opinion in the archipelago; but the men of property and education, who alone interest themselves in public affairs, in general recognize as indispensable American authority, guidance, and protection.

"5. Congress should, at the earliest practicable time, provide for the Philippines the form of government herein recommended or another equally liberal and beneficent . . .

"7. So far as the finances of the Philippines permit, public education should be promptly established, and when established made free to all. . . ."

Having completed its task, the Commission disbanded, and Dr. Schurman returned to his pleasant desk high above Cayuga's waters. His place was taken by William Howard Taft, already well known as a Federal Circuit Judge and a steady Republican. Taft, as chairman of the second Philippine Commission, overshadowed the other members: Dean C. Worcester; Luke E. Wright, an old-time Confederate soldier; Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses. His girth was large enough to contain a great store of patience and tolerance, and a streak of stubbornness as well. He was a man of understanding and human sympathy, and somehow, despite his stolid upper-middle-class Ohio background, he conceived a deep affection for these spunky, insecure, aggressive people whose destiny he ruled. When he accepted his new post, according to his distinguished biographer, Henry F. Pringle, "Taft knew as much—and as little—about the Philippine Islands as the average American. It may be doubted that he had any knowledge of the grave questions of Far Eastern policy which forced the hand of President McKinley. It is equally certain that he knew little about the history of the Filipino people, to whom he

was to become so greatly devoted, or their struggle for freedom."

Taft came to Manila armed with a lengthy set of instructions, drafted principally by Elihu Root as Secretary of War. In the light of the general attitude of the McKinley administration, and of the widespread expansionist feeling throughout the United States, these instructions were astonishingly liberal. Basically, they established the principle that Filipinos were to gain the widest possible control over their own affairs. As Taft himself pointed out, they "secured to the Philippine people all the guaranties of our Bill of Rights except trial by jury and the right to bear arms." Incidentally, they gave the Commission complete authority over appropriations, a lever with which Taft was able to overturn the reactionary power of the military set headed by General Arthur MacArthur, father of General Douglas MacArthur.

The Philippine Commission itself was both a legislative and executive body. Its first function was to hold hearings in order to learn the views of the Filipinos themselves and draft a new body of legislation for the islands; after a time it was to assume full administrative authority over the Philippines. The Commission was instructed that the American regime was "designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even to their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government."

At the same time, the instructions continued, the Filipinos must remember that their experience in government was meager, and that America adhered to "certain great principles of government" which "we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom." If these principles should conflict with local custom, then local custom must give way.

The instructions carefully set out a bill of rights, not unlike the amendments to our own Constitution. As to government, "it will be necessary to fill some offices with Americans which after a time may well be filled by natives of the islands." A civil service system was to be established quickly, as well as municipal government "in which natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs . . . subject to the least degree of supervision." A system of free education was to be organized, with English taught as the official language.

The instructions were thick with paternalism. But after nearly half a century, knowing as we do the conflicts and the passions of the intervening years, they seem to stand up rather well. The Filipinos, of course, were not satisfied. It was all very fine for Americans to talk glibly of the years that must pass before a people can learn to govern itself. But does any people, they asked, ever really know how to govern itself? Has any nation failed to make disastrous mistakes? Can any community learn self-government until it is thrown on its own? Their questions had been answered years before, unintentionally, by a stolid American named Ulysses S. Grant. During his world tour, President Grant was asked by some Japanese interviewers how a nation could learn the art of self-government. Grant's laconic reply was, "Govern yourselves." This was the core of the Filipino argument.

IV

Taft and his fellow-commissioners arrived in Manila in June, 1900, announcing: "We are civil officers. We are men of peace . . ." They came into immediate conflict with Arthur MacArthur, who, as a man of war, trusted no "natives." MacArthur wanted to civilize 'em with a Krag rifle, if it took ten years. The Commission, he complained, was "an injection into an otherwise normal situation." In the long run,

fortunately, the situation was made permanently abnormal, and the Army became subordinate to the civilian Governor-General.

As for Taft, he had no distaste for the Filipinos. "We hold the Philippines for the benefit of the Filipinos," he said once, "and we are not entitled to pass a single act or to approve a single measure that has not that as its chief purpose." The attitude was astonishing to the military set, and repugnant to the swarm of American businessmen who had arrived to make quick fortunes in the islands. Taft himself remarked: "We have in these islands possibly eight thousand Americans and we have about eight millions of Christian Filipinos. If business is to succeed here, it must be in the sale of American goods to the eight millions of Filipinos. One would think that a child in business might understand that the worst possible policy in attempting to sell goods is to abuse, berate and vilify your only possible customers." To which the stock reply was, "He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain't no brother of mine." One American firm inserted a large advertisement in a Manila newspaper; it reproduced a picture of Taft, with the caption, "This is the cause of our leaving the Philippines." (As it happened, the firm stayed and prospered.) Finally Taft lost his temper, and in a speech at Iloilo told the bothersome Americans that they were neurotics who ought to take the first boat home if they didn't like the government. This was, perhaps, the one time when so specious an argument has been justified.

By September 1, 1900, the Philippine Commission assumed full legislative powers, levying taxes, appropriating funds, establishing courts. Almost a year later, on July 4, 1901, Taft became the first full-fledged civil Governor. He took his oath of office, significantly enough, before a Filipino—Cayetano Arellano, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Filipinization did not begin smoothly. "The administration of justice through the native judges in Manila stinks to Heaven," Taft told Root early in 1901; the Filipinos were too prone to accept bribes. But he had the same trouble later with

American officials who showed equal tendencies toward corruption.

Meantime, a group of wealthy and professional people organized the first political party under the American regime; the Federalista Party called for immediate peace with the Americans, and ultimate incorporation of the Philippines into the United States. As men of property, the Federalistas preferred the assured stability of American rule. They wanted five elected representatives in Congress, an insular legislature of which half would be elected and the other half appointed, with a governor-general appointed by the President of the United States. F. H. Pardo de Tavera, a Federalista leader, called for "a steadily increasing autonomy, the separation of church and state, Philippine representation in Congress, and adoption of the American Constitution, culminating at last in the admission of the islands as one of the States of the Union." The Federalistas were, of course, anathema to the revolutionists, and their aims were never popularly accepted. A few years later, they were even forced to advocate ultimate independence, and finally the party expired.

Taft was very hopeful about the Federalistas. Most Filipinos were more practical; they realized that they could never achieve actual incorporation into the United States, including appropriate representation in Congress and full parity with other American citizens. The idea always seemed pleasant but unrealistic, and from the beginning most people thought only of independence.

Taft carried out his policy of attraction from the earliest possible moment. In September, 1901, he appointed three Filipinos as legislative members of the Philippine Commission. They were Pardo de Tavera, the Federalista leader whose ancestry was more Spanish than Filipino; Benito Legarda, who owned large tobacco and distillery firms in Manila; and José Luzuriaga, a wealthy landowner of Negros. They were inducted into office with great ceremony, and Pardo de Tavera said proudly: "We do not consider this day solemn because we have been appointed by the Commission. We consider it

a great day because three Filipinos have been appointed, regardless of who we be or what be our names." The three appointees were pro-American and enthusiastically co-operative—but they were Filipinos, and they were serving on the highest governing body in the country.

As the months passed, the Commission did its work earnestly. New laws were drafted and promulgated. A code of civil procedure was drawn up, and Taft sent for judges from the United States. Despite the last lingering flare-ups of insurrection, civil government spread rapidly through most of the archipelago. Public works, harbor facilities, highways, were built. Primary and secondary schools were going up, and enrollments swelled. Steps were taken to improve health and sanitary conditions, and especially to cope with the rinderpest which had attacked farm animals during the years of unrest, adding economic distress in the farm areas to the difficulties of political turmoil.

Taft made a special trip to Washington to talk Congress into providing, in 1902, a provisional Organic Law for the Philippines. This gave the Filipinos an elective assembly and two resident commissioners to represent them in Washington. It was another brick in the structure of Filipino self-government.

The influence of this man was a good and lasting one. He was a governor of wisdom, kindness, firmness, and understanding. He had managed to break through his background and establish a bond of human understanding with the people. So great was his affection for them, so earnest his devotion to the work he had begun, that he refused a seat on the Supreme Court because he felt he could do more good in Manila. And he reluctantly accepted the post of Secretary of War only when President Theodore Roosevelt pointed out that in his new post he would still control American policy in the Philippines. But after he left Manila, and accustomed himself to the Washington atmosphere of the time, Taft grew away from the people he had come to love. The whispers of the military set were loud in his ears. The traditional conservatism of his Re-

publican cronies shriveled his instinctive understanding of the Filipinos.

As Secretary of War and as President, Taft became ever colder to the people of the islands. He announced his opposition to Philippine independence, and in the heat of debate he progressed from criticism to unfriendliness.

Meantime, in the Philippines, his successors did nothing to further his original progressivism. The governors-general who followed him were able and conscientious, but they had no desire to help the Filipinos toward self-government. They could not go backward, for they respected the pledged word. But they refused to go forward, irritated by Filipino insistence on more and more reforms. "They had started a national movement in the Philippines," Harrison wrote, "and then wished to arrest it in mid-career; they had found that such principles as liberty and self-government cannot be turned on and off like water from a tap, however benevolent the hand in control." Indeed, a hard and arrogant American bureaucracy was building in the islands, distrusting the Filipinos and resenting their claims to greater participation in government. Yet nothing could hold back the momentum of American reformist promises.

In this atmosphere, the new Philippine Assembly was born. It was assuredly not the product of the official American thinking at the time. Indeed, it was the worrisome result of a promise made years earlier, when Taft was more sympathetic to Filipino desires. And its fruition was another indication of the American habit of keeping promises, even after the initial enthusiasm had cooled.

The Assembly had been provided for by Congress in 1902, but it could not convene until two years after a census of the Philippines was completed. In September of 1902, the Philippine Commission certified that the insurrection had ceased, and the census was taken about six months later. Tabulation of returns required two years; after their completion came the two years of waiting. Not until March, 1907, could the way be cleared for the first general election in the Philippines. In

October the Philippine Assembly convened for the first time, as the lower house of the Philippine Legislature. The upper house, which retained final power, was nothing more than the Philippine Commission itself, acting in its legislative capacity.

But the Filipinos at long last had a forum, and a share in the determination of governmental policy. This was not only the first popularly elected national legislative body in the Philippines. It was the first such body in any colonial territory of the Far East.

Taft, as Secretary of War, went to Manila with the party of American officials attending the installation of the Assembly. In the warm manner of his earlier days, he put his arm on the shoulders of Sergio Osmeña, the new Speaker of the Assembly, and said that now Osmeña would be the second man in the Philippines (outranked only by the Governor-General himself). Osmeña, for his part, said he was sure that the Assembly would "cement the relationship between the already closely related Americans and Filipinos." And the first official act of the Assembly was to adopt a resolution, addressed to President Theodore Roosevelt, thanking the American people for permitting the Filipinos to establish a legislative body to make the laws by which they were governed.

Osmeña may have been the second man in the Philippines, but he was the first among the Filipinos. As Speaker of the Assembly, the young politician was unchallenged in his leadership of the Nacionalista Party. And the party he led was by now the dominant factor in Philippine politics. It had been organized vigorously as soon as the Filipinos realized that the guarantee of free assembly and free speech was real. Its platform contained, in reality, only one plank—*independence as soon as possible*. On this slogan the Nacionalistas attracted most of the political brains and talent in the country, and most of the voters.

v

Woodrow Wilson's "new freedom" extended to the Philippines. Soon after he entered the White House in 1913, he sent

to Manila as Governor-General a New York Congressman named Francis Burton Harrison—hand-picked by Manuel Quezon, who was busy in Washington as Resident Commissioner of the Philippines.

Harrison was thoroughly dedicated to the proposition that the Filipinos had a right to run the Philippines, and in the years of his incumbency the experiment began to take real shape.

By 1913 many American businessmen had lost their early enthusiasm for the Philippines. Trade with the United States had rocketed skyward, but it could not compare, proportionately, with the Hawaiian trade or with the vast and increasing European commerce. The ardent imperialism of the century's turn had long since been dissipated, and no longer were Americans fascinated by their great island possession halfway round the world. For Harrison this was an advantage. While the horror of the Americans in Manila mounted, while the Army and Navy set turned their noses higher and higher, Harrison put through reform after reform.

He found that McKinley's instructions on the Filipinization of the civil service had been ignored. Only one bureau chief was a Filipino, and at that he headed the small and relatively minor Bureau of Labor. On the other hand, there were approximately 2,600 Americans in the insular civil service, with half as many more holding unclassified or temporary jobs. Many of these Americans were doing clerical work, with duties that almost any Filipino could carry out. Others were established in key positions and resisted any suggestion that their jobs should ultimately be assumed by Filipinos. Had they cared to, Filipinos might have quoted a grievance from the American Declaration of Independence: "He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance."

These multitudinous officers were often capable, and had a certain pride in their jobs as colonial administrators. They had come to enjoy the pleasant, smooth life in Manila, where

they could live in greater luxury amid more servants than they could ever have afforded in the States. Inevitably they resisted the idea that they should be replaced by Filipinos. And they were only reflecting the established policies of the governors-general who preceded Harrison.

Politically, resistance to Filipino aspirations had reached a point of complete deadlock by 1909. The five American members of the Commission stood firm against the all-Filipino Assembly in a fight for absolute control of insular finances. An appropriation bill, covering the insular budget, failed to pass, and Governor-General Forbes was forced to renew the previous year's appropriations. This was the most striking symptom of the irritation between Americans and Filipinos. The warmth of social contact, established by Taft, had long since cooled. Relationships generally were artificial and formal.

But now, as harbinger of the new Wilsonian spirit, came Governor Harrison. He landed at Manila in October, 1913, and was escorted through huge throngs to a speakers' stand on the Luneta. There he read Wilson's message to the Filipino people:

"We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands.

"Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence. And we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken experience will guide us to the next.

"The administration will take one step at once and will give to the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the Appointive Commission, and thus in the Upper as well as in the Lower House of the Legislature a majority representation will be secured to them.

"We do this in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will be given in the action of the Commission under the new arrangement of the political capacity of those

native citizens who have already come forward to represent and to lead their people in affairs."

A roar of delight swept through the land. The Filipinos were coming into their own. As for the Americans, they were roaring too. Businessmen, bureaucrats, military men, and their ladies, poured slander, ridicule, abuse, on the new Governor-General. "I was constantly on the defensive," Harrison recalled, "replying by cable to requests for explanations from the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, as to what was going on in the Philippines, especially during my first year of office. The 'organization' had determined that I must go, the sooner the better, but they counted without the indomitable will of President Wilson . . . An active lobby was maintained in the Manila Hotel which seized on each traveler upon his arrival and filled him full of race prejudice and gloom; strangers were told that the Democratic administration was turning over the islands to a mob of irresponsible, dishonest Filipino politicians who were headed toward chaos and disorder.

"The existing American political organization in the islands," Harrison continued, "had come to believe that the Philippines were theirs to have and to hold; they must treat the Filipinos gently and with justice, but must never forget that they were only 'little brown children'; American prestige was built up, for them, by the assertion of the strong arm, which was backed by an army always at hand . . .

"They seemed to consider President Wilson's Philippine policy as the vagary of an irresponsible and theoretical visionary, put into execution by a governor-general who was, to say the least of it, without sense of responsibility and ignorant, and bound to be overwhelmed sooner or later by the results of his folly."

Though Secretary of War Garrison vacillated and worried, the President was firm, and Harrison knew it. He went straight ahead. He conferred often with the Filipino politicians. He met them socially. He found their company pleasant. He appointed the five members of the Commission who gave it a Filipino majority—Victorino Mapa of Iloilo, Rafael Palma of

Manila, Jaime de Veyra of Leyte, Vicente Illustro of Batangas, and Vicente Singson-Encarnacion of Ilocos Sur. They were steady men, no radicals, no extremists, dignified, capable. Most of them had a background of governmental experience, and of considerable wealth. By no stretch of the imagination could any of them be considered outstanding, but they served well enough to demonstrate that Filipinos could provide men of stability.

Now the deadlock was broken. The Philippine Assembly gaily adopted a resolution which declared: "We believe that, happily, the experiments of imperialism have come to an end, and that colonial exploitation has passed into history. The epoch of mistrust has been closed . . . A few days have sufficed to bring about a good understanding between Americans and Filipinos, which it had been impossible to establish during the thirteen years past. We are convinced that every onward step, while relieving the American Government of its responsibilities in the Islands, will, as in the past, fully demonstrate the present capacity of the Filipino people to establish a government of its own and guarantee in a permanent manner the safety under such government of the life, property and liberty of the residents of the Islands, national as well as foreign. We do not wish to say by this that there will not be difficulties and embarrassments. Nor do we even expect that the campaign, open or concealed, of the enemies of the Filipino cause will cease soon, but we feel sure that through a conservative use of the powers entrusted to us, the Filipino people will, with God's favor and the help of America, emerge triumphantly from the test, however difficult it may be."

These were busy days in Manila. Harrison decided that, rather than force Americans out wholesale, he would simply fill each new vacancy with a Filipino, wherever possible. And he encouraged Americans to vacate. One of the greatest encouragements of all was the decision to forbid government officials to engage in private business on the side. At first he appointed Filipinos as assistant bureau chiefs, on probation, to learn the job, and in the first year Filipinos were appointed

thus to such bureaus as Internal Revenue, Prisons, Agriculture, and Health. When a capable Filipino was made Director of the Bureau of Lands, the American Assistant Director resigned in a huff; he would not serve under a "native." Unperturbed, the Governor-General let him go. He appointed a Filipino to the executive secretaryship of the insular government, placing him, in effect, in charge of all the bureau chiefs. In Washington, Wilson told Congress: "Step by step we should extend and perfect the system of self-government in the Islands, making test of them and modifying them as experience discloses their successes and their failures; that we should more and more put under the control of the native citizens of the Archipelago the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of the communities, and so by counsel and experience set up a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their own control at last."

Inside of five years, the insular government was transformed smoothly "from one of Americans aided by Filipinos to one of Filipinos assisted by Americans." By 1921, some thirty bureaus and offices were directed by Filipinos, and most of the rest had Filipino assistant chiefs. The exceptions, generally, were in the highly technical agencies for which the Filipinos themselves admitted that they did not yet have competent and trained personnel.

As for the American prophets of disaster, they were repudiated by the facts, though they never admitted defeat. "It is customary to attribute to Filipinization an impairment of efficiency of administration," Governor Harrison said. "It would be only just to say that in many respects efficiency had been gained, in that the new government had the support and co-operation of the people to a marked degree, thus making much easier the task of administration. The distribution of executive power and the exercise of more genuine authority by many officials, the gradual withdrawal of the central Government from minute inspection and direction of minor functions—in

other words, the extension of self-government and the spread of democracy—may in themselves have impaired somewhat the efficiency of administration. If so, that disadvantage is more than offset by the gain in contentment of the people, the growth of respect and friendship for the United States, and the valuable lessons in self-government secured by the Filipinos.”

There were, of course, cases of graft and inefficiency among the Filipino civil servants. These could not be condoned. But neither could they be considered an excuse for withholding the right to self-government—certainly not by a country where a large enough contribution to the right party’s campaign fund could buy an ambassadorship, where the words “Teapot Dome” were soon to be known to every citizen.

VI

In Washington, Manuel Quezon had been waspishly persistent. As Commissioner, he was also a delegate to Congress, with the right to talk but not to vote. Ambitious, zealous, single-minded, melodramatic, he talked often and worked hard. He could stand on the floor of the House, a slight figure surrounded by the littered desks and the bored legislators, and in words made sharp by his Spanish accent move his hearers almost to tears. He could buttonhole men of influence, seek audiences in the White House and the War Department, confer with liberals, produce a sharp little propaganda sheet called “The Filipino People,” work tirelessly for independence. With the upsurge of liberalism under Wilson, he was at last able to get results. They came in 1916, with the passage of the Jones Act.

At first this legislation had fixed the very date for establishment of a Philippine republic, not later than 1921. The Clarke Amendment, specifying the date, was supported by such Republicans as Kenyon, McCumber, and LaFollette, and it passed the Senate by the deciding vote of Vice-President Marshall. It had Wilson’s support, though it aroused Secretary

Garrison to such fury that he resigned in protest. The House, however, revolted against Wilson, striking the amendment from the bill. Nearly thirty Democrats bolted to join the Republican opposition in voting it down. They were mostly Catholics to whom Cardinal Gibbons had appealed for retention of the Philippines by the United States. (A year later, Irish-Americans in Manila held a St. Patrick's Day banquet to promote Irish freedom. Manuel Quezon, called on for a speech, said briefly and bitterly: "We Filipinos wish for your Irishmen the same independence you wished for us.") But even without the definite date, the Jones Act was revolutionary.

It provided for an elective legislature composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives, with a Governor-General who had power to veto any legislation, including individual items in appropriation bills. Aside from acts relating to the public domain, timber and mining, tariff, immigration, currency, and coinage, all of which were subject to the approval of the President of the United States, the government of the Philippines was in effect placed in the hands of the Filipino people. The Philippine Commission was abolished.

To the Filipinos, of course, the Jones Act was a great milestone because of its preamble:

"WHEREAS, It was ever the intention of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

"WHEREAS, For the speedy accomplishment of such purposes it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without in the meantime impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence. . . ."

It was as if the great conscience of America had spoken.

Quezon returned to Manila a hero, for the Filipinos knew how active he had been in bringing about the passage of the Jones Act. Never in Philippine history was there an outpouring of humanity to match the swelling crowds that waited to greet him. A typhoon raged in the bay, and Quezon's steamer was delayed. The crowds waited for hours in a driving rain, and it was dark by the time Quezon could reach the new Quezon Gate facing the college of San Juan de Letran. Speeches of triumph were shouted above the wind and water, and Quezon went to Malacañan Palace as the guest of Governor Harrison.

The first senatorial elections brought an overwhelming victory to the Nacionalista Party, and when the first all-Filipino legislature came into being in October, 1916, there were among its members three Moros, one Ifugao, and one Igorot. Quezon received the unanimous vote of his district, and with equal unanimity was elected first President of the Senate. As the new legislature met, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker cabled its Filipino members to say that they were "in the Orient, the successors of that Continental Congress which more than a hundred years ago established free institutions in America."

A few weeks later, Harrison made public the names of his new cabinet. With the exception of the Vice-Governor, every member was a Filipino. "As a general policy," said Harrison, "I endeavored to give to the Filipino executives all possible opportunity to exercise their own discretion, and even forced upon them responsibilities of decision and action as frequently as possible. At first some of them displayed a tendency to undue caution in their decision, but the exercise of self-government later became perfectly natural and easy to all of them—to such a point, indeed, that at times I had to exercise all the discretion I could summon not to appear to be interfering with them with insufficient excuse. Occasions of this sort arose with less and less frequency after the general public gradually learned to appreciate the fact that the Governor-General was not the sole fount of authority, and that the

heads of department must be consulted upon all matters affecting their functions."

The political leadership was not in the hands of the cabinet members, however, but of Osmeña and Quezon. One was Speaker of the Assembly, the other President of the Senate; but Osmeña was still the top Nacionalista leader. To Osmeña the Governor-General turned again and again for advice on appointments and policies; Quezon resented his subordinate position, which seemed to minimize his status as Senate President. And both men desired a share in the growing executive authority. Osmeña, always the student of governmental procedures, came up with a proposal to establish a Council of State, and Harrison readily agreed. Its membership, under the presidency of the Governor-General, included the cabinet members and the presidents of the two legislative bodies. The Council quickly superseded the cabinet as the real policy-making instrument of government. Quezon moved Osmeña's election as its vice-president, still accepting relegation to the role of Number Two man in Philippine politics.

As for the legislature itself, it lived up to its new responsibilities. Occasional charges of election frauds were no more numerous than in the United States. Lawmaking techniques were mature and effective. Under Osmeña, with the whopping Nacionalista majority, the lower house was a smooth machine that worked efficiently. The Senate, under Quezon, was somewhat more democratic and talkative, except when a "government" measure was involved, and at these times the Senate President got his way. Debates were conducted in Spanish for many years, and it was not until 1920 that Representative Eulogio Benitez delivered the first speech in English. Even today, most of the oratory of the Philippine Congress is in Spanish, though the bills themselves are written in English.

From the beginning, the great political weakness of the Philippines was manifest—the overwhelming power of the majority party. Never was the authority of the Nacionalista Party seriously questioned. It satisfied the demands of the men of wealth, and it appealed dramatically to the majority of

poverty-stricken Filipinos. It was in no sense a dictatorship, if by dictatorship is meant forcible rule by a single group. Its strength was derived from the eager consent of the governed, and that consent arose from the dominating personalities of its two great leaders, Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Luis Quezon.

VII

Harrison's job was to liquidate his job. This was, of course, in keeping with the spirit and the letter of Wilson's philosophy. Like all the little peoples, the Filipinos took the principle of self-determination very seriously indeed. And now they saw an increasing fulfillment of that principle. Soon after the war ended, a large mission went to Washington to urge speedy independence. It was received by Secretary Baker, because the President was in Paris. Baker spoke eloquently of the near-complete autonomy that the Filipinos had achieved, and spoke encouragingly of forthcoming recognition of independence.

But the joint Congressional committee to which they submitted their petition was by no means so promising. Congress was now Republican, and one of the alternating chairmen of the committee was Warren G. Harding, soon to be President of the United States. It treated the Filipino spokesmen with every courtesy but with profound boredom, and the members of the mission were realistic enough to recognize that their mission had failed.

In Paris Woodrow Wilson found the status of the Philippines greatly embarrassing. Surely American domination of a people so articulate in its demands for independence, so convincing in its demonstration of capacity for self-rule, could hardly be compatible with the Wilsonian protestations. When he came back from France, Wilson told the Senate of the suspicion that had been rife in the chancelleries of Europe. And in his last message to Congress, in December, 1920, he made a final appeal:

"Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a

stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress, as precedent to the consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet."

Congress paid no attention. A new President had already been elected, and his attitude had been clear enough as chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines. The Jones Act had left a huge loophole for those who opposed independence. It pegged Philippine freedom on the achievement of a stable government. Wilson, it is true, had expressed the opinion that stability had been achieved. But the Republicans preferred to draw other conclusions.

Harding sent General Leonard Wood to the Philippines as head of an investigating commission in 1921. At a banquet in Manila, the General gave his own definition of stability:

"A stable government means civic courage, courts of justice which give equal opportunities to the senator as well as to the simple *tao*, resources ready for disposal at any moment they are needed by the country, organization which will enable the country to defend its integrity, adequate hospitals all over the Islands which are not found in the provinces we have just visited, social organization which shows keen interest in the protection of the needy and the poor, effective public sanitation, common language, and many others."

By these terms, the Philippines would never be independent. Indeed, by these terms, the United States itself did not deserve independence—and does not today. Now out of office, Harrison wrote furiously in 1921: "What, then, are the tests of a 'stable' government? Must it be a government which under any circumstances can withstand aggression from without, and at all times be able to preserve its independence? If so, has there ever been a stable government in history, and is there one upon the face of the earth today? Must it be perfect

in all its details? If so, has the human race ever set up a stable government? Must it conform exactly to American standards of government? If that is to be the test, must it conform to what we Americans would like to be, or to what we know of our institutions in actual practice? If the latter, there have been times in our own recent history when that test would not have been approved even by Americans. Must it be financially beyond criticism and its credit above reproach? If so, how many of the great nations of the world today could answer that requirement? Finally, must the Filipinos be judged by a committee or by persons known to be resolutely opposed to their independence, or is not the faith of our country involved in the preamble to the Jones Act?"

No argument, whether by Americans or Filipinos, was likely to sway the Republican Party. In the administrations that followed Wilson's, especially under Harding and Coolidge, no advance of any sort was made toward self-government or independence. The Filipinos sent missions, their legislators passed resolutions, but there was no progress. As for the American governors-general, they were efficient administrators who would gladly build roads but would do nothing to promote Filipino self-government.

General Wood, the new Governor-General, had headed (with former Governor W. Cameron Forbes) the mission sent out by President Harding. Its report, submitted late in 1921, fumed over the Filipinization program conducted by Governor Harrison. It announced that Filipino public opinion was uneducated, and that most of the Christian Filipinos preferred independence under American protection but not immediately; "a very substantial element," it insisted, "is opposed to independence, especially at this time." The mission asserted that the insular government was prey to "those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government," and that the people needed time "to absorb and master what is already in their hands."

Inevitably the Nacionalistas saw in Wood the personification of reaction. Quezon, still basking in his 1916 victory, and

aggressive as ever, was all for taking the offensive. Osmeña urged caution, but in the internal party struggle Quezon managed to wrest leadership from his colleague. For years the battle raged, always bitter, always wordy, with Wood ever the stiff military man holding the real power, and the Filipino nationalists capitalizing on every defeat to increase their popularity with the people.

In 1924 a new Filipino mission went to Washington, with a bill of complaints against General Wood. They were received by President Coolidge with the tart warning that "nothing could more regrettably affect the relations of the two peoples than that the Filipinos should commit themselves to a program calculated to inspire the fear that possibly the governmental concessions already made have been in any measure premature."

Two years later the Assembly passed a bill authorizing a national plebiscite on independence. It was vetoed by Governor Wood, and his course was supported by Coolidge in a long message didactically informing the Filipinos that "political activity is not the end of life," and asserting that "a plebiscite on the question of immediate independence would tend to divert the attention of the people towards the pursuit of mere political power rather than to the consideration of the essential steps necessary for the maintenance of a stable, prosperous, well-governed community."

It is not surprising that the Filipinos were delighted to see Wood leave Manila at last. Between his own coldness and the Coolidge quick-freeze in the White House, there had been no room for warm friendship. Wood's successor, Henry L. Stimson, came out in 1927. He had a sense of deep responsibility to the people he had arrived to rule. He was no advocate of early independence; indeed, if anything, he favored an ultimate dominion status for the Philippines, somewhat like that of Canada. But he was a man of human warmth and understanding, vastly different from the stiff military mind-set of his predecessor.

Stimson was succeeded by Dwight F. Davis, and Davis by

Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the last Republican Governor-General of the Philippines. By now the political atmosphere in the United States had changed. Hoover was President, but the Congress had fallen into Democratic hands at last. Once again proponents of Philippine independence found sympathetic listeners among the Democrats. Congress, in the waning months of Hoover's administration, passed the first real bill providing for the independence of the Philippines—the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. Hoover vetoed it; his veto was over-ridden. And at last the Filipinos, in 1932, were able to make out on the horizon the shining goal of their quest for freedom.

VIII

Did they really want independence? It was hard to say, definitively. In the United States, it seemed that the facts added up to one conclusion for Republicans and another for Democrats.

It was pointed out that in 1905 a party of visiting congressmen had been told that the archipelago contained an adequate governing class and a governable populace. The congressmen came home complaining that Filipinos did not understand American democracy.

It was pointed out that the early elections which gave the Nacionalistas such sweeping victories involved only 3 per cent of the total population, because of the strict qualifications for voting.

And it was argued that the Filipino majority did not really want independence, that they had been talked into it by ambitious politicians like Quezon and Osmeña. After all, had not Quezon himself said once that the Filipinos might draw back at the moment of decision? When the time came, he had told a Senate committee, "perhaps the Filipino people may say, 'Well, we prefer to be under the United States, we prefer to be under a country which recognizes our right to be free, and gives us our opportunity to work out our own salvation under its flag.' "

So the questions kept bobbing up: Did they really want independence? Even if they did, should they get it? In the United States it was a favorite subject for high school debates. In Manila it was the subject of much oratory. In Britain and France and the Netherlands, it was a matter to be watched, as the diplomatic language would put it, with grave concern.

Naturally, one easy way to answer the question would be to place it before the Filipinos squarely. Once, the tight-lipped Coolidge had refused to sanction such a plebiscite. But now the Democrats were coming into power. They were not going to shy away from a plebiscite. They were all for it.

In making their choice, the Filipinos would have to weigh many things: the specific merits of the terms on which they were to be offered independence; the problem of national safety in a world already beginning to whisper of another war; the economic strength of their archipelago. And they would have to weigh, too, the advantages of the American paternalistic administration of their country. For the truth was—despite the occasional exposés in liberal periodicals, despite the stiff-necked refusal to co-operate on political issues—that the American record in the Philippines had much to be said for it.

VI

REFORM FROM ABOVE

IN A GENERATION the United States had, half-unconsciously, helped the Filipinos to grow toward maturity. Political progress had been rapid—more rapid than in any comparable situation in history. But it would have been abnormal without progress in other directions.

Here was a nation emerging from long centuries of somnolence under an alien mastery which had deliberately thwarted normal growth. Now the awakening had come. Inevitably, there were the stretching pains of unused muscles, the groggy farewell to a nightmarish world, the irritating introduction to everyday realities. But there was progress, and it was in effect imposed from above.

In his last days, José Rizal had come to believe that the redemption of his people lay in just such reform from above; he did not reckon, of course, on help from across the sea. At Fort Santiago, less than two weeks before his execution, Rizal wrote a message to his countrymen, calling for "the development of the people in order that, by means of education and labor, they might acquire the proper individuality and force which would make them worthy of these liberties." He had no

mystical faith in the people. "Reforms to be effective must come from above," he said. "Those which come from below will be . . . irregular and unstable." Some years later, Elihu Root, author of the instructions to the Taft Commission, described Rizal's words as "the platform of the American government in the Philippines."

Root was right. The American political program in the Philippines consisted of irregular advances toward Filipino self-government; but always the decision was in the hands of Americans, prodded constantly though they were by impatient Filipinos. At the same time, this political development could not have occurred without an accompaniment of educational, economic, and social progress as well. And these, too, were directed from above.

Many years ago, Baron Saito, as Governor-General of Korea, defined Japan's colonial policy thus: "The economic development of the country must come first. Education and the raising of the standards of the people will follow. Afterward political development will be possible." This order of events was reversed by the Americans in the Philippines—reversed in the sense that political development and education were given a high priority, and also in the sense that an attempt was made to advance simultaneously on all fronts rather than in one field at a time.

Indeed, the uniqueness of the American experiment stems from the variety of its approaches. And of these the most important were:

1. That at all times American policy had accepted the inevitability of ultimate self-government for the Filipinos. American liberals like Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt were enthusiastic in their support of Filipino aspirations. American conservatives were more grudging, but never did they repudiate the principle altogether.

2. That, having established such a policy, the Americans followed it up with expanding Filipino participation in the routines, burdens, and pleasures of power.

3. That the training of Filipinos for responsibility was con-

ducted in an atmosphere which made it almost impossible for a large American community to flourish in the Philippines. Few American families have developed roots in the Philippines likely to last for generations.

4. That a continued program of mass education had been carried out from the earliest days of the American occupation, and that this program had prepared large numbers of Filipinos for democratic, responsible citizenship. No other colonial area in the Far East or in the tropics has made such rapid progress in the field of mass education.

5. That a Western language of international importance had been taught to millions of Filipinos, providing them with a window to the Occident. In the other colonial areas, only an élite is provided with the opportunity to learn English, French, or the less valuable Dutch. Indeed, in many colonies, the deliberate policy has been one of concentration on local dialects. Theoretically such a policy is based on a desire not to disrupt long-established folkways; in practice, it is a convenient means of preventing the spread of new ideas which might otherwise be absorbed from the West.

6. That the standard of living in the Philippines was raised to a point where no other colony in the Orient could begin to compare with it. It is true that free trade with the United States, on which the comparative prosperity of the Philippines was based, was shortsighted and illogical. Nevertheless, it had at least succeeded in teaching the Filipinos that material comforts are not necessarily a monopoly of the Occident. The Dutch or French or British could perhaps claim that their colonial subjects did not desire to improve their conditions because they were happy in their primitive state. In the Philippines this argument was exposed as a fraudulent conceit.

II

On August 23, 1901, the United States Army transport "Thomas" docked at Manila, bearing a cargo of some six hundred American schoolteachers. They had been preceded, a

couple of months earlier, by an advance shipment of forty-six teachers, but the size of the passenger list of the "Thomas" has made the date of its arrival an anniversary still observed in the Philippines.

These young schoolteachers had the qualities we like to consider peculiarly American. They were energetic and adventurous, tough but tolerant; their voyage to the distant archipelago was distinctly in the pioneer tradition, for they were traveling westward into a land almost unknown to them. They were not, generally, in search of riches. They were scattered through the provinces and many of them boarded in modest Filipino homes. They saw themselves as men and women fulfilling a great and unselfish mission, and in this sense they were as much missionaries as the friars who had arrived centuries earlier.

But the Thomasites were not the first American teachers. The soldiers themselves, who had come to fight the Filipinos, undertook almost from the beginning to teach them. By now the Filipinos have developed a sentimental concept of the rough American soldier with the heart of gold, who has put down the "civilizing" rifle and picked up a ragged textbook to expound the ABC's to a group of Filipino children clustering at his knee, athirst for knowledge. Thus, Sergio Osmeña once declared that "the Filipino will never forget the inspiring spectacle of American soldiers leaving their guns and, as emissaries of peace and good will, with book in hand, repairing to the public schools to teach the Filipino children the principles of free citizenship."

They had started a great experiment. By 1925, a group of American educators surveying the Philippine school system reported: "The student will scan the pages of history long before he will read of an adventure in human enlightenment more bold than that which has been undertaken in this Oriental setting." This adventure was succinctly summarized by Governor-General Frank Murphy in his message to the Philippine Legislature on the occasion of its final session before the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935:

"President McKinley directed that the Commission 'should regard as of first importance the extension of a system of primary education which shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community.' In its first proclamation to the people of the Philippines in 1899 the First Philippine Commission declared the establishment of elementary schools and appropriate facilities for higher education to be of cardinal importance in the American program for the islands.

"No people ever accepted the blessings of education with more enthusiasm than the Filipinos. Like the Americans, they saw that the road to self-government lies through the school-house. The United States Army began the establishment of modern schools in 1898, and within a year more than 4,500 primary pupils were enrolled in Manila alone. The foundations for a permanent educational system of the country were laid by the Philippine Commission in January, 1901. One of its first acts provided for the appointment of more than 1,000 American teachers. Some of the members of this original group of educational pioneers are still in the Philippines . . .

"Although a system of primary public schools was provided for by royal Spanish decree in 1863, few Filipino children were being educated at public expense at the end of the Spanish regime. Today about two-thirds of all Filipino children of primary school age (seven to ten) are enrolled in the first four grades of the public schools. Total primary school enrollment in March, 1935, was 1,204,485 pupils. They are taught in 7,680 schools, staffed by 27,120 teachers and administrators. In 1934 total expenditures for public education amounted to nearly 23,000,000 pesos. This included more than 20 per cent of the total expenditures of the central government for all purposes.

"Although the burden of popular education in the Philippines, as elsewhere, has been borne mainly by the State, 97,500 pupils are enrolled in private educational institutions recognized by the Philippine Government and operated under gov-

ernment supervision. Those that meet certain definite standards are accredited by the state and are articulated with the public educational system . . .

"No agency of the state has been more effective than the public schools in the creation of a strong consciousness of Philippine nationality and the development of a sense of civic responsibility. The English language is now spoken in every *barrio* in the archipelago by people of all ranks of life. The schools have been an important factor and effective instrument in the improvement of the health of the people. The offices of the government and of private business have been almost completely staffed with competent Filipinos trained in the public schools."

By the 1930's, literacy in the Philippines was higher than in virtually any other European colony in the Orient, higher than in many of the Latin American countries, and at least equal to some of the more backward European nations. But literacy itself, of course, is a relative matter. Ability to pick out letters and form them into words may involve widely differing levels of understanding. A child who has completed third grade may be literate, but he is not likely to understand everything he reads in a daily newspaper. On the other hand, he is obviously better off than a child who has had no schooling whatever.

And even in those early years, he had been given the chance to absorb new ideas that might otherwise never have occurred to him. From the elementary school through to higher education, the Filipino was exposed to the revolutionary democratic concepts on which America has been built. The deep value of this fresh new knowledge cannot be brushed aside. It has done much to make the Filipino what he is today. Recently, Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo made this point with great eloquence.

"America," he said at Rollins College early in 1946, "is still young as a nation. America has a history but no mythology. We, on the other hand, have been nourished on myths as are the old European countries. Early England had its magical,

chivalrous hero, the good King Arthur. Germany had its King Barbarossa, the good ruler with the red beard, who slept enchanted in a cave. And we in the Philippines had our own legendary King Bernardo who had lain hundreds of years imprisoned in a cave on Luzon and who would some day awake to stride gigantically across the land and set us free.

"America taught us that only men, not myths, can set a people free. She taught us this in terms of her own history, and she pictured for us her own shrines—Concord, Lexington, Gettysburg, Shiloh—shrines where men had died in their struggle to set their brothers free.

"These were America's legends, but they were real—made real by the names of men whose voices are still heard in America. They had spoken out for freedom in 1776, 1812, 1863, and their voices are still clear and sharp. We heard them, as this century began, spoken by American teachers in the new American schools in our country, and we made these men our leaders, their words our laws. We set them beside our own heroes in our hearts; we hung their pictures on our walls—your Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln beside our Rizal and Bonifacio and Mabini. The youngest schoolboy in the Philippines glowed over Concord and the Alamo and Gettysburg, and enshrined them beside our own shrines where men had died rather than submit to foreign power—Balintawak, Zapote, Tirad Pass."

It was true. The Filipinos had been taught a new philosophy whose roots were so universal as to become, quite naturally, their own. This was no philosophy of power for power's sake, of conformity for survival's sake, of subjugation for security's sake. The American truths were so overwhelming that they survived the occasional buffets of American misdeeds.

And so there was a great yearning to absorb these ideas, and to learn the language in which they could be found. The American insistence on use of English in all classes, from the earliest grades, found little real opposition among the people, though it troubled some of the Filipino leaders and some of the American educators. To many children, it meant spending

so much time in the bewildered effort to master a strange and intricate language that other subjects went by the board. But the language served another purpose; it was the mortar to bind the people together. Frederic Marquardt, whose parents arrived on the "Thomas," remarks in his highly readable *Before Bataan and After*:

"English as spoken by a Philippine public-school product, especially in the later years when more than 99 per cent of the teachers were Filipinos, may not have sounded much like English as spoken either in the United States or the British Isles. But a Filipino from Iloilo could carry on a conversation in English with a Filipino from Vigan when they couldn't talk to each other in their own dialects. The use of English as a medium of instruction was probably the greatest single factor of unification during the American regime, and the fact that the child of a laborer could learn the language of the courts and of the government in the public schools carried the Filipinos another long step forward on the road toward the self-respect which had been denied them for years."

The educational system on the whole has done more to ready Filipinos for self-government and democratic practices than any other in the Orient. The near-perfect literacy record of the Japanese did not teach them to do away with a military despotism. On the other end of the scale, the almost total ignorance of the Chinese masses has left them in a deadly swamp of never-ending civil violence. In Indonesia the narrow village schools succeeded (until the dam burst) in holding back the will of seventy million human beings. And India, with its myriad of superstitious, unlettered subjects, suggested a deliberate policy of enforced ignorance bolstering British power.

But the educational process in the Philippines has left great gaps in the development of the people. Inevitably, its rapidity has prevented the Filipinos from creating a culture of their own. The Spanish regime lasted more than long enough to suppress indigenous folk arts; only a few songs and dances survive. Today the arts in the Philippines are mostly derivative.

Filipino writers and composers and artists—even talented ones like the poet José García Villa, the writer Carlos Bulosan, and the composer Rodolfo Cornejo—may use Filipino materials but in style and interest they would be hard to distinguish from Americans.

Obviously a nation does not develop a culture overnight. Because of organized education, Filipinos have plunged into the main stream of modern knowledge, into the arts and the sciences, and surely this was progress enough. The great failure did not lie in this direction at all. On the contrary, it lay in the very fact that they sought so ardently for the successes of the mind that they forgot the respectability of the muscle. A dangerously large majority of educated Filipinos looked with disdain upon the prospect of a non-intellectual career. There was—and is—in Manila almost an upper-class English attitude toward the unfortunates “in trade.” The result was too many Filipino lawyers and too few Filipino storekeepers.

Thus, in 1933, over 63 per cent of all students in Philippine secondary schools were enrolled in academic courses. On the other hand, the figures for vocational courses were 6.64 per cent agricultural; .73 per cent commercial; 7.42 per cent home economics; .12 per cent nautical; 7.42 per cent teacher training; and 12.7 per cent trade. These proportions have been improved only slightly since that time, though they are a good deal better than in the early days, when wealthier pupils insisted on having houseboys carry their books to school for them.

Indifference to commercial pursuits has left the field wide open to outsiders, and the frugal Chinese have long taken advantage of this opportunity. Filipino antagonism to the alien, and particularly to the Chinese, can very largely be traced to this cause—which is to a great extent their own doing. Another unforeseen result of the educational policy in the Philippines has been a tightening of social cleavages in the country. Higher education is obviously more available to the wealthy student than to the poor boy from the back country. And

when the university course is completed, the desire for a professional career has thrown the young Filipino intellectual, whatever his origin, into an uneasy alliance with the very wealthy group against which he so often rages in private.

III

In the thirty-odd years since the Americans had arrived in Manila, how great had been the social and economic progress of the Filipino people? The answer depended entirely upon the framework of the question. By comparison with their condition at the end of the Spanish regime, or with the current condition of other Orientals, the progress was phenomenal. By comparison with the United States, or with an ideal blueprint, it fell far short of satisfactory.

Certainly, for millions of Filipinos, there were many gains. A large number of them knew how to read and write. Their health was better, and they were likely to live longer. No longer was every Filipino face pockmarked, and the children were growing up taller and stronger. The average Filipino's height had increased from four feet eleven inches to five feet four inches. The population had doubled. Land under cultivation had increased nearly threefold. Many Filipinos were better off financially than their parents had ever dreamed. The labor wage was the highest in the Far East. Governor-General Frank Murphy, summing up in 1935, asked:

"But what does it signify, this gaining of a better economy, if the chief aim of government is the well-being of the people generally? Is it merely crass materialism, or has it improved the life and spirit of the generality of men and women? The public benefits that have accrued from the wealth created during the last thirty-five years are too numerous to catalogue fully. A few may be sketched:

"1. Higher standards of diet, clothing, and housing have lifted the Filipino laborer far above the level on which he formerly lived.

"2. State funds have been provided out of which railroads,

highways, bridges, and ports have been brought into useful being.

"3. State payrolls make possible the highest average salary for government employees and the largest number per capita to be found in the Orient or Tropics.

"4. Private capital is available for investment in sugar mills, oil mills, stores and offices, land and houses; capital that has been used to modernize the old industries and create new ones.

"5. Less tangible but equally important are the acquirement of better health, wider education, and higher scientific and artistic culture, and all the chain of advancing social standards, which come with an expanding and diffused economy."

Yes, there were many items on the credit side. But, to the extent that these advances stemmed from economic prosperity in the Philippines, they were fraught with danger. For they were the result of the free trade between the United States and the Philippines—so long as there was not world-wide free trade—which meant that the destiny of the archipelago rested on the whim of the United States Congress and the vicissitudes of the American economic cycle. Boom in America meant prosperity in the Philippines; depression in America meant hardship in the Philippines.

Under the Treaty of Paris, proclaimed in 1899, Spanish ships and goods were for ten years permitted to enter the Philippines on the same terms as those of the United States. When this period expired, Congress enacted the Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, establishing—with some limitations—free trade with the Philippines. Under this law, all Philippine products except rice entered the United States duty free if they did not contain more than 20 per cent of foreign materials in value; sugar, cigars, and tobacco were allotted absolute quotas, but within these quotas they could be exported to the United States free of duty. At the same time, American products were permitted to enter the Philippines free of duty, with no limitation whatever. This entire relationship, seemingly liberal, was looked on with foreboding by Filipino leaders.

The newly created Philippine Assembly petitioned Congress

in 1909 not to establish free trade because it "would in the future become highly prejudicial to the economic interests of the Filipino people and would bring about a situation which might hinder the attainment of the independence of the said people." The petition was ignored and, in one form or another, free trade has been maintained ever since. Even now, with independence, it has had to be extended for a twenty-eight-year period.

Free trade has, of course, brought many benefits to the Philippines. It permitted a more rapid economic expansion of the archipelago than would otherwise have been possible after the generations of stagnation under Spain. But it fastened on the country a four-product economy (sugar, coconuts, tobacco, hemp) which was totally dependent on the American duty-free market. Except for fish and rice, which are wholly consumed in the Philippines, 95 per cent of the total prewar national production of the archipelago was for export.

And, during the five-year period ending in 1940, the United States commanded the lion's share of this foreign trade—both ways. The Philippines received 67 per cent of its imports from the United States; the next highest country was Japan, with 9 per cent. It shipped 78 per cent of its exports to the United States; the next highest country, again, was Japan, with 6.5 per cent. In long-range terms, this American monopoly on Philippine trade was clearly unhealthy, because it could not possibly survive the cessation of free trade.

Nevertheless, while it lasted, free trade did benefit the archipelago. It belonged on the credit side of the ledger, as a temporary asset. But the debit side was not bare. Anyone who traveled through the country could observe that most of the people lived in a warm, fertile, friendly, rural slum. In too great a part, the higher average of per capita wealth meant a fantastic accumulation of riches by those who were already rich, while the poor at best received the crumbs. Taxes were remarkably low, but often they seemed oppressive. In the provinces, where most Filipinos lived, usurers flourished like

ravenous and disgusting parasites, while tenant farmers headed hopelessly into ever increasing debt to both moneylenders and absentee landlords, or to the powerful, wealthy, arbitrary *caciques*.

The great problem was the land and the people who farmed it. In the beginning of the American era, this was crystallized into the touchy question of the friar lands, which troubled Taft when he was in Manila. The friars owned more than 400,000 acres of the best farmlands, which they rented at exorbitant rates to some 60,000 tenants. Since the insurrection, the tenants had refused to pay their rents. The friars insisted on their property rights, while the tenants recalled all their grievances against the religious orders and refused to pay. "The truth is," Taft wrote in December, 1900, "that the friars ceased to be religious ministers altogether and became political bosses, losing sight of the beneficent purpose of their organizations. They unfrocked themselves in maintaining their political control of this beautiful country. Distance from Rome and freedom from supervision made them an independent quantity and enabled them to gratify their earthly desires for money and power and other things and they cut themselves off from any right to consideration by the church, by those who are in the church, or by those who, being out of it, respect it."

Finally Taft went to Rome, on instructions from President Theodore Roosevelt, to negotiate with the Vatican. The Church was willing to sell the friar lands, but in a fit of vanity it refused to accede to the American insistence that the friars themselves be replaced with other priests, preferably American. Back in Manila, however, the deal was at last consummated late in 1903, and a good part of the friar lands were bought for \$7,543,000. The insular government gradually sold these lands to Filipinos in small parcels, but unfortunately most of the lands wound up in the hands of the *caciques*. Although Rome never formally recalled the Spanish friars, their influence waned and by the end of 1903 only about two hundred were left in the Philippines.

Filipinos have never ignored the evils of large land-holding; indeed, they are not permitted to ignore it, for the breaking up of the friar lands did not eliminate other huge estates still owned by equally rapacious laymen. There was an overwhelming public resistance to the growth of any further such estates, and the Constitution now provides that no person or corporation may acquire more than 1,024 hectares of land, except for grazing lands, where the maximum is 2,000 hectares. "The average Filipino," observed Governor-General Stimson in 1928, "believes that it is better for his country to be slowly and gradually developed by a population of comparatively small individual landowners than to be more rapidly exploited by a few large corporations which own the land and till it either with tenant farmers or hired employees."

But very little had been done for the already existing tenant farmers—especially those who lived on the plain of central Luzon. Here, in truth, was a depressed class, which had suffered for generations but never in silence. Through the years this fertile soil has been seeded with discontent (and even today, as we shall see in a later chapter, it remains the center of agrarian unrest). Ever and again these farmers have risen to blind revolt, led sometimes by religious fanatics, sometimes by charlatans, and sometimes by sincere social reformers or radicals. They rebelled in Nueva Ecija in the middle twenties, and in Bulacan in the late twenties. In northern Luzon, in 1931, the peasants combined religious fanaticism with a revolt against agrarian oppression and abuses by the Philippine Constabulary. This was the notorious Tayug uprising. At the time, nearly all Filipino politicians (with the exception of irrepressible and unpredictable Tomas Confesor) stressed the religious fanaticism and minimized the legitimate grievances. But Professor Hayden quotes an American account of the time: "The reasons why the Filipino leaders did not wish the Tayug incident to be investigated by a body containing the appropriate members of the governor-general's staff of advisers are obvious. Such an inquiry would inevitably be pushed into the whole realm

of the oppression of the poor peasant by the local boss, the usurer, the Constabulary, and the local official. The fact that the machinery for the registration of land titles is years behind in its work and that the rich and influential 'land grabber' is taking advantage of this situation to despoil the homesteader and small farmer would come up for consideration. The bitter and dangerous discontent of large numbers of peasants in many parts of the central plain of Luzon would be revealed."

The implication here was that Filipino politicians sided universally with the evil, moneyed, oppressive forces. To a certain extent this may have been true. But it is also very likely that many leading politicians, with their usual single-minded concentration on independence, feared that an investigation might provide effective arguments to Americans opposing early Philippine independence.

Another uprising occurred in the thirties, the suicidal Sakdalista attempt to prevent acceptance of the Philippine Constitution. The Sakdalistas were part crackpot, part idealistic, part socialist, and part fascist; they were led by a bitter, talented ex-civil servant named Benigno Ramos who hated Manuel Quezon and the other popular politicians. Ramos was all out for immediate independence, and accused the Nacionalistas of hypocrisy in their devotion to the cause. He played on the magic of the word "independence" in the minds of ignorant peasants, and led them to believe that with independence there would be no taxes, no misery, but only happiness and prosperity for everyone. He demanded tax reductions for the poor, if not outright abolition; a more even distribution of property; forced division of the great landed estates; elimination of graft in the government. At public meetings, he distributed pictures of Quezon enjoying the company of a famed movie star in Hollywood. It was a typical Hollywood publicity photo, but Ramos said it proved that Quezon was squandering the people's money in the United States. Then he showed pictures of himself engaged in serious discussion with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, presumably settling the

matter of Philippine independence. Actually, Ramos had never been in the White House; the picture was a fake.

In the 1934 elections, the Sakdalistas so aroused the peasants that they elected three Representatives, one provincial governor, and many local officials. The revolt came in May of 1935, a few days before the nation-wide plebiscite on the new Constitution. Peasant mobs stormed municipal buildings in a dozen towns around Manila, from Nueva Ecija to Cavite. The fighting was often bitter, and there were many casualties before the uprising was quelled. In New York, Quezon called Ramos a political racketeer. Ramos himself remained safely in Tokyo.

For all except the killed and wounded and jailed, the Sakdalista revolt had something of a musical-comedy flavor. Yet underlying it was a significant indication of the dissatisfaction of the submerged tenant farmers of central Luzon. "During forty years of American sovereignty," Professor Hayden wrote, "caciquism has been reduced in extent, softened in its methods, and morally discredited with a growing proportion of the people. It still exists, however, because it springs from roots of character and custom that are too deepseated to be destroyed in one generation, or in two. But the victims of this system are increasingly determined to end it. Speaking of the Tanguan uprising at Tayug in 1931, the late Governor John C. Early, who knew the common people of the Philippines as well as any American, declared that probably the chief cause of that outbreak was agrarian abuses, one of the most common manifestations of caciquism. 'Take away a man's land and he is desperate,' Governor Early said. 'This is an old condition in that region. Other parts of Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija are just as bad. The whole of central Luzon is ready for an uprising. It needs leadership only. Sandiko [General Geodoro Sandiko, an officer in the revolution of 1899, leader of the tenant farmers of Bulacan, vice-president of the Constitutional Convention] has said that land troubles in central Luzon would not be settled as long as the Americans remain, but will soon be dealt with after they leave. The Americans, General

Sandiko says, have too much respect for property and property rights. Let the United States get out, and the oppressed will soon right things with the bolo.' ”

IV

Thus, in the field of education, there had been striking progress, but many problems were still unsolved. In the realm of social and economic justice, there had also been remarkable progress, but again many evils shrieked for remedies. But in the more tangible spheres, where one could use a hypodermic needle or translate an architect's drawing into cement and stone, there was the greatest progress of all.

Under Dr. Victor G. Heiser, a public health program cut the Manila death rate from 42.28 per thousand in 1903 to 24.66 in 1914. Smallpox, cholera and bubonic plague were practically eliminated from the Philippines. The malarial mosquito was tracked to his unexpected lair in fast-running mountain streams. Leprosy was checked. Epidemics were brought under control; pandemics were eliminated. No longer did filth run in open drains through all the streets of Manila. No other country in the Orient could match the Philippines in the progress made in public health.

As for public works, the record shone. When the Americans came, there were exactly 990 miles of alleged roads in the Philippines. Practically all were rivers of mud in the rainy season, and hardly any better in the dry season. By the 1930's there were almost 13,000 miles of roads and trails, of which about half were in first-class all-weather condition. The number of bridges and culverts jumped from 2,600 to over 8,000. Schools, hospitals, municipal buildings, fine government office buildings were erected. In the Spanish time, aside from the small Carriedo system serving Manila, there were no water-works at all. Dangerous, disease-ridden water was secured by means of jars, buckets, and tin cans from shallow wells, springs, rivers, and lakes, or from rainwater carefully drained off roof tops. By the end of 1934 nearly 300 water supply systems

furnished adequate drinking water to more than a million people; and thousands of artesian wells supplied another three millions with pure water. Irrigation systems had been developed, port and harbor works constructed, interisland shipping greatly expanded and improved, and an auspicious start made in air transportation.

The cost of all this had not been borne by the United States, as many Americans believed. It had been paid for out of the insular treasury, out of the taxes and other revenues collected within the Philippines. With a few minor exceptions, the only sums directly allocated to the Philippines by the United States went for military and naval purposes, beginning with the \$177,000,000 spent by the Army in quelling the insurrection from May 1, 1898, to June 30, 1902. Since that time, millions of dollars have been spent on construction, maintenance and manning of Army and Navy installations, but these were in the primary interest of the United States.

In addition, in 1903, Congress appropriated three million dollars for Philippine relief following a great cholera epidemic (a gift which was, incidentally, less than one-third of what we gave to Japan after the 1923 earthquake). In the same year we spent \$350,000 for the census leading up to the creation of the Philippine Assembly. Throughout the entire period of American rule, the Coast and Geodetic Survey spent approximately six and a half million dollars on chart-making, which largely benefited American naval and shipping interests, and the Department of Agriculture spent several hundred thousand dollars for agricultural services.

Aside from these sums, everything else was paid for by the Filipinos, including education, public works, government services, and even the salary of the American Governor-General.

v

This, then, was the American balance sheet in brief. It was a record of which an honest American could be proud, without ignoring the many flaws. It was a record for which most

Filipinos were honestly grateful. Without American aid, such progress could not possibly have been made, and every Filipino knew it. But gratitude is one thing, and self-respect another. The very progress had, if anything, intensified Filipino pride—and Filipino impatience to strike out independently. The clamor for independence grew stronger. At long last it was heard in Washington. The time for action had come.

VII

TRANSITION

IN THE UNITED STATES, many favored Philippine independence. Some operated within the liberal tradition; the battle of the old Anti-Imperialist League had never been entirely lost. For the liberals this was simply a problem in morality: the time had come to keep a promise no one dared repudiate.

But they had new and powerful allies, strange company for liberals. These were the farm groups—in particular, the dairy and cottonseed oil interests, that had joined in a powerful lobby that worked ceaselessly in Washington, first to curtail imports of Philippine products which they considered competitive, and later to promote Philippine independence toward the same end. There were also the sugar interests—especially the home-grown sugar-beet people, with the Cubans lurking sympathetically near by.

The dairy and cottonseed groups took a dim view of the great increase in duty-free imports of coconut oil from the Philippines. During the first World War, when copra and coconut oil were badly needed, Philippine production had skyrocketed; exports to the United States alone jumped 3000 per cent from 1910 to 1918, and in the 1920's exports of coconut and

its derivatives leveled off to over 160,000,000 pounds a year. The depression which later spread throughout America had long since hit the farmers, and here was a convenient scapegoat.

After all, the product of the "coconut cow" was coming in on the free list, and it was easy enough to assume that cheap Filipino labor costs plus the long life of the coconut palm tree were combining to stifle prosperity in America's dairy and cotton areas. Most of the coconut oil went into the manufacture of soap—and no commercial oil produced in the United States has its peculiar qualities of firmness, easy lathering at low temperatures, lack of unpleasant odor, and adaptability to use with hard water. (The deterioration in quality of American soap during the second World War, when coconut oil was hard to get, gave convincing evidence of virtues so superior as to make coconut oil practically beyond competition. Significantly, soap manufacturers and large soap-users did not join in the clamor against Philippine coconut oil.

By the 1920's Chester Gray of the American Farm Bureau Federation was telling a Senate committee: "We want American soap, and we want it made by American laborers, by American capital, and we want it made by American fats and oils." He was stoutly supported by Senator Bailey, who paid his tribute to the cause of progress by adding: "If that makes us dirty, we won't be any dirtier than our fathers were."

At first the farm groups campaigned for abolition of free entry of Philippine coconut oil, and imposition of the full Smoot-Hawley tariff rate of two cents a pound. This, presumably, would make it unprofitable for soap manufacturers to use coconut oil. And, as for the dairy people, it would presumably make oleomargarine (for which a small proportion of coconut oil was also being used) so expensive that people who used margarine would now turn to butter. The campaign continued throughout the 1920's; it was dirty, emotional, and largely based on complete ignorance of the facts.

But as the years passed the farm groups came to realize that they would get nowhere with a simple, selfish campaign to end

free trade with the Philippines. They turned to the more sophisticated device of backing Philippine independence—which might raise the moral tone of their lobbying and still presumably achieve their original purpose. By December, 1929, the American Farm Bureau Federation was adopting the new though obvious tactic.

"It was an idle gesture," it announced in a resolution at its eleventh annual meeting, "to place even high rates of duty on farm commodities and then allow such commodities or substitutes therefore to enter our markets, duty-free, from our so-called colonies or dependencies. Therefore, we favor immediate independence for such dependencies, but in the event that such independence cannot be granted, we insist most strenuously that the products from these colonies or dependencies be subjected to the rates of duty which are applicable to similar products from foreign nations."

Meantime, domestic sugar producers were alarmed by the sugar exports of our "so-called" colony. In the late 1920's, spurred by free trade and modernization of the industry, the Philippines exported increasing amounts of sugar to the United States, free of duty, and the price of sugar dropped steadily. The Nebraska State Senate declared that this "constitutes a grave menace to the continuation of the beet-sugar industry in this country, and threatens the agricultural prosperity of the State of Nebraska." Actually, of course, the United States never has been self-sufficient in sugar, and probably never will be. It must import from abroad, and the Philippines has been but one source of its supply. As for the price of sugar, it has in general represented the world price, established in London, plus the amount of duty on sugar from Cuba. And if, indeed, duty-free sugar from the Philippines did lower this over-all price, the harm to a few American producers might well be overshadowed by the benefit to all American consumers.

At any rate, the sugar interests followed much the same lines as their dairy and cottonseed-oil colleagues. They wanted tariff concessions abolished. Short of that, they wanted a strict limitation of duty-free imports from the Philippines. And short of

that, they wanted Philippine independence with no economic ties.

In the Senate, Heflin of Alabama shouted: "I am ready to vote to free the Philippine Islands and at the same time to free our American farmers from the unfair and destructive competition to which they are subjected . . . And hereafter when their cheap and inferior stuff comes in to swamp our American farmers we can put a tariff on it and preserve the home market for our American home people." As for Vandenberg of Michigan, he remarked with distaste that he thought the argument "utterly sordid," but this did not prevent him from observing that "the greatest single exposure which American sugar, as well as many other farm commodities, confronts is exposure on the West from free trade in Philippine sugar." Wheeler of Montana had already declared that "the question is whether or not we have the right to protect American industry and American labor, and one of the ways in which we can do it is to protect the sugar producers in my state . . . by giving the Philippines their independence."

In defense of America's honor, it should be said that the special-interest groups were never able to have their whole way. They lobbied and orated and resolutely and exerted fair and foul pressure, but, when the iniquitous Smoot-Hawley tariff bill was approved by President Hoover in 1930, it did not contain a tariff on Philippine products. Copra remained on the free list, and the duty on coconut oil stayed at two cents a pound.

Therefore, whether they liked it or not—and, on the whole, it was a matter of vast indifference to them—the farm groups found themselves supporting Philippine independence. In this they were joined by West Coast labor organizations that feared the threat of cheap Filipino labor coming into the United States at the rate of 5,000 a year.

Thus, out of the raveled cross-purposes of American opinion, slowly and with ill grace, there emerged something of a coalition favoring independence for the Filipinos. It included liberals, hard-boiled farm lobbyists, and Filipino nationalists

themselves. Arrayed against them were American businessmen with investments in the Philippines, who feared for their prosperity once American sovereignty disappeared from the archipelago; conservatives who still held to the ideas of Western imperialism; and some liberals who doubted whether the Philippines could survive without economic links to the United States, and who were outraged by the cynicism of the farm groups.

But now, in the dead center of depression, the Democrats were coming to the fore. Historically they favored independence. Senator Harry B. Hawes of Missouri, a Democratic member of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, took an honest interest in problems of the Philippines. In 1931 he went to Manila to find out what the Filipinos themselves wanted. A turnout of 250,000 earnest Filipinos convinced him; it was the biggest parade Manila had ever seen. In Washington, he introduced a bill providing for the writing of a Philippine Constitution to be submitted to the people, and, if approved, to the United States Congress. His bill also called for a five-year period of transition, during which free trade would be gradually closed off by annual tariff increases by both countries; in the fifth year the Filipinos would vote for or against complete independence.

In late May, 1930, the Hawes-Cutting Bill was reported out of committee favorably, after lengthy hearings. For the Filipinos this was a portent of what was now sure to come. Though the bill was not voted upon by Congress, the stage was set at last. Manuel Quezon, who had been in Washington, returned to Manila and urged that a new independence mission go to America and consolidate the drive for independence. To demonstrate Filipino unity, the mission was made up of men of all political shades; it was led by Sergio Osmeña and by Manuel Roxas, then Speaker of the House. They were destined to stay in Washington for nearly two years, but when they finally returned to Manila they were flushed with victory.

For, after many vicissitudes in the committee rooms of Con-

gress, after many pages of the *Congressional Record* had been filled with views and counterviews, after long conferences with farm and labor leaders, after endless arguments and compromises and debates, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was passed by Congress. For the first time in history, Congress was offering the Filipinos the thing they wanted more than anything else, but with plenty of strings attached.

The bill, on the economic side, established quotas for the major Philippine exports to the United States, within which these exports could enter free of duty. This was a sop, and a very great one, to the special interests. But it at least recognized the fact that free trade cannot be snapped on and off like an electric light. During a ten-year transition period before final recognition of independence, there was to be a gradual application of the American tariff through export taxes, so that free trade would end when independence came. Meantime, the Filipinos were to write their own Constitution, vote on it at a plebiscite, and establish an interim government. There is little point in describing the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill at greater length, for with a few changes it was very like the later Tydings-McDuffie Act under which the Philippines finally achieved independence.

To an embittered man in the White House, the new bill was a red rag. Herbert Hoover had already been repudiated by the voters in the Presidential elections of 1932. He was waiting out the lame-duck months before his successor took office. He had been buffeted by forces stronger than he understood, and for his impotence destiny had punished him mightily. But he had lost neither his courage nor his convictions. To him the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was wrong on every count. It would mean chaos in the Philippines; it would not help American farmers; it might throw the archipelago into the aggressive maw of Japan; it was a repudiation of America's responsibility to herself, to the Philippines, to the world. There was not one single thing he could approve in the bill. And so he vetoed it.

But Hoover was already a forgotten man. The House voted to override his veto by 274 to 94, and the Senate by 66 to 26.

The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was the law of the land. It merely required, before it went into effect, acceptance by the Philippine legislature.

II

Osmeña, Roxas, and their colleagues came back to Manila with the new charter of independence. This was what they had worked for through two tedious years in Washington. It was not as good as they might have wished. But they were sure that it was the best that could be obtained from the United States—which had, at the moment, other problems to worry about. They reported solemnly to the Philippine Legislature that these were “the most favorable conditions obtainable under the present circumstances.” They had perhaps expected plaudits. They found only abuse.

This was not what Filipinos meant when they talked of independence. There were indignation meetings, resolutions of protest, angry editorials. People talked of America’s “unrestrained selfishness,” of an “unequal economic arrangement,” of “artificial obstacles” which would make failure inevitable.

To Manuel Quezon, the turn of events was auspicious. He knew how to exploit it. If only he could play his cards skillfully, he could at last consolidate his political strength so thoroughly that for the rest of his life the words Philippines and Quezon would be interchangeable. And that is exactly what he did.

He led the fight against acceptance of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. He went up and down the land castigating it, and attacking the Osmeña-Roxas team which supported it. He managed, by shrewd politicking, to force Osmeña out of his post as President pro tempore of the Senate and Roxas out of the Speakership of the House. He criticized the trade provisions of the bill, the immigration restrictions, the fact that the powers of the proposed American High Commissioner were not satisfactorily defined. But he was sufficiently familiar with the American scene to know that probably no one could persuade

Congress to change its mind on them. He concentrated on one point most of all. "My main objection," he wrote later, "was to the provision of the law that called for the retention of military and naval establishments by the United States after the Philippine Republic should have been proclaimed. I did not object to the provision regarding the retention of naval stations so long as this was made dependent upon the consent of the Philippine Republic; but I did strenuously and definitely oppose the retention of military establishments otherwise, for it destroyed the very essence of independent existence for the Philippines."

The critical vote in the legislature came on October 17, 1933. It was a straightaway victory for Quezon, a bad defeat for Osmeña and Roxas. The legislature had rejected the first tangible American offer of independence to the Filipinos.

III

Manuel Luis Quezon was now the undisputed political boss of the Philippines. He had earned the title the hard way. He was not a dictator—certainly not in the modern sense, which implies use of armed force, violation of civil liberties, ruthless persecution of a people in the name of their own welfare. He was boss of the Philippines because he was the smartest Filipino of them all. He could think and talk and act faster than any man who opposed him. He had learned the lessons of politics in his native province, in the legislative mills of politics-minded Manila, and in the very Capitol at Washington where he served as Philippine Resident Commissioner. He knew every trick, every technique. He could be tough when firmness was needed; and gentle as a woman when the occasion demanded. For people who respected only authority, he could be the imperious bully; for men of principle he could be sweetly reasonable. He knew when to charm and when to shout. He could walk before an unfriendly crowd in a restless province, and cast a spell of hope and conviction that turned his listeners into eager admirers. He could demolish his enemies, and later

forgive them, and raise them once again to positions of power. His secret was simple. In 1936 he gave it away, in the course of a speech in Manila: "All that is necessary, I think, to make a success in government is simply to act like a human being and decide questions as a human being."

In another country, under other conditions, molded by other social pressures, Quezon might well have gained a world stature equal to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Indeed, there were many similarities between the two men. Though their origins were vastly different, both were alike in their devotion to their people. Both were master politicians, intuitively responsive to the slightest changes in political thinking. Each, with disarming unself-consciousness, identified his person with his nation; Roosevelt could speak to Congress about "Russia, Britain and I"; Quezon could describe his critics as "anti-Filipino." Both were able to be imperious, and each had a keen sense of humor; Roosevelt's was, perhaps, broader and mellower; Quezon's was almost Gallic in its sharpness. Both men hated details, yet insisted on running the government in a highly personal way. Both thought of themselves as planners, but neither was a planner by nature; rather, they were magnificent improvisers, able to produce an original, imaginative, dramatic, and even well-rounded scheme almost on the spur of the moment. Both were effective speakers. Both suffered from lasting diseases—infantile paralysis for one, and tuberculosis for the other—which somehow helped harden the inner core of their personalities and influenced their philosophy of life. By the accident of chance, both men died only a few months before the fulfillment of what had become the last and greatest lifework of each. It was natural that these two men should understand one another thoroughly. Yet, in the case of Quezon, respect and admiration for Roosevelt never really grew into warmth. The statesman whom he truly worshipped was Woodrow Wilson; but it would be hard to think of two men more fundamentally different.

Quezon was born in the little village of Baler, along the northeastern coast of Luzon. He was a *mestizo*, in appearance

more Spanish than Filipino. His father was a schoolteacher who also farmed a small plot of land; the family was at best somewhat above the peasant class, but it was poor. Nevertheless, Quezon managed to study in Manila, and was graduated from the University of Santo Tomas. Unlike the current generation of Filipino politicians, there was no American influence in his educational background. During the insurrection against American rule, Quezon fought in the revolutionary army. By his own account, he seems to have done somewhat more running than fighting.

After the revolt ended, Quezon began his career as a lawyer and later as prosecuting attorney in Tayabas, his native province, and quickly gained a local notoriety for his eloquence, sharp wit, and ability to win cases even against Americans. By 1905 he had learned some English (which he spoke with a strong Spanish accent for the rest of his life), and was now governor of Tayabas. Two years later, when the elections for the first Philippine Assembly were held, he went to Manila to represent his province. He was a successful young politician, but not so successful as a schoolmate of his, who at the same age was elected Speaker of the Assembly: Sergio Osmeña of Cebu. From that time on, the rivalry for political dominance narrowed almost entirely to these two men, but it was to be many years before Quezon won out entirely.

Quezon was the exact opposite of Osmeña; he was fast, fluent, and fiery, while Osmeña was deliberate, reasonable, cautious. Once, when they were students together, Osmeña came out of a lecture on philosophy imbued with a new concept of man and cosmos. "I could prove by reason alone," he told Quezon, "that you do not really exist." "No, you couldn't," Quezon replied hotly, "because I would give you a punch in the nose first." The story is probably apocryphal; but it was Quezon who imagined it and Quezon who told it. This offers something of a clue to the difference between the two men.

In 1909 Quezon went to Washington as Resident Commissioner. He was a new kind of Filipino. He stood in the well of

the House, delivering his maiden speech, and followed up his tribute to the benefits of American rule in the Philippines with an oratorical flight: "But despite it all, we still want independence . . . Ask the bird, Sir, that is enclosed in a golden cage if he would prefer his cage and the care of his owner to the freedom of the skies and the allure of the forest." And again, later: "If the preordained fate of my country is either to be a subject people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter." Here, in truth, was a young man who would go far; he had, with his old-fashioned oratory and his thick Spanish accent, moved the American congressmen more than they would admit.

He looked like a small, fierce bird, with eyes that compelled attention, and an easy Latin charm that intrigued the ladies. He was very vain, almost foppish, about his appearance and clothing, and his prowess as a ballroom dancer was far-famed. In later years, when tuberculosis ravaged his body, his conversation was interrupted frequently by long, exhausting coughing spells—which he turned to his advantage by evoking the sympathy of his listeners. In anger, an eyebrow twitched menacingly, and many an underling knew where he stood with Quezon by watching it surreptitiously. His conversation was brilliant, witty, and alarmingly candid. He formed opinions rapidly, and held to them stubbornly; but when he was proven wrong he undermined critics by a speedy and if necessary public admission of error. He had many critics; some because of fear or jealousy, or because his very brilliance gave them a sense of rebellious inferiority; and some who accused him of actual or intellectual dishonesty. During the recent war, for many months, I talked to Quezon almost every day, generally for at least an hour. Despite his erratic foibles, I quickly came to admire him as by all odds the most interesting and dynamic person I have ever met in public life. He was more than a great Filipino; he was a great man.

During six years as Resident Commissioner in Washington, Quezon made friends, speeches, and politics. And in the end

came the Jones Act. He returned to Manila, to receive a greeting that was tumultuous and triumphant, for the Filipinos were convinced that he had brought about this legislation single-handed. Ever since, Filipino leaders on missions to Washington have secretly hoped to be able to bring home the bacon as dramatically and effectively as did Manuel Quezon in 1916; the precedent has laid something of a curse on Philippine negotiations abroad.

When the Philippine Senate was established, it was natural that Quezon should be elected, not only to the Senate, but to its Presidency. Now, for years, the rivalry between Quezon and Osmeña was marked by an endless series of arguments, splits, and reconciliations—and by Quezon's long absences because of illness. Gradually, as time passed, Quezon cut down Osmeña's position of pre-eminent leadership. With the defeat of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act—after a bitter fight in which he was almost the only top Filipino politician categorically demanding its rejection—Quezon won a total victory.

Now he was ready to go back to Washington and arrange for his second great triumph. As he had expected, no one in Washington would agree to amendment of the economic provisions in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. But he was able to persuade President Roosevelt that the preordained maintenance of military reservations after Philippine independence would make the granting of independence look rather hypocritical. In March of 1934, President Roosevelt sent to Congress a message on the Philippines, declaring:

"Our nation covets no territory; it desires to hold no people over whom it has gained sovereignty through war against their will . . . Our government for many years has been committed by law to ultimate independence for the people of the Philippine Islands whenever they should establish a suitable government capable of maintaining that independence among the nations of the world. We have believed that the time for such independence is at hand."

He recommended that the original Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act

be changed so as to eliminate the provisions for a permanent military base. He was not quite so definite on the naval bases, perhaps because of his sentimental attachment to the Navy, and merely suggested that provisions be made for "ultimate settlement of this matter on terms satisfactory to our own government and that of the Philippine Islands."

The changes were made. The bill was introduced by Congressman McDuffie and Senator Tydings, passed each house within ten days, and received President Roosevelt's approval on March 24, 1934. Quezon could bring home the bacon once again. The changes had hardly made the fight worth while, but now the independence act was Quezon's victory, and not the victory of Osmeña and Roxas. The legislature met in Manila at a special session and, on May 1, 1934, unanimously adopted a concurrent resolution accepting the offer contained in the Tydings-McDuffie Philippine Independence Act.

This was the bread of fulfillment. It was, perhaps, only half a loaf.

IV

What did the law provide?

It authorized the Philippine Legislature to arrange for a constitutional convention. It stipulated that the Constitution must be "republican in form" and that it must contain a bill of rights. It also listed a group of provisions for the interim government which were to be included in the Constitution—among others, that all citizens and officials owe allegiance to the United States; that religious freedom must be guaranteed; that official United States property must be tax-exempt; that the public debt must be limited by the United States Congress, and that no foreign loans could be made without approval of the President of the United States; that there must be an adequate system of public schools, primarily conducted in English; that acts affecting currency, coinage, imports, exports, and immigration must be approved by the President of the United States; that the United States retained control over foreign affairs; that the United States retained the right to ex-

propriate property for public uses, to maintain military reservations and armed forces in the Philippines, and to call into its service all military forces organized by the Philippine Government; that the Supreme Court of the United States could review decisions of Philippine courts; that the United States had the right to intervene for the preservation of the government of the Philippines, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; and that American citizens would have civil rights equal to those of Philippine citizens.

The new Constitution was to be submitted to the President of the United States for his approval, and then "submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands for their ratification or rejection." After ratification, officers of the new government would be elected and, on the proclamation of the President of the United States, "the existing Philippine Government shall terminate and the new government shall enter upon its rights, privileges, power and duties."

The act provided for a continuation of free trade between the two countries over the ten-year transition period, but with quotas beyond which certain Philippine products shipped to the United States would be subject to the regular duty. The duty-free limits were 50,000 long tons for refined sugars and 800,000 long tons for unrefined sugars; 200,000 long tons for coconut oil; and 3,000,000 pounds for abaca and other cordage. Meantime, beginning in the sixth year of the transition period, the interim Government would collect an export tax on all articles shipped to the United States free of duty, starting with 5 per cent in the sixth year and increasing by 5 per cent each year until the tax reached 25 per cent in the tenth year.

This money was to be "applied solely to the payment of the principal and interest on the bonded indebtedness of the Philippine Islands, its provinces, municipalities, and instrumentalities, until such indebtedness has been fully discharged." After independence there would be no further tariff preferences whatever. But the Act did provide for a conference, to be held at least one year before the date of independence, in which Philip-

pine and American representatives would formulate recommendations as to future trade relations.

The President of the United States was given the power, during the interim period, to approve or disapprove all Constitutional amendments; to suspend any laws or actions which might result in Philippine failure to fulfil contracts or meet debts, might impair reserves protecting Philippine currency, or might violate international obligations of the United States. His representative in Manila was to be the High Commissioner, and the Commonwealth was to be represented in Washington by a Resident Commissioner entitled to official recognition by all departments, with a seat in Congress that gave him the right to speak but not to vote.

As to immigration, the act stated that "citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens," and an immigration quota of fifty a year was established.

Then, in section 10 (a), the act declared: "On the fourth day of July immediately following the expiration of the new government under the Constitution provided for in this Act the President of the United States shall by proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty then existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippine Islands, including all military and other reservations of the Government of the United States in the Philippines (except such naval reservations and fueling stations as are reserved under section 5), and, on behalf of the United States, shall recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, under the Constitution then in force."

This large but vital mouthful was followed by a provision hopefully designed to protect the new country from foreign aggressors: "The President is requested, at the earliest practicable date, to enter into negotiations with foreign powers

with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the perpetual neutralization of the Philippine Islands, if and when Philippine independence shall have been achieved."

v

The Tydings-McDuffie Act was accepted by the Philippine Legislature in a resolution whose wording was suspiciously Quezonian. It observed that "the Filipino people cannot, consistent with their national dignity and love of freedom, decline to accept the independence that the said Act grants," and then went on to quote from President Roosevelt's message to Congress: "I do not believe that other provisions of the original law need be changed at this time. Where imperfections or inequalities exist, I am confident that they can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples"—"a statement," said the resolution, "which gives to the Filipino people reasonable assurances of further hearing and due consideration of their views."

The next step was to elect delegates to the Constitutional Convention and get to work on the document itself. Quezon himself stayed away from the Philippines, because, he later explained, he did not want to be accused of having unduly influenced the delegates; but his influence was there in spirit, and it was strong enough. The Constitution was adopted on February 8, 1935, and approved by President Roosevelt six weeks later. It was, of course, modeled on the Constitution of the United States, but there were several important differences.

It opens with a preamble: "The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution."

This is followed by a declaration of principles.

"Section 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty

resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

"Section 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

"Section 3. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the law of the Nation.

"Section 4. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency should receive the aid and support of the Government.

"Section 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State."

A bill of rights contains practically all of the basic rights in the American document, with the exception of trial by jury (a concept foreign to Spanish juridical procedures) and the right of the people to bear arms. It goes beyond the American Constitution to specify freedom of abode and movement; privacy of communication and correspondence; and the right to form associations and societies. It states the legal principle that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved," and guarantees that "free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."

Suffrage is guaranteed to men of twenty-one and over who can read and write, have lived in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality where they vote for six months. Suffrage was offered to women if at least 300,000 of them would favor it in a plebiscite; and subsequently, after such a plebiscite in 1937, the right of women to vote became law.

The National Assembly was established by the Constitution as a unicameral body. This was later changed by an amendment which divides the legislature into a House and a Senate somewhat along American lines. The President is permitted, along with his normal veto powers, to single out for veto particular items in appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills. No money or

property may be appropriated for any religious purpose whatever.

Originally, the Constitution provided for a single six-year Presidential term, with no immediate re-election. By a subsequent amendment, this system was changed to permit two four-year terms of office, but with an immediately succeeding third term prohibited. (This allowed Quezon to run for office again in 1941, at the end of his original six-year term. The understanding was that Osmeña, as Vice-President, would automatically assume the Presidency on November 15, 1943, and serve out the remaining two years of the four-year period. This question rose to plague the Government-in-exile during the war, but was side-stepped when Osmeña gave up his prerogative and permitted Quezon to remain in the Presidency until his death.)

As to the judiciary, the Constitution provides for a Supreme Court to review contested decisions of inferior courts in all cases where constitutionality, tax problems, court jurisdiction, death sentences, life imprisonment, or errors or questions of law are involved. It provides for a Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices, appointed by the President with the consent of the legislative Commission on Appointments.

Impeachment procedures are laid down; a General Auditing Office is provided for, with an Auditor General to examine, audit, and settle government accounts; and the principle is established that the civil service must be operated on a merit system.

The Constitution is very explicit in the matter of conservation and utilization of natural resources. The pertinent sections of Article XII are worth quoting verbatim, for they have since the war become a paramount issue:

"Section 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or

associations at least sixty *per centum* of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association . . . [A hectare is equivalent to slightly less than two and a half acres.]

"Section 6. The State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government."

Other articles in the Constitution cover the national flag (red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars); adoption of a national language (Tagalog was subsequently selected); promotion of science, arts, and letters; state regulation of schools, providing "at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens"; protection to labor, agricultural and industrial; maintenance of dominant Philippine ownership of public utilities; provisions for Constitutional amendments; and transitory provisions covering the change-over to Commonwealth status and subsequently to the com-

pletely independent Republic. The stipulations of the Tydings-McDuffie Act are embodied in an appended Ordinance.

With many minor differences, required by custom or the special needs of the Philippines, this Constitution is clearly based on the American parent document. Its greatest difference, perhaps, lies in the larger power afforded the executive branch of the government. But it is definitely both democratic and republican in concept and practice.

VI

"The building up of the Filipino nation is done," Manuel Roxas had told the House Committee on Insular Affairs. "We do not contend that the Filipinos have reached the highest peak of progress and culture and economic advancement attainable, but we believe that we have reached the limit of progress, advancement and education in democracy that we can achieve under American guardianship. The remainder we must learn by ourselves through the proven process of trial and error. We have built up a homogeneous, united people. We have developed political institutions responsible to public opinion and democratic in form. We have maintained a stable and sound currency. Our government finances are in a firm and healthy condition. Public order exists to a degree which surpasses, I dare say, that which prevails in many of the independent nations of the world. What else is there to be done?"

What else, indeed? Now the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed and accepted by the Filipinos. A new Constitution was written, and approximately 1,700,000 Filipinos (including 200,000 women) had given it their approval—despite the Sakdalista uprising—in the 1935 plebiscite. Quezon, gleeful and victorious, was ready to be generous to his erstwhile opponents, and invited Osmeña, Roxas, and their followers to join him in the election campaign that would install the new officials of the Commonwealth.

Quezon was nominated for the Presidency, and Osmeña

for the Vice-Presidency. In later years, Osmeña explained that he had accepted this subordination because he felt that a continuation of the bitter party split would be harmful to the newborn government; and also because in an atmosphere of political ins and political outs many competent men would be barred from important government positions. These reasons seemed valid enough at the time, though they entrenched a one-party system injurious to the democratic process. The Quezon-Osmeña ticket was opposed only by Aguinaldo and by the religious leader, Bishop Gregorio Aglipay of the Philippine Independence Church. Of more than a million votes, Quezon received 69 per cent, Aguinaldo 15 per cent and Aglipay 14 per cent. Indeed, in the election sweep, the only startling development was the fact that Osmeña received more votes than Quezon. There was at least some consolation for the man who had outshone Quezon for so many years.

But the matter was hardly noticed amidst preparations for the most joyous holiday in all the history of the Philippines. It dawned bright and clear; the ceremonies would begin very early to avoid the midday heat. The sun was warm and friendly, and Manila was a golden city, overflowing with happy people. /It was November 15, 1935, the birthday of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the inaugural day of President Manuel Quezon. /

He left his house in Pasay, near the edge of the bay, and rode through streets bedecked with flags and arches. Before the legislative building hundreds of thousands of Filipinos packed every open space. On a platform sat the delegation of visitors from Washington—Vice-President Garner, Secretary of War Dern, Speaker Byrnes, seventeen Senators, twenty-six Representatives. Beside them were the Filipino dignitaries, department heads and jurists and legislators.

Secretary Dern read President Roosevelt's proclamation establishing the Commonwealth Government. Frank Murphy read his farewell address as Governor-General, which was at the same time his introductory address as High Commissioner. Chief Justice Ramon Avanceña stepped up to administer the

oath of office to the new President. A secretary had mislaid the special pen with which the new President was to sign the document, and Quezon roared a resounding oath—"Punietal!"—which was gleefully picked up by the microphones for the assembled crowd and for radio listeners all over the world. And now Manuel Quezon, in high spirits, delivered his inaugural address.

"We are bringing into being a new nation," he said. "We are witnessing the final stage in the fulfillment of the noblest undertaking ever attempted by any nation in its dealing with a subject people . . .

"The Government which we are inaugurating today is only a means to an end. It is an instrumentality placed in our hands to prepare ourselves fully for the responsibilities of complete independence . . .

"We shall build a government that will be just, honest, efficient, and strong so that the foundations of the coming Republic may be firm and enduring—a government, indeed, that must satisfy not only the passing needs of the hour but also the exacting demand of the future."

He asked for the support of every Filipino. He promised to appoint to the bench only men of honesty, character, learning, and ability. "No man in this country from the Chief Executive to the last citizen is above the law." He spoke of the common man: "It is our duty to prove to him that under a republican system of government he can have every opportunity to attain his happiness and that of his family." Labor's rights would be protected, and the new government would "bring about the needed economic and social equilibrium between the component elements of society." The budget would continue to be balanced. Taxes were low, but if need be they might be raised. In any event, the government would be run with economy. The civil service would be independent, public instruction adequate, public health safeguarded, and the natural resources conserved and developed. "We must increase the wealth of the Nation by giving greater impetus to economic development, improving our methods of agriculture, diversi-

fying our crops, creating new industries, and fostering our domestic and foreign commerce." Toward other nations, the golden rule would be good will.

"I face the future," he concluded, "with hope and fortitude, certain that God never abandons a people who ever follow His unerring and guiding Hand. May He give me light, strength, and courage evermore that I may not falter in the hour of service to my people."

The roar of the people, exulting in the hour of triumph, swelled through the square and rolled in widening circles over the golden city of Manila. It could be heard, none too faintly, in Batavia, Saigon, Rangoon, Singapore, and Bombay.

VII

Now came the happy years, years of growth and development. And the record, on the whole, was rather good.

Quezon was convinced that he must face the future realistically, and must recognize that when total independence arrived the Philippines could not depend upon a mere recognition of the 'country's neutrality. He arranged for General Douglas MacArthur, son of Arthur MacArthur, to leave his post as Chief of Staff of the United States Army in order to build a new Philippine Army. MacArthur recognized the difficulty of defending the archipelago. But he hoped to make the Filipinos strong enough to cause a potential aggressor to think twice before attacking.

"Our program of national defense," President Quezon explained to the National Assembly, "must serve notice upon the world that the citizens of these Islands are not to be subjugated; that conquest of this nation cannot be accomplished short of its utter destruction, and that that destruction would involve such staggering cost to an aggressor, both in blood and gold, that even the boldest and the strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such an undertaking. . . It is imperative that our plans reach fruition by the time the beneficent protection of the United States shall have been

finally withdrawn. We have ten years, and only ten, in which to initiate and complete the development of our defensive structure, the creation of which, because of the conditions of our past existence, must now begin at the very foundations. Not a moment is to be lost."

As it happened, there was not even ten years for the work. The plan called for compulsory military service which would ultimately result in a pool of about 400,000 partly trained reservists, backed by a few thousand regular troops. Japan's attack came in the middle of the program, and put it to an unfair test. Yet the fact that many Filipinos had some knowledge of the rifle and of rudimentary military practices turned out to be extremely valuable.

In the field of social and economic progress, Quezon was plagued by the inequities of the agrarian system. In December, 1935, he told the National Assembly: "The problem involved in the relationship between tenants and landowners, whether within large or small estates, owned by individuals or corporations, public or private, transcends in importance practically all other social problems of the Philippines . . . The difficulty in the solution of this problem is complicated by the lack of a uniform tenancy system in the Philippines, as each province has its own, created and developed by century-old customs and practices. And not only has each province a system distinct from the others, but at times that system varies in the different municipalities; and even within a municipality not all the landowners follow the same practice."

Whatever the reason, the fact remained that many Filipino farmers were lost in a morass of hopeless debt. In some areas, it was estimated that tenants were receiving the income of only 8 per cent of their crops; the rest went to the landowners and usurers. In Manila some politicians proposed that the government take over the land. But this, said Quezon, would "only transfer to the Government the difficulties which the tenants now have with the present landowners." And where the experiment was made it worked out as he had said.

Expropriating the land and giving it to the people who

farmed it—the most radical proposal—met with the same difficulty. It is no solution to settle a family on a four-hectare farm if it cannot make ends meet on less than eight hectares.

Only planned resettlement could truly solve this problem, and during the six peaceful years of the Commonwealth a few tentative steps were taken along these lines. Of these, the Koronadel project in Mindanao was the most promising.

Meantime, wages were also an urgent problem. Around Manila they were averaging sixty centavos (30c) a day, and in the Ilocos regions only forty centavos (20c). At Quezon's behest, the National Assembly established a minimum daily wage of one peso (50c) in the country districts and one peso twenty-five centavos (67½c) in the municipalities. To Americans this may have sounded pitifully small; but in the Orient it was a social advance of almost revolutionary proportions. It smacked of wealth unknown to the people of China, of India, or even of bustling Japan. And it was accompanied by enactment of a law for the eight-hour day.

Quezon busied himself with appointments, reorganizations, new projects. The National Development Company, product of semisocialistic thinking, was revitalized to permit the government to establish commercial enterprises essential to the national interest but too risky or unprofitable for businessmen to essay. At the end of the first year of his administration Quezon gleefully announced an unencumbered surplus of fifty million pesos in the Philippine Treasury. "This," he said in New York, "is in spite of the fact that we have introduced public improvements that were of immediate benefit to the country. We have increased the number of our roads, the number of our hospitals, the number of our schools, and this increase in our surplus was not due to the fact that we have been going after the taxpayer in the form of increasing taxes. We have been going after the taxpayer who heretofore did not pay his taxes; in other words, we have made the collection of taxes effective."

These, then, were years of growth. It was not a perfect government, but there was much to which it could point with

pride and relatively little to view with alarm. As a government it was stable, rather efficient, unafraid of experimentation, and less ridden by graft than most Latin-influenced regimes. To be sure, the wealthy elements, the moneyed interests, the rich Spaniards who openly backed Franco, were able to get to the ear of the President. Their financial backing filled the party coffers. But no one could honestly say that the President of the Philippines considered himself beholden to any man, or that he acted as though he was; and the only group to which he acknowledged an obligation was the group known as the Filipino people.

There were difficulties, of course. Murphy's successor as High Commissioner was Paul V. McNutt, who insisted on his prerogatives as representative of the President of the United States, and whose highhanded manner made him unpopular with Filipinos. When McNutt finally proposed re-examination of the whole independence program, his unpopularity was greatly enhanced. He was in turn succeeded by Francis B. Sayre, a liberal whose lack of personal warmth created many difficulties of which he was frequently unaware.

And, over all, there was the gathering cloud of war. Quezon, with the quick intuition of the congenital politician, had sensed the danger from the beginning. He went ahead with his national defense program despite cries of "warmonger and dictator" in the Philippines and in the United States. But even he fell into the easy delusions of most Americans; things were going so well; it was inconceivable that the Japanese would dare challenge the wealth and power of America.

In the hot season, for rest and recuperation, Quezon would go to the summer capital of Baguio. There, in the cool mountain air of which he was to be so pathetically reminded when he reached the Adirondacks for his last illness, he would pass the days pleasantly with his family. One morning in December came a disturbing telephone call from Jorge Vargas, the Secretary to the President. Vargas talked of war. "George, you are crazy," the President said. But he decided to return to Manila that very day. At breakfast, the sound of airplanes

was heard from a distance. An American engineer named Sylvester went out to the porch, and returned to remark that they looked like American bombers. The President's daughter, Zeneida, thought it would be nice to look at them.

It was a squadron of seventeen planes, 10,000 feet up, flying a V formation. Before their eyes, unbelievably, a string of bombs plummeted to earth not half a mile away, bringing death and terror to the soil of the Philippines.

VIII

THE WAR YEARS

EVERYBODY KNOWS how war came to the Islands: how the Japanese, a few hours after Pearl Harbor, bombed many targets in the Philippines; how they landed at several points in the archipelago; how they pushed the American and Filipino troops back by dint of superior numbers and equipment; how Manila, declared an open city, was first raided and then occupied; and how the American and Filipino forces fell back to Bataan and held out through long months of ceaseless fighting, of short rations and few weapons, of hope turned to fatalism and finally to despair.

Bataan and Corregidor are now enshrined in the military history of both the United States and the Philippines.

But the lasting import of the battle was political. It lay in the fact that, for every American fighting man on the peninsula, there were at least four Filipino fighting men. It lay in the fact that the heroism of these Filipino soldiers matched, man for man, the heroism of the Americans. It lay in the fact that the Filipinos were not impressed soldiery, not mercenaries, not servants, but upright and self-respecting individuals who

were making a conscious choice when they proved that they were willing to die in resisting the enemy.

American heroism on Bataan was, after all, no matter for wonder—except for the universal wonder at any mortal's willingness to risk his life in any cause. The war with Japan, after all, was an old-fashioned war, in the minds of most who fought it. Japan had, without provocation, violated American soil, in Hawaii and the Philippines. The violation had to be punished, not only because of the nation's sense of honor, but because otherwise there would be no guarantee that it would not happen again. Unlike the war against Germany, in which was involved the American contempt for the idea of fascism, this was a war by one nation against another nation which had transgressed.

For the Filipinos it was not so simple. True, the Japanese had violated Philippine soil. But they had done so while the American flag still flew over that soil, while American sovereignty was supreme. And the Japanese insisted they bore no grudge against the Filipinos; indeed, they were almost apologetic for the inconvenience caused to the Filipinos.

Such propaganda seemed ridiculous to the white man of the West; it was not so ridiculous to the Oriental.

The Japanese spoke of Asia for the Asiatics. They spoke of all the Occidental stupidities and cupidities in the Far East, of British arrogance and American crassness. They aroused the suffocating memories of humiliations which every Oriental had experienced if he had come in contact with the white man. They talked of Anglo-American imperialism, of Dutch and French greed. They pointed to the fact that Japan herself was an Asiatic nation, that by her ethnic origins and by her traditions she deserved the support of her fellow-Asiatics. They pointed to her military successes—her early victory over Tsarist Russia in 1905, her successful challenge to the Western world in China since 1931, and now this new and exciting string of easy victories since the first great victory at Pearl Harbor. The day of imperialism is ended, they said. The white man will never again be supreme in the Orient, they said. We

offer you, they said, self-respect and pride and prosperity, if you will only come to our side and accept our leadership.

It was a potent argument. Had not Winston Churchill himself furthered it when he declared that the Atlantic Charter, pledging "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," did not apply to the colonies in Asia? Had not the Dutch furthered it also, when they informed Indonesian Nationalists that the Charter was no more than a cynical propaganda device to bolster American public opinion and encourage the occupied countries of Europe?

A few weeks before Pearl Harbor, the able Filipino journalist, Carlos P. Romulo, made a swing around subject Asia, talking to the leaders of the people; they were more frank with him, perhaps, than they might have been with any white man.

Annamites of French Indo-China told him: "The French have two rules for dealing with natives—the boot and the riding crop." The Siamese said: "We are neutral." In India, Gandhi told him: "We are entitled to exactly what you were given by America. It is our birthright." U Chit Hlaing, leader of the Burmese House of Representatives, asked bitterly: "Why have the British not given us the opportunity to show what we can do about governing ourselves—since America has put such trust in the Filipinos? Who knows whether the boy can swim, if he is not permitted to enter the water? This part of the world is still ruled by three words: Might makes right." And Indonesian leaders railed against their Dutch masters:

"We have asked for specific reforms. We have asked for the right to assert the genius of our race. No matter how weak and undeveloped that genius may be, it is ours, and we want it to live. We have been given many promises. They always lie vaguely in the future. We want that future now."

What Romulo had heard, surely, the Japanese had also heard. And Japan's emotional appeal to the peoples of South-east Asia was keyed, most effectively, to this rising, restless

spirit of resentment against the West. At best, many Orientals would welcome the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. At worst, Orientals would say, "Well, it cannot be worse for us under the Japanese than it is now under the British (or Dutch, or French). They cannot take away our liberty, for we have no liberty. They cannot humiliate us, for we have lost our pride. They cannot make us more miserable, for we do not now enjoy the riches of our countryside."

In those critical months of 1941 and 1942, it required a great measure of maturity and political sophistication to withstand the blandishments of Japanese propaganda. Only one Oriental nation in all of Southeast Asia met this crucial test of maturity, and that was the Philippine nation. The American program in the Philippines, with all its flaws, had made sense to the Filipinos—the mass education, the rise in living standards and health, the basic principle of equality, the promise of independence made and now being kept. They could look to Korea and Manchuria and contrast the conditions of those lands with their own. The Burmese, Malayans, Indo-Chinese, Indonesians, could not possibly make the comparison—either because they had been kept in total ignorance and had never heard of Korea or Manchuria, or because even if they had the contrast did not appear too great.

And so the decision was made by the Filipinos, as it was by all the other subject peoples of Southeast Asia. The Filipinos decided, of their own volition, to fight. The others decided, with but few exceptions, to help the Japanese or at least not to hinder them—in any event, not to help the white men.

The Filipino decision—symbolized as it was on Bataan—was one of the most remarkable political facts of World War II. It was proof that two peoples of a different color, background, history, and aspirations, could combine in defense of a common ideal.

But Bataan was only the symbol. The Filipinos who fought there were, some of them, crack troops of the Philippine Scouts; in far larger part, they were raw recruits who had in many cases not even received the three months of basic train-

ing provided for in the Quezon-MacArthur military program. But, trained or raw, these men were soldiers. No one could order them to be heroes, yet it was at least their duty to act like soldiers.

The reality of Filipino resistance was greater than the symbol that was Bataan. The reality was the overwhelming unanimity of the Filipino people everywhere—the peasant, the woman, the child, the laborer whose income had been one peso a day. These people, throughout the archipelago, made a private decision: they resisted. Some went into the hills and joined the guerrillas, in the classic Filipino tradition. Many did not; for not all human beings are born for the rigors of heroism. Some helped surreptitiously—providing money or food to the guerrillas, reporting on Japanese military movements, retiring into deliberate impenetrable stupidity in dealing with the Japanese, or simply not telling what they knew about Filipino and American intelligence agents who penetrated even into Manila. The countryside of the Philippines resisted the enemy.

And the Filipino civilian had to remake his decision every day. Every day he was pounded by fluent Japanese propaganda promising him a life of self-respect and comfort. Every day, year after year, he saw all around him the proof of Japanese invincibility: the Americans had fled; they had not returned; they had betrayed the Filipinos, because they had guaranteed protection and now they were gone; they would never return, for Japan was too shrewd, too powerful, too successful. This was the propaganda of the fact, and the propaganda of words from the short-wave transmitters in San Francisco seemed weak by comparison; yet the Filipinos listened to the words and stood firm.

Meantime, in the hills and forests, the guerrillas kept up the fight. The farmers of central Luzon harried the Japanese not a hundred miles from Manila. Secret printing presses turned out newspapers carrying the latest information from San Francisco, and these somehow managed to find their way into the city. The cages at Fort Santiago were once again filled with

Filipino martyrs. In the Visayas, there were whole islands on which it was unsafe for a Japanese soldier to walk. In Mindanao, the resistance forces were organized into regular military units, with both Filipino and American officers. They were complete and formal organizations, down to training camps, maneuvers, OCS, orders of battle, and the usual military red tape.

II

Of course, there were the collaborators. The Japanese would not have been able to rule the Philippines without them. There were Filipinos who accepted high government posts which made them the mouthpieces and the executors of the Japanese will. There were profiteering businessmen who engaged in the notorious "buy-and-sell" racket, who traded in vital supplies so necessary to an occupying army living off the land. There were landowners who made millions by selling rice to the Japanese at inflated prices, while the Filipinos hungered.

Why were there collaborators in the Philippines? There could be many explanations. Some men had been in sympathy with Japan long before the war—not necessarily in a treasonable or conspiratorial way, but rather from honest conviction, tinged with not a little old-fashioned resentment against the white man and his discriminations. At the head of these, perhaps, could be placed the name of José P. Laurel, the puppet president.

Some men had been ordered to stay behind, and had acted like good soldiers. Such a one was Jorge Vargas, the capable Secretary to the President, whom Quezon had instructed to remain behind and deal with the Japanese in order to protect, as much as possible, the interests of the Filipino people. It was a thankless and distasteful job, but someone had to do it (just as an American, Claude Buss, was instructed by High Commissioner Sayre to remain behind and represent American interests). Vargas may have gone too far in carrying out Quezon's orders; he accepted the post of Chairman of the Executive Commission, the civil medium through which the Japanese

ruled the country, and when the puppet government was set up he became its Ambassador to Tokyo. But it is hard to see how he could have prevented himself from being pushed further and further along the road of collaboration, once he had taken the initial step.

The excuse that might have been valid for Vargas was exploited by a hundred others after liberation. Everyone, it seemed, had received personal orders from Quezon to remain behind and deal with the Japanese. On the face of it, this was ridiculous. Quezon may have implied something like this to a few men, but he did not do so to all who claimed he had. And even if Quezon had issued such orders, these men were not forced to obey him. They were not soldiers to obey blindly; and the war-crimes decisions at Nuremberg made the point that even a soldier must not obey orders which violate his higher loyalty to humanity, justice, and freedom.

There was a third group of men, whose reasons were quite different. These collaborated because of fear of reprisal against themselves or their families; because they were opportunists willing to play both ends against the middle; because they thought they could outwit the Japanese and perhaps help their countrymen; because they believed in their ability to come out on top, no matter who won the war. There were more such men than is good for any country. One of them is now President of the Republic of the Philippines. His name is Manuel Roxas.

What, then, constituted collaboration? It was not an easy question to answer, even during the war. After the war, it was going to be so beclouded by other factors that it would be almost impossible to answer. As to some, of course, there was no question—Aguinaldo, Ricarte, Pio Duran, Leon Guinto, a few others. They helped the Japanese from the earliest possible moment. But the others were not so easy to label, and even the most ardent guerrilla could not always make up his mind. In one village near Manila, I was told in 1945 that everyone considered José Laurel "the real hero of the Philippines," because he had tried to oppose the Japanese face to face. Yet

in this village every male had been arrested and starved by the Japanese for three days because they refused to produce rice for the occupation army.

What was happening, especially in Manila, was that the people had developed a dual attitude toward the war. They were bitterly anti-Japanese. Yet their lives were filled with daily problems of survival; and it made them feel safer to know that in Manila there were Filipino leaders who, though prisoners of the Japanese, were doing all they could to protect them from Japanese excesses.

The truth was that this duality, however sincere, was totally misguided. It helped the Japanese mightily. And there has been no proof that, on any important matter, the Filipino puppets prevented the Japanese from doing what they wanted to do. Laurel, it is true, opposed the suggestion that the puppet government institute conscription in the Philippines; but the suggestion had been made halfheartedly, and was withdrawn with relief, for the Japanese were well aware of the dangers in arming the Filipinos. Roxas, it is claimed, made an attempt to get a fairer distribution of rice to his hungry countrymen; but there has been no satisfactory evidence that he succeeded.

III

Japanese policy in the Philippines developed, roughly, into three phases. In the early months, it was a policy of military cruelty, compounded of the normal exuberance of a conquering army and of irritated impatience with an unfriendly civilian populace. In these days, there were excesses everywhere. This was the period when recalcitrant Filipinos were manacled to trees in the Manila streets, standing all day in the boiling sun; when the infamous March of Death was organized, to be followed by the even more infamous regime at Capas, where five hundred prisoners died each day; when the city of Cebu was burned to the ground in retaliation for its resistance.

But, after the fighting on Bataan had ended, a new policy

was introduced. Now the Japanese design was to integrate the Philippines into the Co-Prosperity Sphere, to win Filipino friendship, to restore order so that the country might make its contribution to Japan's war effort. In this period the puppet Constitution was written and promulgated, and the puppet Republic established.

This phase was followed, in turn, by the weeks of hysteria which began after the first American air raids on Manila, and intensified with the landings in Leyte. Increasingly aware that the Americans were winning the war, the Japanese military took over, and became ever more rigid and uncompromising. Their hysteria reached its climax in the atrocities of the last days of Manila.

Through all these changes, the occupation inevitably forced many hardships on the Filipinos. Their liberties were curtailed. There was no free speech, no free press, no political freedom of any kind.

Economically, the country went from bad to worse. Early in the occupation, the Japanese reduced the minimum wage from one peso a day to about forty centavos, and all government salaries were slashed by about 50 per cent. (Later, inflation forced them to permit some wage increases for unskilled labor and lower-paid government employees.) Prices were kept down during 1942 and the first half of 1943, and a measure of control over the cost of living, adequate for Japanese purposes, was maintained until well into 1944. But the system was opposed by the increasingly overt hostility of the Filipino people as well as by the pressure of American military victories too close for comfort.

Severe shortages began to develop, especially in food and clothing. Farmers hoarded rice. The black market became the only market. In late 1944, with the American landings in Leyte, all semblance of order in the economy disappeared.

From December, 1941, to January, 1945, the cost of living increased 650 times. By then a single Philippine Treasury Certificate (one peso) would bring eighty-five Japanese pesos

on the black market, and real estate prices were thirty-seven times their prewar level. Salaries increased only sixteen times. The price of a sack of rice jumped as much as a hundred pesos a day. A normally dressed woman walking along a Manila street was likely to have her clothes torn off her body by ragged passers-by. Late in 1943 one commentator observed that "the main problem today is not how to live but how to exist."

Meantime, there was serious unemployment in Manila, whose population swelled as people poured in from provinces where it was impossible to get enough food. The Japanese tried to counteract joblessness by a program of public and military projects designed principally to repair what had been destroyed in the early fighting. But living costs continued to soar, and by the time Manila was liberated inflation was completely out of control.

Filipino banks were forced to remain open, and to use the worthless "Mickey Mouse" currency. Many debtors gleefully paid off their debts during this period, and creditors were left with large sums of money which, when liberation came, had only a souvenir value. For lending institutions this was to mean near-disaster after victory; for usurers it was a well-earned setback.

Politically, the Japanese were energetic. The Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces issued manifestoes and proclamations by the dozens, couched in an English that would have been laughable if their earnestness were not so deadly. "The sovereignty of the U.S.A. over the Philippines," he announced early in January, 1942, "has completely disappeared . . . The purpose of the Japanese expedition is nothing but to emancipate you from the oppressive domination of the U.S.A., letting you establish 'the Philippines for the Filipinos' as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Greater East Asia and making you enjoy your own prosperity and culture . . . All the people in the Commonwealth are requested to comprehend the real intentions of the Army and never be deceived by

propaganda of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, and you should never disturb public peace in any way, warning yourselves against rashness, and refraining from spreading wild, fabulous rumors."

Six weeks later, he said, with obvious annoyance: "We have no intention of conquering any Asiatic people, nor do we have any territorial desire on any Oriental nation . . . But if you fail to understand the true and lofty purpose of Japan, and instead obstruct the successful prosecution of the military activities and tactics of the Imperial Japanese Forces, whoever you are, we shall come and crush you with our might and power, and thus compel you to realize by means of force the true significance and meaning of our mission in the Far East."

On January 23, 1942, the Japanese appointed Vargas Chairman of the Executive Commission, with power to govern "under the commands and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces." Six executive departments were created, headed by Filipino Commissioners, but with Japanese "advisers." Every one of the collaborating Commissioners appointed by Vargas—Benigno S. Aquino, Antonio de las Alas, Rafael R. Alunan, Claro M. Recto, and Quintin M. Paredes—was an experienced and respected Filipino who had held important government positions before. The lesser personnel consisted chiefly of holdovers from the Commonwealth Government.

The Executive Commission lasted until October, 1943. It was extremely useful to the Japanese as the chief means of carrying out their will in the Philippines. It tried to conduct the normal functions of government, to provide food and relief to the thousands of destitute and hungry, to reconstruct public works destroyed in the fighting, and to induce Filipino and American guerrillas to surrender. In most of these endeavors it was not overly successful.

In December of 1942 the Japanese sponsored a new political party called *Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas* (Peoples Organization for the Support of the State), or *Kali-*

bapi for short. The Kalibapi was designed to be the sole political party in the country. Benigno Aquino was Director-General, and the notorious Pio Duran Secretary-General; one of the other top leaders was Benigno Ramos, the erstwhile Sakdalista. In its monolithic structure and totalitarian ideology, the Kalibapi was a Japanese-sponsored imitation of fascism. It absorbed the previously established Neighborhood Associations, which the Japanese had created to help distribute rice and other commodities, and which now assumed new policing functions reminiscent of the Nazi block warden system.

The Kalibapi soon claimed a membership running into hundreds of thousands. To the extent that this may have been true, it is likely that most of its members hoped to obtain from their support a larger share of the meager food and clothing supply in the Philippines. But it was useful to the Japanese as a propaganda vehicle and an effective means of political control. When Laurel became puppet president, he announced: "I shall stand for no political party while I hold the rudder of the ship of state. We must have only one party—the people's party (Kalibapi), a party that stands for peace, reconstruction, sound national economy, social reform, and the creation of a new world order."

By 1943 the Japanese policy of attraction was in full swing. In June Premier Tojo informed the Diet that the Philippines would now receive its independence. Two days later the High Command of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines ordered the Kalibapi to set up a preparatory commission for Philippine independence. Its members included José Laurel (chairman), Benigno Aquino (assistant chairman), Jorge Vargas, Antonio de las Alas, Teofilo R. Sison, Rafael Alunan, Claro M. Recto, Quintin M. Paredes, José Yulo, Emilio Aguinaldo, Miguel Unson, Camilo Osias, Vicente Madrigal, Manuel C. Briones, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pedro Sabido, Sultan Sa Ramain, Melecio Arranz, and Manuel Roxas. In September the Constitution was written, and every member of the commission signed it. Three days later, a Kalibapi convention summarily ratified it. There was no attempt to submit it to the

Filipino people, for obvious reasons. But commission members and Kalibapi leaders toured the country, speaking in behalf of the new Constitution and pleading for public support.

IV

In the writing of the puppet Constitution, one of the most active was Manuel Roxas. At last the Japanese had succeeded in getting his co-operation. It was a major victory. (In Washington, when the intercept of the Manila radio broadcast announcing Roxas' membership in the commission was shown to President Quezon, the exiled Filipino leader refused to believe the news. He insisted that this was merely "clever Japanese propaganda.")

Manuel Roxas was surely the most popular man in the Philippines, now that both Quezon and Osmeña were far away. He had been Secretary of Finance in Quezon's cabinet, and in the prewar elections had won a seat in the Senate. He was a magnificent orator. His executive ability was undisputed. He understood the science of government. He was something of an economist. Younger than Quezon and Osmeña, he was the idol of the young Filipinos. Everyone knew that Quezon had been grooming him as his successor, and everyone felt that it was a good choice.

Roxas had held a reserve commission in the Philippine Army, and when war broke out he was in uniform. As a Colonel, and then a Brigadier General, he was a liaison officer on Bataan and Corregidor. When Quezon left Corregidor, he invited Roxas to escape with him. But Roxas, with much emotion, declared that he was now a soldier and preferred to carry on the fight in the Philippines, staying with the people who would look to him for leadership. He did escape to the Visayas, and wound up in Mindanao, where resistance continued.

In the course of a routine mission in April, 1942, Roxas and his party were trapped by a Japanese unit and taken prisoner. He was sent to the prisoner-of-war camp at Malaybalay, in

Mindanao, where he stayed until August. Later Roxas asserted that he did not leave the concentration camp until the last Filipino prisoner was out of it. But a raiding force of which Colonel Tomas Cabili was a member entered the camp many months later and found more than four thousand prisoners still there.

Roxas was a part-time soldier but a full-time politician. During his imprisonment in Mindanao, he apparently concluded that the Japanese had an excellent chance for success in the war. In any event, he was soon ready to accept the inevitable, and to try to make the best of it.

And, from Malaybalay, he sent a letter to American and Filipino officers of the USAFFE, urging them to surrender because "your presence in the hills is causing grave concern and is greatly delaying the return of the people to their normal occupations." Hopefully, the Japanese brought Roxas to Manila, but for months he remained out of the public eye, feigning illness. There were constant reports that he had been offered the puppet presidency, that he had refused; that he had defied the Japanese, that he would collaborate; that his life was in danger, that it was not in danger. Finally, in June of 1943, he accepted membership in the preparatory commission for Philippine independence.

His subsequent explanation of this activity was simple: "I wanted to prevent a dictatorial government which would give the Japanese even more power." If that was truly his aim, he did not have much success. For the puppet Constitution, while retaining many details of the lawful Constitution, was skilfully designed to establish a dictatorial puppet government.

Under the puppet Constitution, the president was elected by the National Assembly and not by the people. He could appoint all officials without the consent of the Assembly's Commission on Appointments. He could enter into agreements with foreign nations (meaning Japan) for utilization of natural resources and operation of public utilities without legislative consent; the lawful Constitution expressly forbids such action. As

for the National Assembly, it was re-created; but it was totally unlike the lawful House and Senate elected by the people. One half of the puppet Assembly was composed of provincial governors and city mayors, appointed by the president. The other half was elective, but in practice the members were picked at meetings of the *Kalibapi* in the provinces. Members of the Supreme Court could be appointed by the president without the consent of the Assembly, and it required a unanimous vote of the Supreme Court to declare any law or action unconstitutional. In addition, the president was given absolute veto power; if the legislature overrode his veto, his second veto would be final. And the list of civil rights was made subject to legislative amendment or control.

In sum, the puppet Constitution, made a dictator out of the president, and correspondingly weakened the legislative and judicial branches of the government.

V

On October 14, 1943, amidst ceremonies stressing Philippine indebtedness to Japan, the puppet Constitution was proclaimed and the puppet Republic established. The new president, José Paciano Laurel, was a brilliant, cultured, sensitive, embittered man with a grievance against the United States. The Japanese had selected a respected Filipino leader who would not hesitate to declare publicly (in August, 1943): "I for myself do not want the Americans to come back. One need not be a military strategist to realize that there is no likelihood for America to reconquer the Philippines. Because I like my country to be free, I do not like America to come back."

Laurel was born in 1891 in the province of Batangas. His first notoriety came when he was only eighteen years old. In a fight over a girl, he stabbed a man and was convicted of frustrated murder by the Court of First Instance. Represented by American lawyers, he appealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered his acquittal on the ground that he had acted in self-defense. The incident had no lasting significance, but it

gave Laurel a reputation for dash and pride which did him no political harm.

Laurel studied law, receiving his degree from the University of the Philippines in 1915. He had already entered the civil service, and worked his way up rapidly. In 1920 he went to the United States to study at Yale, and it is said that social slights in New Haven wounded his pride. But an incident in Manila, in 1923, was probably the real turning point in his attitude toward Americans. By that time, though Laurel was only in his early thirties, Governor-General Leonard Wood had appointed him Secretary of the Interior. Everyone recognized his learning, his ability, his capacity for responsibility; he was clearly a young man with a fine future.

It happened that, at this time, an American named Conley was chief of the vice squad in the Manila police force (which was under the authority of the Mayor of Manila, who in turn was responsible to the Secretary of the Interior). Conley was accused of dealing in opium and other drugs, but the Director of Civil Service and the Chief of Police recommended that the charges be dropped. Filipino nationalists were then engaged in their bitter fight against Wood's reactionary policies, and Laurel saw in the incident, perhaps, a *cause célèbre*. He felt that Conley was being protected because he was an American, and that a Filipino would have received short shrift from the stiff-necked Governor-General. Together with the Mayor of Manila, he told Wood that new charges of bribery had been presented against Conley, and asked that the American be suspended pending investigation. Wood said they were prejudiced, and called for a court trial. Laurel testified against Conley, but the charges were dismissed. An investigating committee proposed a compromise whereby Conley would be reinstated if he would resign later on, and Wood ordered his Secretary of the Interior to reinstate the American. Laurel promptly resigned. A persuasive talker, he succeeded in convincing most of the other high Filipino officials to resign with him, and for a time there was a highly publicized impasse. The Filipino leaders appealed to the Secretary of War and to the

President himself, but those Republican worthies in Washington merely backed Wood up.

As a crisis, it somehow missed fire. Filipino public opinion had not gotten as inflamed as Laurel had expected. Soon all the other cabinet members were reinstated, and many received more lucrative or powerful positions. Only Laurel suffered. For twelve years, broken only by a term in the Senate, he was out of public life.

He plunged into his law practice, and it was not long before he was generally accepted as one of the finest constitutional lawyers in Manila. But the highest aspiration of the Filipino—top government office—seemed closed to him. He watched bitterly while other men, clearly less capable and less fitted, forged ahead from one high post to another. Recognition came late, when in 1936 President Quezon at last appointed him Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. For a man of Laurel's ambition, it was not enough.

In his search for a scapegoat, it was not necessary to look far. The Americans, with their hypocrisy and arrogance, had impeded the career that destiny had marked for him. He veered more and more to a sympathy for Japan. His law firm represented many Japanese concerns. He sent some of his sons to study in Japan. He himself studied the Bushido code, and was attracted by its quality of Oriental chivalry. Even after he entered the Supreme Court, he did not hide his sympathies; in 1938 he became the first Filipino to receive an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the Imperial University in Tokyo.

Ideologically, he leaned far in the direction of totalitarianism. Early in 1941, months before Pearl Harbor, Justice Laurel defended the wide emergency powers granted by the Assembly to President Quezon, on the ground that "constitutional dictatorship" was in keeping with a world-wide trend marked by "totalitarianism gradually supplanting democracy." And he pointed approvingly to the "constitutional and benevolent dictatorship" of Japan.

Thus, when the Japanese came to Manila, it was not difficult

for Laurel to work with them. He offered his services early, and Vargas made him Commissioner of Justice in the Executive Commission. Steadily he gained the favor of the Japanese. And, with equal steadiness, he became the butt of hatred for the Filipinos who resisted. In the spring of 1943 Laurel was almost killed by an assassin, who fired at him early one morning while he was playing golf at a course near Manila, but Japanese medical care pulled him through. The experience served to make him only the more zealous in his collaboration, and it must also have convinced the Japanese that here was a man they could trust. He was chairman of the commission which wrote the puppet Constitution, and he had no hesitation in accepting the puppet presidency.

On the day the new puppet government was established, a treaty of alliance was signed, effectively bringing the Philippines into the Japanese sphere of influence. Laurel explained: "The pact does not envisage a declaration of war by the Philippines against any foreign nation. No Filipino soldier will be called upon to render military service outside the limits of Philippine territory or fight except for the defense of the Philippines or in case of invasion which threatens the independence and territorial integrity of the country . . . Thus although the pact constitutes an alliance, the military aspect thereof is essentially defensive, and unilateral in favor of the Philippines in that only the defense of the Philippines is contemplated."

Laurel's initial cabinet consisted of Claro M. Recto, Foreign Affairs; Antonio de las Alas, Finance; Teofilo R. Sison, Justice; Rafael Alunan, Agriculture and Commerce; Quintin Paredes, Public Works and Communications; and Camilo Osias, Education. Members of the Council of State were Ramon Avanceña (chairman), Rafael Corpus, Pedro Aunario, Ramon Fernandez, and Emilio Aguinaldo.

In the early days of the puppet regime, Manuel Roxas still remained somewhat in the background. But finally he accepted an appointment as vice-chairman of the National Planning Board, created to advise Laurel on economic matters. This

made him, in effect, food dictator of the Philippines, under the careful eye of the Japanese. He announced that the terrible shortage of rice was the fault of the guerrillas, who were impeding the flow of food into Manila. Finally he joined the presidential cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. Rice was selling for two thousand pesos a sack, if it could be bought at all. His activities in the puppet government did nothing to improve the situation.

The final roster of the Laurel cabinet consisted of Claro M. Recto, Foreign Affairs; Teofilo Sison, Home Affairs and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; Antonio de las Alas, Finance; Quintin Paredes, Justice; Camilo Osias, Education; Pedro Sabido, Economic Affairs; José Paez, Public Works and Communications; Rafael Alunan, Agriculture and Commerce; Emiliano Tria Tirona, Health, Labor and Public Welfare; and Manuel Roxas, Minister without Portfolio. The final membership of the Council of State consisted of Ramon Avanceña, chairman; Miguel Unson, Rafael Corpus, Pedro Aunario, Ramon Fernandez, and Emilio Aguinaldo.

These men were the responsible leaders of the puppet Republic of the Philippines when, at the instigation of the Japanese, it declared war on the United States and Great Britain on September 23, 1944. Whatever the courts may decide, whatever excuses may be presented in their behalf by either Filipinos or Americans, it is impossible to erase from the record the fact that they either executed or condoned an unpardonable act of treason.

VI

Thus, many of the respected, influential political leaders betrayed the trust that leadership itself imposed upon them. Moved by fear, greed, ambition, bitterness, and a dozen more subtle impulses, they dealt with the Japanese. Only a few were totally sincere in their collaboration. Others were vaguely uncomfortable, and often they tried to salve their consciences by giving secret help to the guerrillas. Still others, with complete political amorality, were ready to play ball with whoever was

in power, and to hope that when the pendulum swung they could swing with it.

By and large, despite their duality of attitude, the great mass of the Filipinos resisted the Japanese honestly and wholeheartedly. Total resistance became more difficult as one approached the urban areas, and in Manila it became almost entirely impossible. In the mountains one could waylay a foolish Japanese soldier wandering alone, and stab him cleanly and with a good heart. But in Manila one had to bow politely and step into the gutter when an unkempt Japanese soldier passed by; and only the heart could hear the turbulent beat of hatred inside.

Since the élite of the Philippines is, in very large part, concentrated in Manila, it was the élite who, as a group, provided the largest relative number of collaborators.

But between two-thirds and nine-tenths of the Filipino people as a whole (if one accepts as limits the most and least critical estimates) resisted the Japanese in whatever way they could.

There was Tomas Confesor, governor of Panay, who was approached by an emissary of puppet president Laurel with an appeal to surrender. Confesor's letter in reply was one of the great documents of World War II. "This is a total war," he wrote, "in which the issues . . . are less concerned with territorial questions but more with forms of government, ways of life . . . Should I surrender, I would be surrendering something more precious than life itself; the principles of democracy and justice and the honor and dignity of our people . . . Peace and tranquillity are easy to achieve if you choose the easy way . . . You would reduce our people . . . to the status of a dumb animal like the good carabao which lives in peace and tranquillity because it is properly fed by its owners." The letter was copied scrupulously, and passed from hand to hand, stirring the hearts of the faltering and the distressed. After the war, a Filipino journalist declared: "It was probably the most effective piece of pro-democracy propaganda that reached the Filipinos. If I were to wish that I had myself done a single

worthy act performed by a Filipino during the entire occupation, I would want to have written the Confesor letter."

It was from Panay, Confesor's hide-out, that the first weak radio signal, picked up by Army receivers outside, broke the silence that had engulfed the archipelago until the late fall of 1942. The guerrillas operated on a planned, military basis all over the country. They established safe areas where American airmen could land. They set up a network of spies, and of radio transmitters which flashed their information to MacArthur's headquarters. On every major island a weather laboratory gathered daily data for transmission to headquarters. An air warning system gave news of Japanese aircraft movements. Observation of inland waterways and coastal areas gave target information for American submarines, and hundreds of thousands of tons of Japanese shipping were sunk because of it. Guerrillas captured the commander-in-chief of the combined Japanese fleet when his plane crashed in Cebu, and forwarded to MacArthur's headquarters all his plans, instructions, and other information on the strength and distribution of enemy fleets and naval air units.

The balance-sheet of Filipino resistance is one of which the country may be proud. It is marred only by the fact that too many prewar political leaders collaborated. But not all.

José Abad Santos, born in Pampanga, had been sent to the United States by the Philippine Government to study law when he was eighteen. He had attended Santa Clara College in California, the University of Illinois, and George Washington University in Washington, D. C. Like most ambitious Filipinos, he entered the civil service, and advanced rapidly. By 1919 he was a member of the first independence mission to the United States. By 1922 he was Secretary of Justice. He joined Laurel in the mass resignations at the time of the Conley incident, but Governor-General Stimson restored him, in 1928, to his former post as Secretary of Justice, where he served for four years. From 1932 onward he was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, except for an interval of several years in President Quezon's cabinet. Santos was no demagogue, and did

not play politics in the Filipino manner. He was an honest, modest, able public servant. Santos went to Corregidor with President Quezon after war came, and there Quezon appointed him Chief Justice and gave him a cabinet assignment as well. He accompanied Quezon to Negros, but refused to leave the country entirely. Santos thought he would do what he could so long as some parts of the Philippines were still holding out, and then, if the Japanese would let him, he would retire to his farm and live quietly. Quezon entrusted him with full power to act as the Presidential representative.

On April 11, 1942, Santos and his son were captured by the Japanese near the town of Carcar on the island of Cebu. They were taken to Cebu, where the Japanese hoped to make him communicate with Roxas in Mindanao and induce him to surrender. His son, waiting fearfully in an outer room, overheard Santos say, "I cannot possibly do that because if I do so I would be violating my oath of allegiance to the United States."

The Japanese, furious, accused him of having ordered the destruction of bridges and other public works in Cebu. They took Santos and his son southward to Mindanao, according to the young man's later account, and marched them for hours through the marshy jungle to the Constabulary barracks of Parang. Next day they were moved to Malabang, in Lanao, and at two o'clock on the afternoon of May 7 a Japanese interpreter came to escort Santos to Japanese headquarters. He was there only a few minutes. Then he came back to talk to his son. "Pepito," he said quietly, "come down. I have something to tell you." The Justice was quite calm. "I have been sentenced to death. They will shoot me in a few minutes." In spite of himself, the youth sobbed. "Do not cry," Santos said. "What is the matter with you? Show these people that you are brave." Then he added: "This is a rare opportunity for me to die for our country. Not everybody is given that chance." They knelt down together, said a short prayer, and embraced warmly. Chief Justice José Abad Santos was then led away, and a few minutes later his son heard the shots of the executioners. "Your father died a glorious death," the Japanese said.

IX

GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

THE DAY BEFORE CHRISTMAS, as soon as the afternoon air raid ended, President Manuel Quezon left Malacañan Palace for the last time. He turned to Secretary Vargas, saying, "God bless you, George, and lead you in the right path." Vargas replied, "Mr. President, no matter what happens, you can count upon me." Then the President, with his wife, his two daughters, and his young son, departed for Corregidor. He took with him Vice-President Osmeña, Justice José Abad Santos, Major General Basilio J. Valdes, Colonel Manuel Nieto, and his dapper young private secretary, Serapio D. Canceran. They celebrated the midnight mass of Christmas Eve in a tunnel of the beleaguered island.

The air in the tunnel was damp and stale, and the President's tuberculosis, which had recurred some months earlier, became worse each day. His coughing fits were longer and more exhausting, and for a time it looked as if he might not survive. Into the tunnels were crowded all sorts of personages—Army personnel, from General MacArthur down; High Commissioner Sayre, his family, and members of his staff; the

Quezon party; and an assortment of strays who had managed to find temporary safety there.

Outside, the bombings began. By the 29th the lighting system and the water pipes of the tunnel had been hit. For days there was only brackish water, and casualties brought into the tunnel were treated by flashlight.

On the 30th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, on a platform just outside the tunnel used as the officers' mess, President Quezon and Vice-President Osmeña took their oaths of office for the new term to which they had been elected a few weeks earlier. There was no crowd now, and it was hard to remember that sunny day, six years earlier, when the Commonwealth had been established. José Abad Santos, soon to die a martyr, administered the oath of office. A little knot of dignitaries looked on soberly.

Quezon delivered his second inaugural address, stopping occasionally to control the spasms of coughing. It was natural that he should recall the inaugural ceremonies of 1935, that he should refer to the sudden holocaust of war which was upon them. He was proud of the Filipino soldiers and of the people generally, for they were proving their gallantry. "At the present time we have but one task—to fight with America for America and the Philippines." He named the principles for which the people fought. "We are fighting for human liberty and justice, for those principles of individual freedom which we all cherish and without which life would not be worth living. Indeed, we are fighting for our own independence. It is to maintain this independence, these liberties and these freedoms, to banish fear and want among all peoples, and to establish a reign of justice for all the world, that we are sacrificing our lives and all that we possess."

Then he read a proclamation sent to him by President Roosevelt, with its words of admiration, hope, and promise. There were sentences which he read with particular emphasis, for they had a meaning that went far beyond the emotions of the moment. And to these he would come back again and again from that time on.

“‘The people of the United States,’” Quezon quoted from Roosevelt’s message, “‘will never forget what the people of the Philippine Islands are doing these days and will do in the days to come. I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources in men and materials of the United States stand behind that pledge. It is not for me or for the people of this country to tell you where your duty lies. We are engaged in a great and common cause. I count on every Philippine man, woman and child to do his duty. We will do ours.’”

Quezon’s answer was that the Filipinos would do their part. “In taking my oath of office, I make the pledge for myself, my government, and my people, to stand by America and fight with her until victory is won. I am resolved, whatever the consequences to myself, faithfully to fulfil this pledge.”

But, as the terrible days passed, Quezon began to worry more and more. By mid-January the Allied strategists had written off the Philippines as a dead loss, and were hoping only that they might save the East Indies and Singapore. To the Americans and Filipinos still holding out, it was inconceivable that they should be given up. They had no desire to be expendable. They felt like a man, lying abed with a mild grippe, overhearing in horror the doctor’s whispered warning to his wife that he would probably be dead by morning. Certainly Quezon was in no mood to accept the Philippine fate without protest. He radioed President Roosevelt a plea for concentration on the war against Japan. It was hard to realize that the United States simply did not have the wherewithal.

Soon the Japanese in Manila were gleefully announcing the establishment of the Executive Commission under Vargas; and Quezon, telling MacArthur that he was “mortified,” asked him to publicize a brief statement repeating his determination to fight on. At the same time, he told MacArthur (knowing that his views would be transmitted to President Roosevelt) that no government “has the right to demand loyalty from its citizens beyond its willingness or ability to render actual pro-

rection..” He pleaded again for help. “We decided to fight by your side and we have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance as far as the final result of the war is concerned and that, therefore, no help can be expected here in the immediate future, or at least before the power of resistance is exhausted? If so, I want to know, because I have my own responsibility to my countrymen, whom, as President of the Commonwealth, I have led into a complete war effort. It seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here . . .”

MacArthur informed the White House of Quezon’s doubts and fears, and Roosevelt replied directly. He could understand Quezon’s anxiety and his countrymen’s sufferings, but “I solemnly state that I would never ask of you and them any sacrifice that I believe without hope in order to further our attainment of the goal towards which we are all pressing.” He continued: “I desire, nevertheless, to emphasize as strongly as possible that the superb defense of our soldiers in Bataan is a definite contribution in bringing about an eventual and complete overwhelming of the enemy in the Far East. The deficiencies which now exist in our offensive weapons are the natural results of the policies of peaceful nations such as the Philippines and the United States who without warning are attacked by despotic nations which have spent years in preparing for such action. Early reverses, hardships and pain are the price that democracy must pay under such conditions. However, I have dedicated to the accomplishment of final victory every man, every dollar and every material sinew of this nation; and this determination to attain victory necessarily includes as an objective the restoring of tranquillity and peace to the Philippines and its return to such government as its people may themselves choose.”

Roosevelt spoke in rather general terms of the ways in which

help would come to the battered forces resisting the enemy in the Philippines. But Quezon did not have to be a military strategist to see that things were going badly in the Southwest Pacific. He knew that inevitably Bataan and Corregidor were doomed. When he told MacArthur of his fears, the General replied: "I will bring you in triumph on the points of my bayonets in Manila." There was an air of bravado in the words, like the sound of whistling in the darkness of the tunnels, that was not reassuring, despite Quezon's confidence in the man.

For a time he even thought of giving himself up to the enemy, perhaps in the expectation of becoming a martyr like Rizal. But MacArthur talked him out of it. The Japanese would be too shrewd to let Quezon call the turn, he said. They would allow the President to go to Malacañan and then they would effectively surround him with guards. And the outside world would brand such an act, intended to be heroic, as the sheerest cowardice. Quezon said he did not care what the outside world would think, but he was greatly impressed with MacArthur's argument.

In the gloomy corridors, as the shells burst overhead, he thought of the men dying in the horror of Bataan, and of the people suffering under the yoke of a Japanese oppressor. He sought a way out that would save his people and still preserve their honor. Finally an idea came to him which was the closest thing to surrender that one can find in the life of Manuel Quezon. For once, the shrewd politician, the brilliant analyst of human affairs, had failed to place an immediate situation into its over-all setting. He had hit upon a scheme that might have been practicable if it had involved the Filipino people alone. What he forgot, for the moment, was that the Philippines was involved in a war bigger than any single country, and that the fate of the Philippines was unalterably linked with the unfolding development of the war itself.

The plan itself was naïvely simple. In his memoirs, Quezon said he thought it the key to the problem. "I would ask the President of the United States to authorize me to issue a public manifesto asking the Government of the United States to grant

immediate, complete and absolute independence to the Philippines; that the neutralization of the Philippines be agreed at once by the United States and the Imperial Japanese government; that within a reasonable period of time, both armies, American and Japanese, be withdrawn; that neither nation should occupy bases in the Philippines; that the Philippine Army be demobilized, the only organized force remaining in the Islands to be the Philippine Constabulary for the maintenance of law and order; that Japanese and American noncombatants who so wished be evacuated with their own army under reciprocal and fitting stipulations. It was a great anxiety of mine to achieve independence for my people under the Americans. I wanted it done before the Japanese who played no part in this development could claim credit for it."

(The story of this plan is described in detail in Quezon's autobiography, *The Good Fight*, published posthumously in 1946. The book was held up for some months at the request of President Osmeña, because it revealed Quezon's proposal for the first time. Osmeña felt that its publication, especially while the war was still going on, would damage Filipino popularity in the United States.)

Quezon told Roxas and Osmeña of his scheme, and both opposed it—using as their most telling argument the obvious fact that President Roosevelt would never agree. But Quezon insisted that he was disturbed by Japanese propaganda promising the Filipinos "independence with honor"; that the Filipinos might fall into the trap; and that if the plan were to go into effect and the Japanese refused to accept it, then the Filipino spirit of resistance would only be strengthened. Finally he managed to wring approval from the cabinet members on Corregidor, and he sent his message to President Roosevelt.

The reply from the White House was warm with human understanding, but eminently firm. "The immediate crisis certainly seems desperate," President Roosevelt wrote, "but such crises and their treatment must be judged by a more accurate measure than the anxieties and sufferings of the present, however acute." He recalled the American record in the Philip-

pires, pointing out that "in the loftiness of its aim and the fidelity with which it has been executed, this program of the United States toward another people has been unique in the history of the family of nations."

He listed the victims of Axis aggression, culminating now in the Philippines itself, and asked, "Could the people of any of these nations honestly look forward to a true restoration of their independent sovereignty under the dominance of Germany, Italy or Japan?" As for Japanese promises of independence, "I only have to refer you to the present condition of Korea, Manchukuo, North China, Indo-China, and all other countries which have fallen under the brutal sway of the Japanese Government, to point out the hollow duplicity of such an announcement." Filipino sufferings now were infinitely less cruel than would be their enslavement by Japan. "In any event is it longer possible for any reasonable person to rely upon Japanese offer or promise?"

President Roosevelt assured President Quezon that the war would not end until the Axis was overthrown. The foundations for future victory were even now being laid in the Southwest Pacific, and this was "the best and surest help that we can render to the Philippines at this time." The United States would fulfil its pledge to "protect you to the uttermost of our power until the time of your ultimate independence had arrived." And the message concluded:

"So long as the flag of the United States flies on Filipino soil as a pledge of our duty to your people, it will be defended by our own men to the death. Whatever happens to the present American garrison we shall not relax our efforts until the forces which we are now marshaling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive the last remnant of the invaders from your soil."

Quezon admitted that he was overwhelmed by the message. In effect, Roosevelt was telling him, "Whatever you do, the United States will continue to fight for the freedom of the Philippines." To this Quezon replied: "I wish to thank you for your prompt answer to the proposal which I submitted to you

with the unanimous approval of my cabinet. We fully appreciate the reasons upon which your decision is based and we abide by it."

The question never came up again. From that moment on, though Quezon was to chafe constantly at the decision to defeat Germany before turning the full weight of our power against Japan, he had no thought but of complete and unqualified war against the aggressor. In Corregidor, he decided now to move the Commonwealth Government to the Visayas, which were still free of Japanese. By mid-February, arrangements were made for the secret and dangerous submarine trip. Before leaving, the President appointed Manuel Roxas Secretary to the President, with power, "when in your judgment the circumstances so require, to act in my name on all matters not involving any change of policy." How Roxas carried out his assignment we have already seen.

On February 22, the submarine bearing the Presidential party arrived at San José de Buenavista, on the island of Panay. In the Visayas, arrangements were made to send an interisland steamer to Corregidor with food supplies. Quezon moved from place to place constantly, to avoid the danger of enemy air attack. Worried lest the lawful government should by accident of war be left without a head, he issued an executive order directing that "in case I or Vice-President Osmeña should be unable to perform these duties, the Secretary to the President should become the President." Thus he showed once again his faith in Roxas. But his heir apparent was to become President of the Philippines in another way.

Meantime, Quezon received word from MacArthur, already on his way to Australia. The General wanted him to leave the Philippines entirely; "it is the natural and proper thing for you to do to rejoin me at my headquarters in Australia in the great drive for victory in the Philippines." Soon he was aboard Lieutenant Bulkeley's famed P-T boat on the perilous trip to Mindanao.

From Del Monte airfield, the party flew to Australia, and took the train from Adelaide to Melbourne. At Melbourne came

the news of the fall of Bataan on April 11. Vice-President Osmeña insisted that the place for the Philippine Government-in-Exile was in Washington, and accordingly the party boarded the "President Coolidge" for the long voyage across the Pacific.

And at Union Station in Washington, President Manuel Quezon, symbol of the fighting Filipinos, who had faltered just a little on Corregidor but who would never give up a scrap once he got into it, was met by the President of the United States, flanked by members of his cabinet and all living Governors-General and High Commissioners for the preceding twenty years. That night Manuel Quezon slept in the White House. It was the bittersweet beginning of the last chapter in his career.

II

In Washington he established the exiled government. He himself, with his family, lived in a large suite at the Hotel Shoreham, and from his sickbed directed the affairs of his administration. Now, more than ever before, he regretted that he had permitted some of the most competent Filipino leaders to remain behind; and of these, he missed Santos and Roxas particularly. If he had taken them with him, Santos would not have died a martyr, and Roxas would not have acquired the taint of collaboration. But Quezon was forced to proceed with the men he had taken with him, and with those he found in Washington.

There was, of course, Vice-President Osmeña. Though the two men were of almost exactly the same age, Osmeña was in fine health. But the private coolness between Quezon and Osmeña, engendered by the years of rivalry, had not been entirely wiped out, and Quezon constantly strove to keep his Vice-President in the background. Through the whole period, Osmeña retained his quiet dignity, accepting his secondary role and deferring to the almost neurotic quick-changes of the ailing, worried President.

As Secretary of National Defense, Quezon had Major General Basilio Valdes, a physician who had served as a military

officer in many capacities and who had come out of Corregidor with the Presidential party. Valdes was a pleasant, mild-mannered man who made an excellent appearance in public. He was always ready to carry out instructions, but Quezon never depended upon his judgment either in military or other matters.

As Secretary of Finance, the President had appointed Andres Soriano, a *mestizo* who could pass anywhere as a full-blooded Spaniard. Soriano was a member of the Manila aristocracy. He owned Manila's largest brewery, held the Philippine agency for one of the big American tobacco companies, and was engaged in a variety of business enterprises. During the Spanish Civil War, he backed Franco all the way. It was widely rumored in Manila that Mrs. Soriano longed for a title of Spanish nobility, and the honor could only be gotten if the monarchy were restored in Madrid. Whether or not this was his real motive, the fact was that Soriano was a Monarchist, and when the Civil War began he supported Franco as enthusiastically as did other Spanish Monarchists. This support ranged from large gifts of money to open representation of the Franco regime in Manila. He did not hide his sympathies; in July, 1941, a Manila newspaper published a photograph of Soriano with arm raised in the Fascist salute at a meeting of Franco sympathizers. Inevitably, when he turned up in the United States as Quezon's Secretary of Finance, the outpouring of criticism reached Congress itself. There was little to say in Soriano's defense, for he could not deny that he had favored Franco. In the closing days of 1941 Soriano had applied for Philippine citizenship and received his papers, over the protests of the Civil Liberties Union, during the hectic moments when Japan was already attacking the Philippines. On Bataan, and during Quezon's peregrinations in the Visayas, Soriano was in uniform, and distinguished himself honestly under fire.

Once in the United States, he devoted only part of his time to cabinet duties. Generally he remained in New York, energetically conducting his business affairs. Disturbed by the increasing clamor of criticism, he tendered his resignation to

President Quezon. He knew that his presence in the cabinet was embarrassing the exiled government, and he was anxious to go back to active duty in order to serve on General MacArthur's staff in the Southwest Pacific. For many months President Quezon refused to accept Soriano's resignation, on the ground that, whatever his Spanish politics may have been, the Secretary of Finance was now a Philippine citizen and had renounced his loyalty to another state. In addition, Quezon stubbornly refused to let it appear that he was bowing to public criticism.

In the end, Soriano had his way. He left the cabinet, and finally wound up in Australia on MacArthur's staff. His later role in the liberated Philippines was to be marked by mounting criticism, much of it justified. In October, 1945, he became an American citizen.

Most of the detailed financial problems of the Philippine government in Washington were handled by Jaime Hernandez, the Auditor-General. Hernandez was in Washington on an official visit at the time war began, and was of course unable to return to the Philippines. He was a long-time public servant with a reputation for unfailing honesty. Never a politician, he worked hard during the entire period of exile. He was a good-humored, quiet administrator who swamped himself in his work, and suffered, perhaps, from a tendency to be too yielding in his dealings with American officials.

As for the Resident Commissioner, Joaquin M. Elizalde, he was an ex-officio member of the Quezon cabinet. Elizalde was born in Manila of Spanish parents, and, like Soriano, he was of the wealthy aristocracy. His business interests are fantastically extensive; the firm of Elizalde & Co., Inc., describes itself as "manufacturers, general merchants, importers, builders, wholesalers and exporters," with headquarters in Manila, and branches in Iloilo, Bacolod, Cebu, Davao, Jolo, and Baguio. It owns the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.; Elizalde Paint and Oil Factory, Inc.; Elizalde Rattan Industries, Inc.; Elizalde Motors, Inc. (De Soto); La Carlota Sugar Central; Sara-Ajuy Sugar Central; Central Azucarera del Norte; Pilar Sugar Central;

Philippine Milling Company; Johnson-Picket Rope Co.; Union Products, Inc. (Union Oil Co. of California); Manila Steamship Co., Inc.; Anakan Lumber Company; Davao Gold Mine; Samar Mining Company; Tanduary Distillery, Inc.; Metropolitan Insurance Co.; Liberty Motors, Inc. (Willys); Bukidnon Cattle Development Company; and Electro-Equipment & Supply Co. (Westinghouse). And there is also the Elizalde Trading Corporation, which represents a score of important foreign firms.

As the leading member of this intricate industrial setup, Elizalde has long played an important political role in the Philippines. He has contributed generously to the thirsty coffers of the Nacionalista Party. And he has held a series of government positions, beginning in 1934, when Governor-General Murphy assigned him to reorganize the National Development Company and the Cebu Portland Cement Company. In 1936 President Quezon appointed Elizalde as his economic adviser, and a year later he became a member of the National Economic Council. He was made chairman of the finance sub-committee of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs in Washington and special envoy to the International Sugar Conference in London. In 1938 he was appointed to the Council of State, and later in the same year President Quezon sent him to Washington as Resident Commissioner of the Philippines.

Despite Elizalde's wealth and prestige, President Quezon treated him like a small boy, awarding favors one day and punishing him the next. He was originally sent to Washington to organize the office of the Resident Commissioner in preparation for the eventual change-over to the status of embassy. He did an efficient job, and Quezon asked him to stay on. On all important matters affecting Philippine-American relations, however, the President insisted on dealing personally with the American High Commissioner in Manila. In Washington, Elizalde carried out routine assignments and lived a pleasant social life.

With the arrival of the Quezon party, Elizalde was shunted

more and more into the background. The President, always dynamic despite his illness, was clearly the head of the government, and no important decision or action could be taken without his personal participation. The Commissioner found it difficult to hide his irritation, but in his relations with President Quezon he remained meek and willing. No one could ever imply that Quezon was subservient to the Elizalde millions. If anything, the Elizalde millions were subservient to the President of the Philippines.

In appearance, Elizalde bears a strong resemblance to a tired rabbit. He is a mass of insecurities, given to the hasty furies of a man unsure of himself. He had long nursed a grievance against Vice-President Osmeña, and the coolness between the two men was a constant problem within the small exiled government. When Osmeña succeeded to the Presidency, one of his first official acts was to fire Commissioner Elizalde. Not until Manuel Roxas assumed the Presidency was Elizalde able to salve his wounded pride; he became the first Philippine Ambassador to the United States.

III

President Quezon's wartime policy in Washington was uncomplicated. His foremost task, obviously, was to bolster the morale of the people at home. He worried lest they were succumbing to Japanese propaganda, or to simple defeatism. Over and over, he rose from his sickbed to record eloquent speeches for short-wave broadcast from San Francisco. Often the physical exertion of a fifteen-minute speech would leave him ill and shattered for three or four days afterward. But his messages were made the more impressive by the long seconds of racking coughs with which they were spotted, and which were transmitted along with his words. "Do not despair," he repeated, "for your liberation is certain. It may take time, but it will come. Meanwhile, don't let the Japanese fool you. Use your wits and beat him at his own game. Above all, you

must continue to have faith in America, which has kept faith with every nation, and especially with us."

His second purpose was to assure, or rather to speed up, Philippine independence. He was hopeful that the 1946 date might be advanced. Premier Tojo's promises to the Filipinos made him particularly anxious, for he was afraid that some of his people might fall prey to enemy propaganda. On every possible occasion, he urged that the date of independence be advanced—though he never made the suggestion publicly, for he was afraid that a refusal would do more damage than anything else.

In any event, he strove to further the independence policy by acquiring for his government as many of the attributes of sovereignty as possible. He was gratified when he was asked to sign his name to the Declaration by United Nations, in June of 1942; and he was particularly pleased because this made him a signatory to the Atlantic Charter as well. He was flattered by the official invitation to take part in the regular meetings of the Pacific War Council, presided over by President Roosevelt himself, and **attended** by representatives of Britain, China, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. His health prevented him from going to the meetings regularly, and the task fell generally to the Vice-President. But when important matters were to be discussed, he managed to be present. It was at one of these meetings, with Prime Minister Winston Churchill as a special guest, that he recaptured his old fire and raised the question of India. He came back reporting that Roosevelt had been delighted and that Churchill had subsequently treated him with a new-found and rather circumspect respect.

His third great consideration was tied in with the over-all strategy of the war. Inevitably, he chafed at the decision to concentrate on Germany first, and later to turn to Japan. He knew that this meant the subjugation of the Philippines for many months. He pleaded publicly and privately for a reversal of the decision, but the commitment had long since been made and no power short of Roosevelt and Churchill together could stop it now.

On this Quezon refused to be philosophical. "It is all very well," he argued in a conversation with me, "to ask me to consider the war on a world-wide basis. But there are times when I must refuse to think in such terms. I am a Filipino first of all, and my first responsibility is to my people. I cannot ever let them believe that I have stopped fighting for them, no matter what happens elsewhere."

In almost every public statement he made, Quezon came back to this point. Thus, in a typical press statement in April, 1943, he said: "It is true that, in waging this global war, many cold-blooded decisions must be made. There have been, and no doubt will continue to be, times when whole battle fronts and even whole nations will be considered temporarily expendable in order to win the final victory. But it is impossible for me to conceive that the entire Far East is expendable."

In Australia, of course, there was a man who appreciated Quezon's views more than any other. Douglas MacArthur, embittered by his defeat on Bataan and by the conviction that the Germany-first policy was intended almost as a personal affront to him, felt just as furious as Quezon did. At one point, in 1943, he cabled a request to Quezon for a postwar job in the Philippines, to build up the armed forces there. The request demonstrated his faith in ultimate victory, but there was in it, too, an inkling of MacArthur's resentment against his own country (to which he has not returned since long before the war). Quezon accepted the offer with alacrity. But he insisted on keeping the whole matter confidential, despite the obvious fact that its publication might have convinced the American public that talk of MacArthur's presidential ambitions was utterly unfounded. Even the argument that publication of the MacArthur-Quezon exchange might break down the known opposition to the General among the bigwigs at the Pentagon Building, and thereby help the war effort in the Pacific, would not sway Quezon. This is, therefore, the first time these facts are made public.

President Quezon's fourth basic intention, in Washington, was to pin on the United States total responsibility for recon-

struction and rehabilitation of the Philippines after liberation. It was his view, and it was generally accepted by the Roosevelt administration, that this responsibility was rightfully America's. Soon after his arrival in June, 1942, Quezon told the United States Senate:

"When we were attacked by Japan, the American flag was still flying over the Philippines, and we were still under the protection of, and owed allegiance to, the United States. Although in domestic affairs we had almost complete autonomy, in foreign affairs all governmental powers and responsibilities rested exclusively in the hands of the United States. In other words, you were then, as you still are, trustees for the Filipino people in their foreign affairs. No one will deny that the moral and legal responsibilities of a trustee in the care and protection of its trust are greater even than those of an owner in respect to his own property."

No one could conscientiously argue with his point—that the Philippines, at the time of the Japanese attack, was under American sovereignty; that enemy aggression in the Philippines was therefore no different from enemy aggression in, say, Hawaii or California; that the United States bore the same responsibilities to the Filipinos as it would to Americans in California if war had come to the West Coast. Indeed, Quezon was going one step further and arguing that, as a trustee, the United States bore an even greater responsibility to the Filipinos than it did to its own citizens.

Actually, neither he nor anyone else in Washington had any idea of the amount of devastation which was to be wreaked upon the Philippines during the liberation campaign. He assumed that there would be some damage, and that it might be somewhat greater than what had occurred during the early months of warfare. But of near-total destruction he had no inkling.

This was, perhaps, his only excuse for not having launched an effective postwar planning program in Washington. He talked often of such a program, but in practice he was dilatory. It was a prime example of Quezon's characteristic lack of

planning ability; he was, no doubt, certain that when he landed in the Philippines he would be able to present a hasty improvisation that would meet any immediate need. In any event, it took almost a year of constant persuasion before he finally signed his name to an executive order establishing a Postwar Planning Board, of which he appointed Osmeña chairman (to the disgust of Commissioner Elizalde). And, having established the Board with wide powers, he effectively hamstrung it by refusing to grant funds with which to build a staff and get to work.

There was one final point in Quezon's wartime policy: the dream of a Malayan federation. He hoped that out of the war would come self-government for all the subject areas in Southeast Asia—for the Indonesians, Malayans, Indo-Chinese, Burmese. He felt that this was the promise of the Atlantic Charter, and that no repudiation by Winston Churchill could smother the flame it had ignited. He looked forward to a kind of loose confederation of self-governing states in the Southwest Pacific area, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Indo-China, Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, Siam, and Burma.

Quezon felt that the first step would have to be world-wide recognition that the Philippine-American experiment set a pattern which could be applied to all other colonial areas. In a speech delivered on Commonwealth Day, November 15, 1942, broadcast on every major network in the United States and by short wave throughout the world, he declared: "We offer to the world the record of the Philippines as an answer to anyone who would consider the Atlantic Charter illusory and impractical . . . It is the factual evidence of what can and should be done, everywhere and for every people."

In a Cabinet discussion, when Quezon was expounding his views on the federation idea, the point was made that the Filipinos would be swamped by the superior numbers of the other Malayan peoples. Quezon was not terrified. He said he would be delighted to let the capital of the federation be placed in Batavia, and to let all members be as active as they wished. He was convinced that the political know-how of the Filipinos

would bring them out on top. He even hinted that, if he lived, the first President of the Confederation would probably be none other than Manuel L. Quezon.

Quezon knew that the idea could not succeed—despite its ultimate inevitability—without the support of the United States. And it became apparent, by the end of 1942, that on the question of imperialism Churchill was making policy, and not Roosevelt. In the end, President Quezon decided that the scheme was premature.

IV

Quezon's health deteriorated rapidly. His physicians had long since given him up. Yet, after weeks in bed, he would astound them suddenly by appearing fully dressed and seemingly fresh of a morning, energetic, talkative, commanding. Then, as work bore down on him, the fits of coughing would come back, and the cheeks sag, and the voice become harsh and hurried, and the eyes bright with fever.

What kept the man alive, more than anything, was an impatient longing to step again on the soil of his native land. He yearned for one more homecoming, bearing something bigger than the Jones Act or the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and hearing the people shout their adoration.

When the time came for him to relinquish the Presidency, in accordance with the Constitution, he could not bring himself to give up his office. He rationalized and waited, knowing very well that Sergio Osmeña was too much the gentleman to force him out. On the eve of the required change, November 15, 1943, President Roosevelt signed a bill extending the terms of office of both men until the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. The explanation, which had a validity of its own, was that Quezon was a symbol of the Filipino struggle for freedom, that in retirement to private life some of the glamour and the promise would be taken away from the Filipinos in captivity. Sergio Osmeña accepted the decision with good grace, even participated in it.

For two summers, in 1943 and 1944, President Quezon had

tried to recapture his strength at a quiet villa above Saranac Lake. The friendly hills, the sound of the wind in the trees at night, the cool air, the soothing silence of the country, recalled the pleasant days before the war when he would go to Baguio to rest. He was not exactly alone, for he never traveled without Mrs. Quezon, the children, and an impressive retinue of servants, aides, and officials. But for days on end he would avoid work, trying to hold on to the strength that remained, waiting for the call to return.

When it came, Manuel Luis Quezon was dead. He had held out as long as he could, but at last the scarred, tortured lungs could serve him no longer. He died on August 1, 1944. Not three months later, the forces of liberation were landing on the beaches of Leyte.

v

In the early afternoon of the day Quezon died, Sergio Osmeña took his oath of office in Washington as second President of the Philippines. For many patient years he had awaited this moment, and it had never occurred to him that in the end it might not come. When it did come, he was past his prime. He had been forced to wait too long.

Osmeña was not a brilliant man, nor had he ever claimed to be. His virtue lay elsewhere: in his honesty, caution, patience, solidity. These were the traits uncommon among Filipino politicians, and perhaps that was the secret of Osmeña's popularity among his people. Here was a man who would never make a fool of himself. His oratory did not inflame one's heart; his actions did not kindle one's imagination; but he was a man one could trust.

He is a rather tall man, as Orientals go, and in appearance far more Chinese than Filipino. His build is spare and erect, and his face rather stolid and friendly. He likes to smile, but it is doubtful whether anyone ever heard him break into a hearty laugh. Though he writes English rather gracefully, with some of the florid effects of Spanish, he was never as articulate as Quezon, and his accent is much thicker. Yet, in a sense, he

does not need Quezon's conversational artillery, for he has always avoided the direct attack, the scene, the outright dispute, the need for squeezing out of tight corners.

Like Quezon, he was brought up in the political atmosphere of the independence movement. When his actions involved the question of independence, he was sure and firm. But he entered the Presidency at a moment when problems bore down upon his country from a thousand unforeseen directions. He had to cope with economic disaster, with the administrative difficulty of reconstituting his government in a hurry, with intricate political conspiracies whose ramifications were hard to follow, with an unfriendly military clique which made decisions with no regard to consequences.

The time called for a genius. Sergio Osmeña was a conscientious, honest, willing, bewildered journeyman. The task called for the financial wizardry of a Hjalmar Schacht, the intimate economic savvy of a Manuel Roxas, the magnetic ability to handle other people of a Franklin Roosevelt, the bewilderingly quick political tactics of a Manuel Quezon. Sergio Osmeña had only his own integrity, his own desire to do a good job, his own willingness to take abuse, his own tenacity.

As a human being, he is lovable. Those who worked closely with him conceived a protective affection toward him which they would never have dreamed of holding toward Quezon. One could admire Quezon; one became fond of Osmeña. He is the soul of courtliness, in the grand style but without ostentation. He is considerate and friendly, never flamboyant. And his gentleness is so great as to create difficulties. Slightly hard of hearing, he can listen attentively and nod agreement without quite understanding what is being asked of him. Sometimes this creates the impression among Americans that Osmeña is the perfect model of the mysterious Oriental, knowing all and saying nothing, for his nod of agreement and smile of understanding can be interpreted a dozen ways.

If, during the turbulent months of Osmeña's incumbency, he had been given half the American co-operation he had a right

to expect, his record would have been excellent and the United States would not have had a festering Philippine problem on its hands today.

For Sergio Osmeña, the servant of the Filipino people, is the best friend America has ever had in the Philippines. In return for his friendship, he received abuse, political sabotage, obstructionism, and, in effect, repudiation. It is a measure of the man that now, in semi-eclipse, he is not bitter. But even this steadfastness could have been predicted from his record.

Politically, Osmeña had matured early—even earlier than his schoolmate Quezon. He came of Chinese-Filipino parentage, and traveled from his native city of Cebu to study at San Juan de Letran and later at the University of Santo Tomas. During the stormy years of insurrection he was back in Cebu, editing a weekly newspaper and writing ardent editorials in the nationalist cause. His bent was politics, and the way to be a politician was to become a lawyer. In 1903 he was admitted to the bar in Manila, and was promptly appointed prosecuting attorney of Cebu. By 1906, at the age of twenty-eight, he was governor of Cebu.

Even then he demonstrated his amazing ability to get along with people, and to accomplish big things, not with the Quezonian drumbeats, but on a pleasant minor key. In his province at the time the great problem was unrest in the back country, where onetime revolutionists had degenerated into bandits. Slowly, firmly, he calmed them down, not by punishment but by persuasion. Once he conferred with the most dangerous bandit of all, but would not promise pardon in return for surrender because he did not know whether the American Governor-General would back him up. "Of course," he explained in his report, "I was unable to give promises that I was not sure of being able to keep." He let the bandit go, but banditry soon ceased in Cebu—"a situation," reported the Philippine Commission with some awe, "that has not before existed within the memory of living people."

From the beginning, Osmeña was all-out for independence. Yet he never permitted his unswerving devotion to the cause

to interfere with his faith in America. He saw in this no contradiction; rather, in his mind, it was obvious that anyone who tried to understand the American idea would wind up desiring to govern himself.

By 1907, with the Nacionalista Party established, Osmeña had become one of the best-known and best-respected Filipino leaders. He was elected to the new Philippine Assembly, and there was little opposition to his election as its Speaker. Manuel Quezon, seven years later, paid a tribute to Osmeña's record in this post:

"Sergio Osmeña, as Speaker of the House in 1907, was practically the only man in that body who knew anything about legislative work, and the wonder of it all was that he had never been outside of his country, that he had never seen a legislative body at work, that perhaps he had read very little about democracy and the workings of democracy; and yet, none of our Assemblies, from the first to the last, has ever excelled that First Assembly, either in the ability of its members, in the character of the work accomplished, or in the patriotic spirit with which it served. It was all due to Sergio Osmeña. We were nothing but his collaborators."

Osmeña was Speaker of the Assembly for nine years. When the Jones Act created a bicameral legislature, he chose to remain in the lower House, of which he was Speaker until 1922. For fourteen years he was the foremost political leader of the Filipino people. In power and prestige, he was second only to the American Governor-General. But his power and his prestige were at last challenged by Manuel Quezon, who had become President of the Senate. The issue was rather ironic. Quezon claimed that Osmeña's Speakership, combined with his leadership of the Nacionalista Party, resulted in what he called *unipersonalista* rule, which was inimical to democracy. Quezon called for collective leadership (something he was not to put much faith in when his own position was secure). The fight was bitter, and led to a split in the Nacionalista Party. In the 1922 elections, Osmeña decided to run for the Senate rather than the House. Though Cebu re-elected him, Quezon had

won the fight, achieving a political victory of the first order.

But Osmeña was never a man to harbor a grudge, and Quezon was too smart to retain enemies when he could regain friends. By 1925, therefore, the two men patched up their differences and entered the elections with a reunited Partido Nacionalista-Consolidado—of which Quezon was the leader.

Six years later, Osmeña, with Speaker Roxas, headed the mission which went to Washington to negotiate for what was later called the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. Once again, as we have seen, Quezon and Osmeña split, and when the smoke cleared Quezon had won a smashing victory again. But when Quezon in his turn brought home the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Osmeña was too honorable to fight him. He felt that the second act was so similar to the first that he could not in all honesty oppose the one after having defended the other.

With the second split came a second reconciliation. In the elections for the new Commonwealth Government, Quezon and Osmeña ran on a united ticket. It was more than a political truce; it was an agreement to work together because the country demanded it. "It has been the irony of fate," Quezon said in 1938, "that it fell to my lot to have to fight his leadership after a long, continuous, and delightful friendship; but there has never been on my part, nor I think on his part, any ill-feeling in any political struggle in which we were engaged. Each did what he thought was right and his duty. As I look back on the day when for the first time the Vice President [Osmeña] and I, loving each other as much as we did, found ourselves in opposite camps, the only explanation that I can find is the fact that we are temperamentally opposite. He is by nature an evolutionist, and I have been all my life a revolutionist. He always built upon the past, while I always wanted to jump. That and that alone was the cause of our misunderstandings. Inspired by a rebellious spirit, I always moved in a hurry, never satisfied; I always wanted to go on without looking back; while he, ever measuring the distance, always looked ahead but without forgetting what was behind. It was only for this reason that we clashed; and so you find that at the

end of every struggle, since there were never fundamentally serious differences in our aims and purposes, it has always been possible for us to join hands again."

As Vice-President during the prewar years, Osmeña was no Throttlebottom. He served as Secretary of Public Instruction in Quezon's cabinet. He headed a mission to Washington in 1939, to bring about improvement in trade relations by amending the Tydings-McDuffie Act. He was the natural choice for re-election to the Vice-Presidency. When war came, he went to Corregidor with the President. He made the famed escape with Quezon via submarine, P-T boat, airplane, railroad, and steamship, and lived quietly in Washington as a member of the Government-in-exile. When the fierce little bird with the burning ambition and the overworked lungs died at last, a tried, true public servant was waiting to assume the burden.

VI

In Washington there was not much time for Osmeña to carry out a long-range program. The war in the Pacific was coming to a head. "I shall return," MacArthur had said long months before, and now at last he was going to make good the pledge. Osmeña, who had chafed at Quezon's refusal to commit himself to a postwar planning program, now launched a hasty one of his own. A technical committee was set up, headed by hard-working Urbano A. Zafra, and conversations with American government officials were begun. But the concentration was almost entirely on the need for a new trade relationship between the United States and the Philippines, and Filipino officials thought entirely in terms of extension of the period of free trade.

No one, of course, had any idea of the damage that liberation would bring. And there was little concern over this damage, anyway, for President Roosevelt himself had promised publicly that the Filipinos would be assisted in the full repair of the havoc wrought by the war. The promise was repeated over and over again by the American propaganda services to

the Filipinos themselves, and in the remotest *barrio* people assumed that every lost *carabao* would be replaced or at least paid for.

So it seemed that the question was not reconstruction but rehabilitation, and that the proper solution would be extension of free trade. Most of the work of the Technical Committee under Dr. Zafra was therefore conducted within this framework.

Naturally, there would be the immediate problem of the liberation campaign itself, and of re-establishing the Commonwealth Government on Philippine soil. It would be hard work, but neither Osmeña nor anyone else then realized just how hard.

There was, first of all, the matter of relations with General MacArthur and the members of his staff. In Washington, Osmeña had heard the gossip about MacArthur—about his disgust with the delay in sending him enough troops and supplies; about his creation of a military empire with himself as despot; about his arbitrary and subjective policy decisions. On the other hand, like all Filipinos, Osmeña had a warm admiration for the man. And it was obvious that his conduct of the New Guinea campaign had been a masterpiece of military science.

There were some people in Washington who advised the new President not to join MacArthur in Hollandia. But Osmeña thought they were prejudiced; he was to wonder about that later on. For he found in Hollandia an atmosphere of intrigue far more serious than was normal for a military headquarters. On the staff were men whose patriotism was tinged with an acute concern for their business interests, and who did not hesitate to play politics when that served these interests. On MacArthur's staff, too, were many topflight officers who were already beginning to display the old-fashioned arrogance toward Filipinos. For the moment, this was no more than an irritation; later, it would become a danger.

There was even a time in Hollandia, before the Leyte landings, when President Osmeña seriously considered returning to Washington. He was being hamstrung by a combination of in-

trigue and officiousness. His despatches to Philippine Government officials were held up by American staff officers; in one case, after a two-week delay in sending a message of instructions, they even asked the President whether he still wished to send the message since it had been held up so long.

But Osmeña was no Quezon. He did not necessarily identify his personal pride with the destiny of the Filipino people. The important thing was to get home, and to start out fresh. Everything else was minor. He stayed on.

And within a few hours after the first landings in Leyte, in October, 1944, President Sergio Osmeña waded to shore, escorted by General Douglas MacArthur, to open the newest chapter in the history of the Philippines.

LIBERATION?

ON THE STEPS of the provincial capitol at Tacloban, in the muddy, bloody island of Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur announced, "I have returned." Graciously, he turned the liberated areas of the Philippines over to the lawful government under President Osmeña.

The ceremonies ended. The Supreme Commander and his aides drove away in their jeeps. The small knot of bystanders scattered. One man remained, standing alone and bewildered. It was Sergio Osmeña. The Army had given him the outer surface of authority, and had then swept on. A young American officer, with a sympathetic heart, lent his jeep and a driver to President Osmeña whose first mission was to find living quarters.

Here was a symbol of what the United States, through its giant military despotism, was to do to its best friend in the Philippines. For months, even after Manila itself had been liberated, the Army would make the decisions, and Osmeña would be left to take the consequences.

Secretary Ickes had warned Osmeña, before he left for Hollandia, that he should refuse to go unless he could bring a top

American civilian official to serve as buffer between him and the Army. MacArthur, of course, was dead set against the idea. And Osmeña mistakenly figured that a new High Commissioner would only establish American control in the prewar manner, at a time when he could deal effectively face to face with his friend MacArthur.

Throughout his term of office, Osmeña accepted the injustices, arrogances, and highhanded stupidities which the Army showered on him. To impersonal observers, his patience was near-miraculous. What was even more difficult to understand was the underlying reason for the Army's own attitude toward the Filipinos. It was inevitable, perhaps, that individual American officers and soldiers might not display tact and understanding in dealing with Filipinos. It was to be expected, too, that some of the more hidebound officers might reveal a superior, imperialistic attitude toward Philippine problems. But the matter went deeper than this.

Some Americans and Filipinos in Manila thought they could discern a deliberate Army policy favoring the wealthy Spanish, Filipino, and American businessmen, embarrassing the Osmeña administration, and reinforcing the political foes of the President. It was even possible to suspect a conspiracy behind the political and economic difficulties created by Army decisions.

Whether or not such suspicions were justified, the truth was that it was difficult to explain many of the Army's motives and actions. And it could not be denied that on General MacArthur's staff were many officers who either had personal investments in the Philippines, or who had for years been friendly with the most reactionary circles in Manila. The military mind is at best conservative. In this case, it was not unnatural for the military mind to tend toward downright reaction.

The Army's handling of the collaboration problem was the most dramatic symbol of this tendency. Before the Leyte landings, President Roosevelt himself had tried to clarify the American position on collaboration so clearly as to avoid misunderstanding:

"It is contemplated that as soon as conditions warrant, civil

government will be set up under constitutional officers. It will be their duty forthwith to take emergency measures to alleviate the hardships of the Philippine people, and to prepare the Commonwealth to receive the independence which we have promised. The latter includes two tasks of great importance: Those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country, and the democratic form of government guaranteed in the Constitution of the Philippines must be restored for the benefit of the people of the Islands."

The statement of policy, though clear, was not detailed enough for practical execution. Should a clerk in a minor government agency be punished if he had stayed at his desk and collected his meager salary during the occupation? Should a physician who kept his Hippocratic oath and attended a sick Japanese officer be deemed a traitor? On the face of it, there would be no sense in carrying the matter too far.

And so, on Leyte, President Osmeña decided to clarify the question himself. He made a detailed statement of his policy on collaboration. "Persons holding public office during enemy occupation," he said, "for the most part, fall within three categories: those prompted by a desire to protect the people, those actuated by fear of enemy reprisals, and those motivated by disloyalty to our government and cause. The motives which caused the retention of the office and the conduct while in office, rather than the sole fact of its occupation, ought to be the criterion upon which such persons will be judged."

His pale policy was laid down with the approval of Secretary Stimson. By comparison, MacArthur's declaration in November was fire-eating: "When our military forces have landed in Luzon, it shall be my firm purpose to run to earth every disloyal Filipino who has debased his country's cause so as to impede the services of USAFFE officers or men who have continued to resist. Such actions construe direct aid to the enemy in his war against the United States of America and the Philippine Commonwealth."

If MacArthur had abided by his own policy, there would

have been no collaboration mess in the postwar Philippines. If he had backed down a little, and supported the less stringent Osmeña policy, there would still have been no mess. Instead, the whole matter was handled with an inconsistency so chaotic as to be either criminally irresponsible or diabolically shrewd.

II

By April, 1945, MacArthur's forces had reached the outskirts of Baguio, in the mountains north of Manila. Here, they knew, the puppet Filipinos had been placed for safety by the Japanese. The hunting would be good; but the shotgun jammed. In OWI's *Free Philippines*, published under strict Army censorship, the headline was bold and dramatic, and the story startling:

ROXAS IS AMONG LIBERATED,
4 CABINET AIDES CAUGHT

General MacArthur announced today that American liberation forces, battering at the gates of Baguio, have rescued more than 7,000 civilians including Brigadier General Manuel Roxas, former speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and captured four members of the collaborationist cabinet.

The puppet officials who fell into American hands were José Yulo, Antonio de las Alas, Teofilo Sison, and Quintin Paredes.

"They will be confined for the duration of the war as a matter of military security," General MacArthur said, "and then turned over to the Government of the Philippines for trial."

Manuel Roxas, an officer of the United States armed forces who had become a member of the puppet government subservient to the enemy, a puppet official who had not withdrawn from the government when it declared war on the United States, had been "rescued"—while the others, whose record was no worse than his, had been "captured."

By this single act, Douglas MacArthur had determined the future course of Philippine politics. By this single act, committed in the flush of victory, Douglas MacArthur had in fact done all of this:

1. *He had hopelessly confused the collaboration question in the Philippines.* If Roxas was clean, then were not all the others? Where was the objective test by which he could be cleared and the others convicted? Some weeks after the "rescue," a puzzled Osmeña asked MacArthur the reason for his decision. MacArthur's reply, as quoted from memory to me by President Osmeña, was something like this: "We are detaining these men, without trial, because the war is still going on and their record proves they are potential threats to the military security of our armed forces in the Philippines. I have known General Roxas for twenty years, and I know personally that he is no threat to our military security. Therefore we are not detaining him." Collaboration, then, was simply a matter of whether or not General MacArthur knew you.

2. *He had given the other collaborators, the puppet politicians and the buy-and-sell parasites, a powerful champion who dared to defend them publicly and effectively.* Roxas had done no less than they; in all conscience, if he was free, then they should be free, too. Even if he had wanted to avoid the issue, Roxas could not do so. He was forced into a position of championing the collaborators. He did so without embarrassment; rather, he was most enthusiastic. Restored to his one-star rank by the Army, Roxas at once announced that the Laurel government had acted "under duress." His position was simple: "Osmeña should recall every government official and employee as of December, 1941, whether they served under the Japanese or not. If any of them is later proven guilty of collaboration with the enemy, then and only then should he be ousted from office." In other words, he wanted first to restore power to all puppet officials. And it was clear enough that he did not want power taken away from them later. His newspaper, the *Manila Daily News*, took the offensive: "Yes, not one of us

was a collaborator. Every one of us who were left behind acted to help the Filipinos themselves survive until America could come back. Why will there be punishment for a crime that was not committed?"

3. *General MacArthur had added the great weight of his popularity to the Roxas cause.* In the Philippines, there was no question about the admiration, verging on deification, with which most people regarded MacArthur. He was the idol of the Filipinos. And he had given his blessing to Manuel Roxas. Roxas had no need to defend himself, for MacArthur had cleared him. "We wish to inform the Filipino people," announced the *Daily News*, "that the case of General Roxas, if there has been any touching on collaboration, has long been disposed of and that the General has already been cleared by no less an Army authority than General of the Army Douglas MacArthur." Could any Filipino ask for more?

4. *General MacArthur had made inevitable the election of Manuel Roxas to the Presidency of the Philippines.* He had disposed of the accusation of disloyalty. He had thereby thrown to Roxas' side the well-heeled support of the collaborators and their families, whose wealth poured into the Roxas campaign coffers. He had undercut the most effective campaign argument of Osmeña's supporters—that the United States would look with disfavor on a tainted President, and would withhold its aid—by treating Roxas with warmth and affection. Liberals in America could fuss and fret, but to the Filipino voter there seemed no question about Roxas' popularity with the Americans who counted. (And High Commissioner McNutt, later, did nothing to destroy this impression.)

5. *General MacArthur had made America's position seem stupid, irrational, and cynical.* Well could Harold Ickes, as Secretary of the Interior, rage against the collaborators; the policy had been made by Douglas MacArthur. Well could the United States look with approval on Europe's treatment of her Quislings, Lavals, Mussolinis; in our own back yard, we were letting the disloyal go free. And as for the people who had really stood firm, the guerrillas who had risked their lives

every day, the intelligence agents who had dared to enter Manila itself during the war—what could they now think of the country to which they had been loyal? Not a single Filipino with an honest guerrilla record has been treated with one-half the official respect and courtesy that the United States showered on Manuel Roxas from the moment of his “rescue” at Baguio.

I III .

There remains the question as to whether Manuel Roxas was really a collaborationist, after all. On the record, no final answer can be made—that is, in terms of the sober, impartial findings of a court. Once there was an attempt to get the answer, when Secretary of National Defense Tomas Cabili, a guerrilla officer with a splendid record in Mindanao, tried to bring Roxas before the Philippine Army’s Loyalty Status Board.

Roxas was, after all, an officer of the Philippine Army, which was in turn a part of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Cabili had issued, in March, a general order that no personnel “will be retained in such service or on active duty in the Philippine Army who have accepted appointment or performed service in a military or civil capacity in any activity controlled by the Japanese or by the so-called puppet ‘Philippine Republic.’” The order exempted chaplains, physicians, and Army personnel who actively joined the guerrillas not later than one month before the landings on Leyte (on the assumption that by then everyone in the Philippines knew the landings were due and that many tardily joined the guerrillas as a last-minute measure of self-protection). A Loyalty Status Board was created to process all who were subject to the general order.

A few days after his “rescue,” Roxas went to Cabili to inquire as to his own status. Cabili told him he would have to be processed like the others. Roxas asked that the matter be expedited, and a processing team was sent to his home. He did not deny that he had worked in an official capacity with the puppet government. Meanwhile, with no official orders, he

went to work in the office of General Charles A. Willoughby (G-2), on MacArthur's staff.

After brief deliberation, the members of the Board announced that they had personal knowledge that Roxas had been loyal, and sent their decision to General Valdes, the Chief of Staff. Valdes, a good friend of Roxas, indorsed the report to Cabili, adding that he knew personally that Roxas had been the nerve center of the resistance movement. Cabili was furious. The decision, he said, was irregular. No evidence had been taken. Any Board member who had personal knowledge of the Roxas record should have disqualified himself and testified as a witness. Cabili directed that General Roxas show cause why he should not be affected by General Order 20.

But events moved too rapidly for the Secretary of National Defense. Valdes simply reverted Roxas to inactive status, and under the Articles of War no reserve officer can be tried except for felony. Roxas could claim that he had been cleared.

But he went further than that. He proclaimed himself the true, though secret, spearhead of the resistance movement during the occupation. "Modesty aside," he shouted in a speech to the Senate, "Manuel Roxas was the leader, the leader, of the resistance movement in the Philippines!"

In May, 1946, General MacArthur declared in Tokyo that Roxas (now President-elect) had acted as his contact man during the occupation. Roxas, he declared, "not only was instrumental in providing me with vital intelligence of the enemy, but was one of the prime factors in the guerrilla movement." Commenting on this, Professor Dale Pontius, who served in the counter-intelligence section of General MacArthur's headquarters, said:

"I saw much of the information received from guerrillas while General MacArthur's headquarters were in Australia, as I later joined the office where it was opened and prepared. We could not then identify this information as coming from Roxas. General MacArthur and President Roxas would now perform an important service if they could disclose the exact role Roxas played in the underground service, and what infor-

mation he provided. I made efforts to learn whether Roxas had performed any underground service. I could find no one who knew anything about it. When Roxas returned to his political career in liberated Manila, some guerrilla leaders were disgusted by a political trick he pulled. Several of them were invited to a party at his residence. There, they were photographed with him, and were gently urged to sign a statement of testimony that Roxas had been *the* guerrilla leader of the Philippines. Some signed, but others refused."

What did it all add up to? These were the facts: That Roxas had been a distinguished public servant before the war. That, as an Army officer, he had served well from the outbreak of the war until the time he was captured by the Japanese. That, after some months, he had accepted one job after another in the puppet government. That he had remained in the puppet government when it declared war against the country to which he had sworn to be loyal. That he had made some contacts with the guerrilla forces, though it has not so far been proved that this assistance was of any value. That he had been "rescued" and cleared by Douglas MacArthur. Did these things make him a collaborator?

Perhaps Osmeña's point on Leyte was, after all, the only test. A man should not be judged by his acts alone. There is the deeper, and subtler, question as to his motives. Roxas claims that he was motivated by a desire to help his people, and to assist in the defeat and expulsion of Japan. But there is a further consideration, and to some it will be the most telling of all:

That, if Japan had won the war instead of the United States, the top man in the Philippines today would probably have been Manuel Roxas.

IV

The Roxas case was only the most dramatic in a series of Army actions which confused the issue. There was, as another instance, the question of CIC clearance. As more and more of the collaborators fell into Army hands, they were detained

without trial, either to keep them from endangering the prosecution of war, or to await investigation by the CIC (Counter-Intelligence Corps). By September, 1945, the number of these detainees exceeded five thousand. Eventually they were turned over to the Commonwealth Government for trial.

But, from the beginning, a trickle of Filipinos was unconditionally released from detention by the Army. They carried papers from the CIC which, they claimed, "cleared" them of any charges of treason. Actually, the Army was merely releasing them because it did not consider them a menace to its military mission. Except for a few persons, CIC "clearance" did not exonerate the persons concerned. Unfortunately, the impression soon spread that release from detention was equivalent to complete exoneration. This was certainly President Osmeña's own impression, and he did not hesitate to appoint "cleared" individuals to important government positions. It was this, as much as anything else, that gave a mild flavor of collaboration to the personnel of the Osmeña administration.

The problem in the executive side of the government, however, was mild compared to the legislative scandal. Before Pearl Harbor, the voters had elected a new Philippine Congress. Now, after liberation, there was obvious need for convening the legislative bodies in order to restore the orderly processes of constitutional government.

Osmeña hesitated to convene the Philippine Congress. He knew perfectly well that it was rotten with men who had served the Japanese, either in the puppet assembly or in other puppet jobs. Legislative immunity would give them complete freedom to justify their records and to assist Roxas in his championing of traitors.

But MacArthur insisted, and in the end he had his way.

Of the ninety-eight men elected to the House of Representatives just before the war, seven were now under Army detention, several were dead, and the rest were eagerly available. Of the ninety-eight, twenty had served in the puppet legislature and eleven more had held other puppet jobs.

The Senate was even worse. Of the original twenty-four

members, two were dead and seven were under arrest: Recto, Paredes, de las Alas, Yulo, Tirona, Proceso Sebastian, and Vicente Madrigal. That left fifteen, of whom seven had worked in the puppet regime, and the rest had at best been neutral. If the fourteen proven collaborators were prevented from taking their seats, there would be no quorum in the Senate. If they did take their seats, then most of them would follow the leader, Manuel Roxas, through whatever would come.

They took their seats. MacArthur's headquarters ruled that collaborators should be classified according to rank, with legislators ranking below provincial governors. A collaborating Senator was therefore less objectionable than a collaborating Governor. And the Senate convened, with Roxas riding high. Soon he was declaring, as President of the Senate: "What is collaboration? There are no puppets and collaborationists in this house. I am against every collaborator. I would be the first to bring them to justice. But the mere fact of service under the Japanese is not conclusive evidence of collaboration! Not a single Senator can justly be accused of collaboration!"

Through the powerful legislative Commission on Appointments, Roxas controlled Osmeña's selection of key personnel. Resistance leaders like Confesor and Cabili, with clean records, were refused confirmation as cabinet members. Slowly the pressure on the President forced him to choose men more satisfactory to the Roxas clique.

In Washington, Secretary Ickes—still (in theory) responsible for United States policy in the Philippines—fulminated against the "timid, craven and opportunistic helots who basely collaborated with the cruel enemy." But he was almost powerless to clean up the mess. There was no Roosevelt in the White House to support him, and the arrival of V-J Day had turned the American public's attention to the new-found pleasures of an uneasy peace.

On September 11, 1945, Ickes could stand it no longer. He sent a radiogram to Osmeña, who received it after it had been carefully scrutinized at Army headquarters in Manila. "Both

official and press reports," Ickes said, "indicate that a substantial number of persons who adhered to the enemy and gave him aid and comfort through their service in the puppet governments during invasion are now holding important offices in various branches of the Commonwealth Government, including the judiciary. I am informed that you intend to release numerous persons against whom evidence was collected by the United States Army. Your attention is invited to the statement of President Roosevelt on June 29, 1944, that those must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country. It was intended that this statement would serve as a guide to the policy of the Commonwealth and that the Commonwealth would find the means of effectively investigating charges and speedily trying the offenders before courts or tribunals composed of judges of unquestioned loyalty. I deem it essential that this task be completed before the holding of the next Commonwealth election and I would call the attention of your government to the probable reluctance with which funds may be appropriated for relief, rehabilitation and support of the Commonwealth Government if it becomes generally believed that that government had failed diligently and firmly to convict and punish those guilty of collaboration."

The message was probably intended to strengthen Osmeña's hand. But the President was too honest, or else too overwrought, to use it as a club. He could have spoken out now, pinning the blame on the United States Army. This he refused to do. He could have bludgeoned Roxas into line, for here at last was a clear statement that the United States would not tolerate the collaborators. This, too, he did not quite do. Instead, he sent for Roxas and Speaker Zulueta, and showed them the message as one patriot to another. They saw, more clearly than he, that this was dynamite. And for a short time Roxas acted like a chastened man.

He was silent for days, though the pro-Roxas press gradually opened up a barrage of attacks on Ickes and even on the United States as a whole. Finally Roxas himself wrote that

Ickes' "insolent" warning was "reminiscent, if not worse, of the abominable Japanese way." And a lawyer named Juan G. Quijano wrote on the front page of a pro-Roxas newspaper ironically called the *Guerrilla*: "So dangerous and so sudden was the difficult situation for the people that (I shall state here without reservation) we the people in general have a surging feeling of gratitude and pity instead of hate and condemnation towards our so-called political prisoners, with the exception of a few . . . Their stay in office was a sacrifice and not a desire. To put pressure, therefore, on our government in order that these people may be punished without leniency is both undemocratic and un-American."

But a few politicians switched to Osmeña's side as a result of the Ickes blast, and even the Senate briefly changed its tune. It passed the bill establishing a People's Court to try the collaborators, and it quickly confirmed the long-pending appointment of Lorenzo Tañada, an honest, intelligent, liberal young lawyer, as chief prosecutor.

Osmeña considered it the better part of wisdom to send a pallid reply to Ickes. He denied any intention to release people against whom the Army had evidence. He pointed out that detainees turned over to the Commonwealth Government came under civil law, and had the right to release on bail. He reported, somewhat prematurely, that the People's Court had been established, and remarked, "Doubtless the prosecution of alleged collaborators will be diligently conducted and those found guilty will be promptly punished in accordance with law." Then he said: "We have never knowingly reinstated any official whom U. S. Army authorities have detained for collaboration. Several officials and employees who continued in their posts during the puppet regime but committed no hostile acts against the Philippine or American Governments have been reinstated by me in executive or judicial branches after they had been cleared by the Counter-Intelligence Corps of the U. S. Army."

The truth was that Ickes had acted too late. Possibly he could not have done anything even if his message had arrived

months sooner. But by now the damage was done, and his warning was effective only insofar as it could be backed up by a refusal to provide relief and rehabilitation funds unless there was a house-cleaning in Manila. As it turned out, Ickes was unable to carry out his threat.

v

Not all the Filipino puppets had been "captured" or "rescued" at Baguio. There were a few whom the Japanese had taken all the way to Tokyo, in the hope of establishing a puppet government-in-exile. And so, when the American forces landed in Japan, José Laurel, Benigno Aquino, Camilo Osias, Jorge Vargas, and some lesserlings, were nervously awaiting arrest. Almost at the very moment they were picked up, Roxas' newspaper in Manila was announcing editorially that "collaboration is nothing but a myth in the Philippines."

"Is it not a fact," asked the *Daily News*, "that nearly all the so-called puppet officials of the Executive Commission first and later the Republic were in constant contact with guerrilla elements and many of them were in fact guerrilla leaders? Is it not a fact that many in the buy-and-sell trade during that infamous period contributed much to the underground movement?"

It was a good beginning for the whitewash of José Laurel. Interviewed by a Roxas press-agent named Felixberto Bustos, who was suspected by Army agents to have carried secret messages from Manila for the puppet president, Laurel issued a series of statements which skilfully played on the sympathies of the Filipino public. "If the Commonwealth Government contemplates trying the leading men of the Philippines who participated in the republic for their acts," he said to Bustos, "I submit that they be spared of that responsibility and that it try me instead, first and solely." Then came the melodrama to catch the imagination of the people, to establish the martyr role: "I want this collaboration case to be done away with. I want peace, peace, peace. And if our people should decide that I am guilty of dis-

loyalty and treason I am ready to be shot at the Luneta and appear before my Creator and rededicate and rededicate myself to my country and my people even in the hereafter."

It was reported that Laurel's name was high on MacArthur's lists of Axis war criminals. But he was, after some delay, returned to the Philippines in order to stand trial before the People's Court. By the fall of 1946, the Court reached the case of José Laurel. The great constitutional lawyer, the clever speaker, the close reasoner, was out to rebuild his political prestige and incidentally to save his life. He wanted, first of all, to be released on bail, so that he might prepare his case in freedom. And the hearings began in an atmosphere favorable to him.

For by now anti-American feeling had reached a more feverish pitch than at any time, perhaps, in forty years. There was resentment against the conditions laid down by the Philippine Trade Act, which required the Filipino people to amend their Constitution and give Americans special rights equal to those of Filipinos. There were incidents, from Palawan to Manila, between civilian Filipinos and callow American troops. Reconstruction and rehabilitation had progressed hardly at all. Tempers were frayed.

Addressing the People's Court amid such an atmosphere, Laurel said he was like a man whose hands were tied and who was then challenged to fight. He criticized the United States bitterly; Americans, he said, had a double standard of loyalty, one for Americans and another for Filipinos. He stated that during the occupation he was in constant contact with Roxas, who was himself in touch with MacArthur. The Court offered him a chance to remain in his Paco home under technical custody. This he refused. He wanted to be released on bail. And he won his point. His countrymen were impressed.

Meantime, exploiting his provisional liberty, Laurel made speeches by the dozen—almost as though he were conducting a political campaign. At the University of Manila, observing its thirty-third anniversary on October 6, 1946, he said: "America should not expect the Filipinos to love the United

States better than the Philippines . . . We have been left with ruins and destruction in our midst caused not only by the Japanese but also by the Americans." Encouraged by wild applause, he continued sarcastically: "We need rehabilitation; everybody knows this. Now, how shall we rehabilitate? By alienating our natural resources? By giving ourselves to the Americans?" And at a meeting three days later, he declared: "This republic is as much a puppet as the one during the Japanese occupation." Laurel was mending his fences—with a vengeance, as usual.

VI

Thus the Ickes warning had come to naught. So had a directive from President Harry Truman to the United States Attorney General. On October 26, 1945, the White House issued a series of letters and memoranda on Philippine problems, and among these was a set of detailed instructions on collaboration. They follow in full:

"To the Attorney General:

"While the mass of the Filipino people and many of their leaders remained staunchly loyal during invasion and rendered invaluable assistance to our arms, it is necessary to admit that many persons served under the puppet governments sponsored by the enemy. Some of these, especially those engaged in health and educational work, remained at their posts of duty with an evident intention to sustain the physical and cultural welfare of their people. Others of the clerical and custodial services continued in office in order to earn their accustomed livelihood and participated in no way in enemy policy. But, regrettably, a number of persons prominent in the political life of the country assisted the enemy in the formulation and enforcement of his political policies and the spread of his propaganda. Others in the field of trade and finance seized upon the occasion to enrich themselves in property and money at the expense of their countrymen.

"Reports have appeared in the press which indicate that a number of persons who gave aid and comfort to the enemy

are now holding important offices in the Commonwealth Government. Reports further indicate that the Commonwealth Government is only beginning to investigate, charge, and try the offenders. It is essential that this task be completed before the holding of the next Commonwealth general election.

"Considering that disloyalty to the Commonwealth is equally disloyalty to the United States, I request that you send experienced personnel to the Philippines to discover the status and to recommend such action as may be appropriately taken by the United States. Such recommendations should be made through the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. I am further requesting that the Secretaries of War and Navy direct the staffs of their intelligence sections to co-operate with you and make available to you all records and evidence on this important problem.

"Representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to the Philippines should be directed to report through the United States High Commissioner in connection with this and other operations in the Philippine Islands."

In accordance with Truman's instructions, an investigator was sent to Manila by the Department of Justice. He came back with a voluminous report, which has never been made public. No action has ever been taken on his recommendations.

And the paradox of Philippine politics today is this: That the President of the Philippines is a man who, though accused of having aided the enemy, was never called to appear before a court and disprove the evidence against him. And that the only practical alternative to Manuel Roxas, in terms of political popularity, is the man who hates America, the erstwhile president of the puppet Republic of the Philippines—José Paciano Laurel.

XI

THE ECONOMICS OF LIBERATION

MANILA'S LIBERATION came, early in 1945, amid a holocaust of fire and death. To Americans at home the full picture of devastation never quite came into focus, for much of it occurred after General MacArthur had announced his victory, and his censors would not make him a liar. The General's communiqué, itself, was followed by thirty-six hours during which the Japanese burnt down most of the city and had to be routed out of what was left by point-blank artillery fire.

President Osmeña came back to a capital where the only government building still intact was, by accident, the palace in which he would live. The business district of Manila was practically 100 per cent destroyed. Eighty per cent of the south residential district, which contained the best homes in the city, lay in rubble. About 70 per cent of the public utilities, and three-quarters of the factories and stores, were ruined. Manila was only the most striking example of country-wide devastation. Cebu was almost entirely wiped out. Lesser towns were badly hit, and whole *barrios* were burnt to the ground.

The roads were bad; heavy military traffic was making them worse. Except for a few miles of paved highway, they were

little more than paths of mud in wet weather and of dusty pot-holes in dry. Civilians rarely got a chance to use even these, for there was a desperate shortage of vehicles.

There were no telephones for civilians. Most people in the cities went without electric current or running water. The simplest task of daily living—whether keeping one's body clean or making and keeping a business appointment—became a problem in logistics, except for Army personnel.

And, as in every liberated area throughout the world, the cost of living whirled skyward. For a time, the wage scale, too, was high, thanks to widespread employment of Filipino civilians by the Army. At one point, half of Manila's population was either on the Army's payroll or supported by someone else who was. But wages were never able to catch up with the spiraling prices.

A few months after liberation, according to the Philippine Government's Emergency Control Administration, it took eight pesos to buy the amount of food that had cost a single peso before the war. Clothing was nine times the prewar cost. One year after liberation, eggs sold for twenty-five cents apiece; before the war, they were fifteen cents a dozen. A government clerk with a salary of one hundred pesos a month could support his family of four for little more than a week. Until his next payday came, he could starve or resort to graft.

It was not a currency inflation. The peso was still worth fifty American cents, and there was no shortage of American dollars. On the contrary, there were too many dollars (since the peso itself was only another form of the dollar). The inflation was caused by two obvious facts: First, there were not enough goods in the Philippines to meet the minimum demands of the civilian population. And second, the country was overloaded with currency crying to be spent. The Army kept pouring more money in—to pay troops, to pay for civilian labor, to buy available local goods and services. By September, 1945, there were probably 450,000,000 pesos in circulation, compared to the prewar circulation of 230,000,000 pesos.

Meanwhile, most banks, insurance companies, building and

loan associations, and postal savings institutions faced what looked like disaster. During the occupation they had been forced to do business with "Mickey Mouse" currency dumped by the Japanese; after liberation they were left with large quantities of worthless paper and a mess of financial problems.

In the provinces, farmers were unable to produce basic foods, for nearly all *carabaos* were gone, either taken by the Japanese or killed for food. In Manila, black marketeers thrived in hasty little stalls amid the ruins, and people subsisted in the remnants of their homes. Morale was shot. Nearly everyone had a racket, from GI to customs inspector, from clerk to high government official. Newspapers reported on pilferings, thefts, murders, until these were news no longer. Under the tutelage of some American soldiers, Filipinos hijacked food from relief ships in the harbor. Once they stole so many cans of condensed milk from a dockside warehouse that the black-market price dropped below the official ceiling price.

The city, the whole country, was a nightmare of chaos and corruption, of misery and destruction, of raw nerves and overwhelming desire for escape. The people were daily more ragged and hungry, and the war-sick city groaned as they swarmed in from the provinces. The number of indigents in the Philippines was placed at almost a million and a half. From the mountains of northern Luzon came reports of famine.

II

Sequestered in his quiet offices in Malacañan Palace, carefully avoiding the rooms which Quezon had once made his bouncing own, President Sergio Osmeña worked long hours, stoically taking the abuse which inevitably fell upon him. Toward the end of his term he suffered badly from insomnia.

The people clamored for food, the Manila fire victims for clothing, the sick and lame for medicines. During the first six months, their needs were met by the United States Army's relief program—aided unofficially by GI's who either gave

away Army supplies or sold them on the black market. In June, 1945, the Army was feeding 600,000 persons daily in Manila alone. Of these, all but 60,000 were paying for the food they received. Then, in September, the Army pointed out that the war was over and civilian relief must be a job for civil authorities. It handed the responsibility to the Commonwealth Government, but it did not offer the supplies, warehouses, trucks, or other necessities which would permit the Government to pick up where the Army had left off.

Relief ships, loaded with supplies bought by UNRRA or Commonwealth purchasing agents in the United States, sped from the American West Coast. They would arrive in Manila Bay, only to be held up for weeks, unable to unload their cargoes. Rice, the bread of the Orient, was almost as scarce as in the worst Japanese days. The official Army explanation was that there were some 600 ships in the harbor, that re-deployment to Japan took first priority, that relief ships would have to wait their turn. So they piled up, just beyond reach of Manila, and the United States War Shipping Administration threatened to divert American vessels to other assignments, because the tie-up was needlessly wasting scarce bottoms.

Desperately, Osmeña appealed to MacArthur: "There is a very limited amount of dockage facilities allocated for use in unloading ships carrying civilian goods. In fact, within two weeks several arriving vessels will be forced to remain in the harbor for lack of pier facilities. Also, the Foreign Economic Administration has such limited supply of trucks assigned by the Army that it is presently unable to remove cargo from the few berths which are available, thus definitely retarding the unloading of the ships. To date no warehousing space has been assigned for temporarily storing supplies unloaded from the ships until they can be distributed throughout the provinces of Luzon and other islands." The bill of particulars went on and on. But remedy came very slowly—and when it came, the harbor was jammed again, this time with merchant shipping. By the spring of 1946, American exports to the Philippines were reaching a value of \$30,000,000 a month. Not till copra

began to leave the archipelago was there anything the Filipinos could export to help pay for what they were buying; and Army spending was rapidly decreasing. The great inflationary store of easy money would not last forever. So the flood of goods to Manila was, in its way, as much a danger as the earlier harbor tie-ups.

The real need, from the long view, was not so much relief as reconstruction and rehabilitation. In the cities the people needed homes. They needed office buildings, stores, factories—all the paraphernalia of which jobs are made. In the provinces, the sugar mills and lumber mills were idle for want of new machinery. The rice fields were not green, for there were no *carabaos* to trudge the watered earth; and the cane lands lay fallow.

The Philippine Government itself was close to bankruptcy. The country was too disorganized to pay taxes. For a time, the Government got along on the \$71,000,000 turned over to it by the United States, covering prewar excise taxes on Philippine imports to the United States. But the money soon ran out. If the United States had not promised to make a loan of \$75,000,000 in July, 1946—after the election of General Roxas—the Philippine Government's fiscal future would have been as dark as the muddied Pasig River which flows through Manila.

At last, in 1946, American aid did materialize, in a peculiar and somewhat backhanded form. It stemmed from President Osmeña's personal appeal for help, for which he flew to Washington in October, 1945.

Basically, he was seeking financial aid, technical assistance and commercial revival. He hoped to arrange for a large long-term low-interest loan that would restore the government, public works, trade, productive industry, and agriculture and mining of the Philippines. He wanted top priority in securing reparations in kind, such as oil refineries, heavy industries, shipbuilding facilities. He wanted "the assurance, before independence, of twenty years of free trade between the United States and the Philippines on the basis of the relationship

that existed between us in 1940, without diminishing quotas or excise taxes."

In the earliest days of the war, President Roosevelt had told the Filipinos that they would be "assisted in the full repair of the ravages caused by the war." These words were repeated so often during the war years, by short wave, by leaflets dropped from planes, by all the media of propaganda, that Filipinos knew them by heart. And President Truman had re-affirmed the promise: "The Philippine people, whose heroic and loyal stand in this war has won the affection and admiration of the American people, will be fully assisted by the United States in the great problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction which lie ahead." In both statements, the words "full" or "fully" accompanied the word "assistance." The promise, reiterated by Congress itself, was more thoroughgoing and less circumspect than any promise made by the United States to any other country.

Late in 1945 President Osmeña came to Washington to ask, with courteous desperation, that America pay its bill in the Philippines.

III

Settlement came in the form of two laws passed by the United States Congress. One was designed to pay for war damages suffered in the Philippines. The other was the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. Both were signed on April 30, 1946, by President Truman, who said they fulfilled President Roosevelt's wartime promises.

It had taken more than six months for these two bills to make their tortuous way through the Congressional mill. They had been written and rewritten, changed and changed back and changed again. American exporters, importers, investors, Cuban sugar lobbyists, British loan negotiators, Philippine Government officials, liberals, imperialists, and a host of others had had their say in the final contents of the two bills, and especially of the trade bill. Carlos P. Romulo, as Resident Commissioner of the Philippines in Washington, had run him-

self nervous as a gadfly in his efforts to protect his government's position. President Osmeña had despatched personal appeals to all his friends in Washington. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt flew back from Manila and nursed the bills through the committee rooms, pressing for his own policies with stubborn insistence.

By the time the trade legislation reached the voting stage, there were few men in Congress who could honestly say they understood every word of it; most could not even define its general outlines. Everyone agreed on the need to help the Filipinos, but the pressures were so heavy and yet so veiled that no one could quite say whether the trade act was good legislation. Accordingly, it became a bipartisan measure, and the legislators adopted both bills with hardly a murmur of protest.

President Truman, signing the bills, declared: "This is unprecedented legislation for the United States, but the situation itself is unprecedented. We are about to grant political independence to these people. Today we are giving them a chance to preserve and develop their nation on a temporary economic basis of trade preferences. Political independence without economic stability would be totally ineffective. I am happy to approve these two measures, which give notice to the people of the Philippines and to the entire world that we are redeeming our promises to the heroic Philippine people."

So we were at last redeeming our promises. Were we? The answer lies in the acts themselves.

The less controversial of the two was, of course, the War Damage Act, for it was intended to cope with an immediate need. The Philippines obviously could not recover from the war unless reconstruction began. It could not pay for reconstruction itself. True, a great deal of money was in circulation, but it was rapidly drifting away to pay for immediate consumer needs at exorbitant prices. Besides, much of it never reached the small Filipino to whom the lost *carabao* or damaged farm machinery was at least as serious as the ruined saw-mill to the rich man.

It was up to the United States to make good these war damages. The promise had been made; and even if it had not been made, the responsibility would have remained. The only questions were how, and how much.

The act, in its final form, authorized appropriation of \$400,000,000 to be paid as compensation to all persons and firms that could prove the legitimacy of their claims. A Philippine War Damage Commission was set up to handle both claims and payments. The act provided that small claims—under five hundred pesos—be paid off promptly, before large claims could be acted upon. And it was stipulated that money received for compensation must actually be used to repair or rebuild or replace what had been destroyed.

While it accepted this war-damage obligation for the United States, Congress hoped piously that Japan could be made to pay the cost in the end. The act requires that any reparations or indemnities from Japan must be covered into the United States Treasury until the amount equals what has been paid out for war damages in the Philippines. After that, further Japanese reparations will be used to satisfy Philippine claims still unpaid or not fully paid.

In addition to the basic \$400,000,000 authorization, the act transferred \$100,000,000 worth of surplus property to the Philippine Government. Unfortunately, by the time the bill became law, much of the most useful surplus property in the Philippines had already been transferred or sold to others. But it covered what remained in the way of building and construction materials, vehicles, and other military supplies that could serve a peacetime purpose.

Further, the act appropriated \$120,000,000 for restoration and improvement of public property and essential public services. This money went toward putting roads, streets, and bridges back into operation, rebuilding port and harbor facilities, providing assistance in such matters as public health, inter-island commerce, weather information, fisheries, and coast and geodetic surveys.

Along with this, the act set up a training program for Fili-

pino technicians. This permits ten Filipino engineers to be trained in highway transport, and ten others in construction, improvement and maintenance of river and harbor facilities; one hundred Filipinos to be trained in public health methods and administration; fifty to be trained each year for the merchant marine; fifty to be trained each year in air navigation and traffic; fifty in the first year and twenty-five each succeeding year in meteorology and weather service; 125 in deep-sea fishing and other fishery techniques, with the establishment of fishery schools in the Philippines by the Fish and Wildlife Service; and twenty Filipinos to be trained each year in coast and geodetic survey work.

As far as it went, the War Damage Act was a good piece of constructive legislation. But it did not go far enough.

For one thing, it did not pay back the total loss. What *was* the total loss? Guesses differ. The Philippine Government itself hit on one figure, the United States Government on another, Senator Tydings on a third. A good average of all the guesses would place the figure at about one billion dollars. But the War Damage Act only provided for a total outlay of \$620,000,000—and this included services and surplus war goods as well as cash payment to those who suffered damages. Nor did it take into consideration the painful postwar fact that replacement costs are at least half again as high as the original prewar values. In other words, we are not giving the Filipinos full compensation at all.

And we have taken an unconscionably long time in giving them much of anything. Aside from some governmental services and the surplus property, we have done little more than begin to accept claims from those whose homes, businesses, or tools were wiped out. The law merely authorized an appropriation. It did not appropriate. By the time Congress recessed, in the summer of 1946, it had appropriated only a few million dollars toward the initial operations of the Philippine War Damage Commission. The full amount cannot have been appropriated before 1947 at the earliest—which means that the money cannot possibly go to the people who need it until late 1947 at the

earliest. In other words, the war-torn islands have been forced to live in a state of shock for at least three years since they were freed. It is hardly surprising that Manila, in 1947, is not one whit improved over the Manila of 1945. The rubble, the gutted buildings, the blighted areas, all remain. Virtually nothing has been rebuilt or repaired.

Passage of the War Damage Act by Congress received scant attention from the American public. The newspapers covered it in a backhanded manner, if at all. There was no great public controversy revolving around it, and in an era of strikes and international unrest most Americans were not much interested. But it was one of the misfortunes of the Filipinos that even American officials, who should have known better, did not pay too much attention to the act, either. In the State Department, and even in the Treasury Department, it was generally taken for granted that the United States had fulfilled its responsibility to the Philippines, and had turned the money over so quickly as to permit the whole transaction to resemble a relief measure. Indeed, American representatives at UNRRA conferences opposed Philippine requests for large-scale UNRRA aid on the theory that the United States had taken care of the matter. This was one reason why the Philippines received so little help from the international relief agency.

IV

It was possible to carp at the War Damage Act. It was necessary to do so at the Philippine Trade Act of 1946.

In order to understand the reasoning behind this intricate piece of legislative acrobatics, we must recall the historic trade relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Before the war, ever since 1909, there had been free trade between the two countries. This had made of the Philippines America's sixth largest customer abroad, the world's best market for American exports of cotton cloth, wheat flour, evaporated milk, cigarettes, tires and tubes, and more than a hundred other export items. It had also given the Filipinos a

higher standard of living than any other comparable nation. But it had also effectively tied the Philippine economy onto the American economy, and eliminated the possibility of a more balanced insular economy should the free American market ever be cut off.

The Tydings-McDuffie Act, in its economic sections, had provided for a scaling-off of free trade through the ten-year Commonwealth period. But ten years was too short a time, and by 1939 the act was changed; when war came, free trade still flourished. Under it, the Philippines was selling its sugar, hemp, coconut products, and tobacco to us with advantages offered to no other country (except Cuba, in the case of sugar). America monopolized Philippine trade. There was no incentive to develop new kinds of exports, to look for new markets elsewhere, or even to grow food enough to meet domestic needs. It paid to export raw materials and import finished products—and that is exactly what the Filipinos did.

For a colony, the arrangement was most pleasant. For an independent nation, it would mean remaining a colony.

So, in theory, the smart thing to do would be to stop free trade with independence, let the Filipinos struggle along on their own for a while, and expect them to grow new kinds of crops, find new markets, and fend for themselves.

But the Filipinos were not ready for that. They had just come out of a war that razed the countryside. They had lost their money, their equipment, their gumption, and many of their best men. If they were thrown completely on their own, their economy would probably collapse for good.

So it was agreed—by the Philippine Government, by High Commissioner McNutt (who was making Administration policy in consultation with his economic adviser, E. D. Hester), and by members of Congress—that free trade must be retained for another generation. American businessmen with investments in the Philippines were delighted, as were the big financial interests in Manila—the Sorianos, Elizaldes, and their colleagues.

The theory behind the trade act was that the Philippines

must be given an adequate period of time in which to catch its breath, rebuild prewar industries, start making a little money, and restore the old standard of living. During this time, according to the theory, the country would also be able to do the things which must eventually be done if it really wishes to match political independence with economic independence.

In order to accomplish this purpose, the act provided that trade between the Philippines and the United States shall be free of duty until 1954, subject to certain quotas and other conditions. After 1954, duty on goods traveling in either direction will be increased at the rate of 5 per cent of the prevailing duty each year. In 1974, the full rate of duty will take effect in both countries.

Thus there are to be eight years of duty-free trade, followed by twenty years of gradual constriction of such trade. As a special concession, the downward gradation is hinged on the preferential duty hitherto granted only to Cuban goods; this could mean a tariff reduction of from 20 per cent to 50 per cent on many items even after 1974, assuming that the present American tariff system is still in operation then.

As for the quotas on specific Philippine exports, they did not vary greatly from the prewar limits. For sugar, an absolute quota was set of 850,000 long tons a year, of which 50,000 long tons may be refined sugar. (For a time, before the bill's passage, the American beet sugar and Cuban cane sugar lobbyists had managed to substitute "short tons" for "long tons" in the quota, which would have meant an annual loss to the Philippines of about \$5,000,000 a year. But the original figure was restored in the final bill.) On coconut oil, the absolute quota is 200,000 long tons; on cordage, 6,000,000 pounds a year; on cigars, 200,000,000, with a quota of 6,500,000 pounds of scrap tobacco; on pearl or shell buttons, the absolute quota is 850,000 gross. To satisfy southern rice growers, a quota of 1,040,000 pounds a year was set on Philippine rice; but this is meaningless, since the Philippines has not exported rice for

many decades, and will take a long time before it can grow enough even to meet its own needs.

The whole effect of the trade act is to rebuild the Philippines exactly as it was before the war—freezing both advantages and disadvantages. There are even stipulations which make it certain that only those firms which exported the key Philippine products to the United States before the war can export these products now. This keeps new business out of the most lucrative fields, on the excuse that thus capital is forced into new channels and therefore into diversification of the national economy.

What is more likely is that the old businesses (such as, for example, the predominantly Spanish and American interests controlling sugar production) will make sufficiently large profits out of their monopolies to be able to monopolize any new fields that may develop.

But, basically, there are two other (and far more dangerous) flaws in the Philippine Trade Act. One is apparent, and has created something of a crisis in Philippine-American relations. The other is less apparent but no less real—and, in the long run, far more important.

The first is the provision of the trade act which requires the Philippines to permit American businessmen and organizations to participate in all forms of business activity, including the development of resources of the public domain and the operation of public utilities, on a basis of complete equality with citizens and organizations of the Philippines. The act requires that the Philippine Constitution be amended so that this may take place. It hinges the whole trade program on this requirement.

The Philippine Constitution, as originally written, had deliberately covered the question of control over the public domain and public utilities—for this matter has long been touchy among Filipinos. It stems from a remembrance of the century-old exploitations of the Spaniards, and particularly of the friars. Governor-General Stimson had once pointed to sensitiveness on this as a key to the understanding of Filipino

political psychology. The framers of the Constitution had decreed that only corporations of which Filipinos owned at least 60 per cent could have any interest in the public domain or in public utilities. Now the United States was officially telling the Filipinos that, if they did not back down on this point, they would be doomed to everlasting hardship.

This provision, coupled with insistence on retention of American control over certain Philippine currency policies, is nothing more than a streamlined and unsubtle demonstration of economic imperialism. Its only excuse is that, without it, American businessmen might hesitate to invest in new enterprises in the Philippines, and the country's economy would suffer.

The principle, pushed through with McNutt's support, was opposed by the Department of State. Assistant Secretary Will Clayton, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, said: "Those provisions are not reciprocal. We cannot give the same rights to the Filipinos. The Bell [Trade] Bill would require that the Philippines permit Americans free access to enterprises. It would permit them to engage in many activities in the Philippine Islands from which Filipinos, as aliens, would be barred in the United States."

To Filipinos the whole thing seemed utterly vicious and selfish. Liberal Filipinos, who had demonstrated their loyalty to America during the occupation, felt that they had been betrayed. The Laurels sanctimoniously screamed their I-told-you-so's.

Commissioner Romulo, who had done his best in Washington, defended the stipulation as well as he could. "I fought this provision tooth and nail," he said. "I spoke against it, I pleaded that it be changed, I used every weapon in the arsenal of peaceful negotiation to stop it. But I failed." Nevertheless, now that it was in the trade act, he appealed for its acceptance because, in his opinion, the other advantages of the act outweighed this disadvantage.

As for President Roxas, he was trapped. If he opposed the stipulation, he would lose free trade altogether. The country

would wobble outside the American tariff wall, and there would be widespread and continued hardship among all the people. His business friends and political backers would be the first to suffer, but they would not be the only ones. He knew it would be almost impossible to arrange for a new trade act in Washington if the amendment were rejected. So he put the best face on the matter that he could. He mobilized all his great political influence and exploited all his personal charm. Finally, by a series of remarkably narrow votes, the Philippine Congress agreed to submit the proposed Constitutional amendment to a plebiscite in the spring of 1947. The first step had now been taken. The second might be more difficult.

Roxas campaigned eloquently for a favorable vote in the plebiscite. Addressing fellow-alumni of the University of the Philippines, he said:

"I should like to indicate the economic blindness of the view, often expressed here, that so long as we have resources we need not worry; that it does not matter if they are undeveloped; that the matter of primary importance is keeping them exclusively for ourselves. This is economic nonsense. It is the philosophy of the miser who hoards his money and denies it even to himself.

"Our generation has every right to exploit and enjoy these resources. Let us do it ourselves if we can; if we cannot, let us do it with the help of others. Mine is not the view of defeatism; it is the challenging one, practical and proven."

In a later speech, Roxas declared that it would be incorrect to describe the amendment as an equal-rights provision. "We do not propose to grant equal rights to American citizens in any sense of the word," he said. "What we propose to grant is special rights, the right of equal treatment with regard to development of natural resources and ownership of public utilities. That is a far cry from parity.

"We propose to grant special rights to engineers, miners, technicians and the like. These are exactly the type of skills we need and which will come if the amendment is ratified."

It is questionable whether Roxas really believed these

rationalizations himself. But he knew that he was forced to espouse them, for the alternative was dreadful to contemplate. As he stressed publicly, rejection of the amendment would mean automatic denunciation of the executive trade agreement based on the trade act. The government would no longer receive any revenues from the sugar, coconut, and cordage industries. It would therefore be unable to make payments on its loans. The budgetary crisis would force essential government services to close down. There would be no hope for rehabilitation of the sugar, coconut, cordage, and tobacco industries. The United States would withhold payments on some of the war-damage claims. Tension between Filipinos and Americans would grow. Any hope of developing a sensible program of economic rehabilitation would wither. There would be unemployment and widespread unrest. Industrialization would stop, and the Philippines would remain under a colonial economy. It was a dreadful prospect, and amending the Constitution looked like the lesser evil.

With these arguments, and the obvious counterarguments which appealed so headily to their patriotism and pride, the Filipinos were asked to cast their votes in the plebiscite. On March 11, 1947, less than half the registered voters turned up at the polls. Of these a large majority voted for the amendment. In doing so, they gave up, not so much an inherent right or even a vital vested interest, but rather a part of their national self-respect. Few honest Filipinos can accept the amendment in true sincerity. If they accept it they do so because they cannot do otherwise. They have been forced into a repugnant decision because the United States has presented them with no other alternative. To that extent, at least, they have been trapped into a reduction of their economic independence.

But there is a second, and deeper, danger inherent in the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. The plain fact is that, at best, it fulfils only one-half of the American responsibility to rehabilitate the economy of the Philippines. It provides, through free trade, a breathing spell of twenty-eight years in which the Filipinos can get back on their feet. Theoretically, during

this period, Filipino businessmen will be hard at work in new fields of production. But they are offered no assistance. If, for example, a crop like ramie should become important to Philippine trade, there is nothing in the trade act which would help build up a ramie industry from scratch—unless this industry, too, should fall into the trap of temporary free trade with the United States. Nor is there anything that would, in any serious way, assist in development of Philippine agriculture so that home-grown crops could more nearly provide the country with food and clothing and other necessities which it must now import from abroad.

Free trade does assist the Filipino for the short run. For the long run, it does not. It entrenches, most of all, some of the most dangerous elements in the Philippines. It helps the moneyed interests, who are to an alarming extent not Filipinos at all, but Spaniards who openly favored Franco during the Spanish Civil War and now pay glib, expedient tribute to American democracy.

In 1940, ownership of sugar mills was 55 per cent Filipino, 32 per cent American, 12 per cent Spanish, and 1 per cent nondescript. But among the Filipino majority are included many who have taken out Philippine citizenship without giving up their Spanish attachments and mentality. In the coconut oil industry, only one of the eight large plants was owned by Philippine capital, and its quota allotment was $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total. In the tobacco industry, Spanish interests controlled 60 per cent of the total factory investments. In the cordage industry, none of the four big firms was controlled by real Filipinos. In the mining industry, the key men were Haussermann, Soriano, Marsman, and Elizalde, of whom three are Philippine citizens but none a Filipino of heart or face.

To Americans, this emphasis on ethnic origin may seem strange and reactionary. It is not a racial question, but a question of the destiny of a colonial economy. It might not be so difficult for Americans to understand this matter if United States Steel, General Motors, and nearly all other giant American corporations were owned by men whose American citizen-

ship was little more than a formality, who felt themselves socially and intellectually superior to Americans generally, and who gave enthusiastic political and financial support to General Francisco Franco of Spain. Such are the men whom free trade entrenches in the Philippines.

The United States must do a great deal better than this. We assumed a heavy burden in the Philippines nearly half a century ago, and we did not lay it down when independence came in 1946. Having made the Philippines, economically, what it is today, we cannot be satisfied. For we must make sure that the country progresses, or at least that it does not retrogress. Free trade may prevent retrogression for another quarter-century; it promises nothing beyond that. In the life of a nation, a quarter-century is not a very long time.

The American obligation is to provide the money, the advice, the constant assistance, for an economic program that will develop a new system of crops, production, and exports in the Philippines. This program must begin at once, for it will only be useful if it is carried out during the very period when free trade offers a temporary respite. Such a program can, in a quarter-century, become far enough advanced to take over when free trade dies. It cannot start in 1974. It must start in the 1940's.

v

Whatever his record of opportunism, Manuel Roxas has a clear head. He has an understanding of basic economics. As President, he has been faced with an impossible situation, and he has done his best to cope with it. In the fall of 1946 he created a Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, capitalized at 300,000,000 pesos, and patterned on the American RFC. "It is imperative," he told the Philippine Congress, "that we fashion here an economy that, though not entirely self-sufficient, will be positive in the sense that we cease to be merely a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. We must find here such industries as can process

our native products and present them to the world's buyers with a 'Made in the Philippines' label."

The Philippine RFC, set up for this purpose, is empowered to grant loans to private individuals or corporations for the rehabilitation or development of agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises. It may also lend money to government corporations for waterpower projects, public utilities, irrigation systems, waterworks, resettlement projects, and purchase and subdivision of landed estates. It may make loans to cities, towns, and other governmental subdivisions for similar projects. It may underwrite agricultural marketing and consumers co-operatives. And it may grant home-building loans to individuals.

The great problem remains: Where will the 300,000,000 pesos come from? One-third of the amount was automatically transferred from the Treasury Certificate Fund, whose 100 per cent backing of the peso makes Philippine fiscal policy as conservative as any in the world. Withdrawal of 100,000,000 pesos from this fund was based on the guess that this much money was destroyed during the war and therefore did not need to be backed any further. As for the other two-thirds, Roxas proposes to raise that through sale of surplus properties given the Philippines by the United States. Even if the properties sell for this much, the money will be a long time coming in.

Whatever the difficulties, the idea as a whole was bold. It had the obvious merit of being something concrete at a time when no one else had a worth-while suggestion to offer. It had the further merit of spearheading some money, at least, into constructive channels. It provided a means of making use of foreign exchange in healthy chunks. For the wild millions of dollars in the Philippines were so widely and yet so privately distributed that the government had no way of forcing them into enterprises that might be less profitable but more beneficial than the mere import of consumer luxuries.

Thus the RFC is an excellent first step, but a first step only.

It will cost more than 300,000,000 pesos to do the job of rehabilitation.

Meantime, the export production of the archipelago is slowly reviving. Rebirth has been by no means so rapid as in many European nations—such as Belgium and Norway, for example. But it is beginning. “Next year,” President Roxas said in October, 1946, “we will be able to meet our domestic sugar needs, and by 1948 we will begin to export sugar.” Sugar exports in 1948 can hardly be expected to reach more than a token figure. It will probably not be possible to approach the prewar figures until 1950, at the earliest. Tobacco, too, will probably not be produced in sizable export quantities for at least three or four years. The big recovery has been in copra, spurred by acute shortages in the United States. Total shipments for 1946 probably will have exceeded 300,000 tons, matching the prewar level. Exports for 1947 were forecast at between 45,000 and 65,000 tons a month. But there has been no production of coconut oil, because of the destruction of mills to crush the coconuts. Oil can be produced as soon as these mills are re-established, probably before the end of 1947. As for hemp, the 1946 export figure amounted to approximately 200,000 bales—or about one-seventh of the prewar figure. Here, again, it will take at least three or four years to get back to prewar production.

In sum, copra is booming, sugar and hemp are recovering very slowly, and tobacco is lagging. These are the four great export crops of the Philippines under the free trade system. As matters now stand, there is no sign of development of new export crops to withstand the shock of future economic independence. And the production of domestic consumer goods, such as rice, is so low as to remain catastrophic.

Even now, as the recovery of the Philippines begins, it is possible to recognize the outlines of the old setup. For the Filipino people this spells disaster, unless the United States fulfils its additional responsibilities to them.

XII

THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION

WITH LIBERATION, a dreadful truth became more and more apparent: Sergio Osmeña had lost his flair for politics. The quiet, self-effacing, conscientious dignity with which he approached his job was not enough to capture the imagination of the public. A wall of misunderstanding was rising between the President and the people. It might have been breached, perhaps, if the President's information chief, Mauro Mendez, had been less sensitive and more effective. But the problem went far beyond the technical aspects of public relations.

Surely the years of exile, in which Osmeña lived far away from the day-to-day ordeal of his countrymen, must have made a difference. His human sympathy was big enough to encompass much of what he had not experienced, but there are some things which no man can understand unless he has himself lived through them.

There was also his trait of stubborn integrity, which forbade him to meet the demagogic demands of politics. He refused to make rousing speeches when he had nothing tangible to say. He made practically no attempt to move around the country and meet people face to face. He would take no dramatic

stance, launch no slogans, manufacture no glamour. Only occasionally, on the spur of the moment, would he unbend. Once, in September of 1945, left-wing adherents of the Democratic Alliance demonstrated on the grounds of Malacañan. Some demonstrators had come many miles, from the Huk country, to hold placards and shout slogans. There were speeches from the balcony by leftist leaders. Osmeña himself replied with a sober address, stating his faith in the basic principles of social justice. Then, suddenly, he proposed that each demonstrator come to the front door of Malacañan and shake hands with him. Five thousand handshakes added up to a grueling, touching performance; but it happened too rarely.

Even a daily repetition of such gestures might not have been enough to counteract the pervading atmosphere of defeatism. People were tired of anybody in power. They were tired of the memory of humiliation and danger and privation under the Japanese. They were tired of the constant spectacle of destruction. They were tired of their insecurity, their misery, their very tiredness. Inevitably, they were tired of the familiar face in Malacañan, and of his modesty and caution. All over the world, others were feeling the same revulsion against established ways. Britain turned from Churchill to the Labour Party. Europe rocked under the storms of political strife. Later Americans too would give the opposition party emphatic control of both houses of Congress. This was the postwar mood.

Politically, a sense of inexorable doom pervaded Osmeña's official family. The President had not managed to attract the fierce loyalty of enough Filipinos. In his home provinces in Cebu and the other Visayan islands, he was still the local boy who had made good. But elsewhere, and especially in Manila, few paid him the tribute of undivided devotion. Everyone recognized his integrity, his desire to do a good job, his straining for wisdom. But this was not enough.

As President, in a governmental system where great power centers on the chief executive, he tried to mobilize his strength for the oncoming elections. Many of his appointments to provincial and municipal positions were made with an eye to

political effect. But he suffered from a lack of frank and detailed information on conditions outside Manila. Sycophants told him what they thought he wanted to hear. The Army controlled all communications throughout the archipelago, and its intelligence officers knew more of the political crosscurrents than did anyone in the Osmeña administration.

From the beginning, Osmeña had only one serious opponent with whom to contend. Manuel Roxas wanted to be President of the Philippines. Everyone knew it, long before he said so publicly. He had many advantages.

He had, most of all, the advantage of his own dynamic personality. He is a magnificent orator, with a florid style which Filipinos love, and yet a lucidity that impresses the most critical. He looks young and energetic, and in his manner there is a flashy reminder of the imperious, quick-witted Manuel Quezon. Osmeña was in his late sixties; Roxas in his early fifties. His political career, prior to the wartime blot, was brilliant. He came from the little town of Capiz on the island of Panay, of a moderately wealthy family of planters, and he won high honors as a student at the University of the Philippines. In his law examinations he received marks never equaled. At twenty-seven he was governor of the province of Capiz, but he soon left for Manila as a member of the legislature. For a time Roxas was Quezon's prime lieutenant, and he attracted wide prominence as Speaker of the House. Then came the fight over the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, which he and Osmeña had secured in their mission to Washington. Roxas and Osmeña fought side by side, and both went down under the fury of Quezon's wrath. Roxas lost his Speakership. While the gallery applauded, he said: "I have fallen from the Speaker's chair into the hearts of the people." Quezon, quick to forgive, took Roxas into his cabinet later as Secretary of Finance. He worked hard and intelligently.

Roxas had been brought up under the American regime, and his schooling was American. He understood economics; though he played a supporting role in the independence struggle, he was not warped by it to the point where all else was minor.

To young Filipino students, worried about economic and social problems, he looked like the last best hope of liberalism. His only disadvantage, as the new campaign began, was the collaborationist record. But so many voters were so confused by what had been done and said since liberation that they were willing to overlook this.

Now, in his drive for the Presidency, the tense, bright-eyed, ambitious politician was ready to adopt any expedient. He seemed to have unlimited resources of money, for large campaign contributions poured in from wealthy business circles in Manila. (Roxas had been senior partner of the law firm representing most of the Soriano interests before the war.) He financed newspapers, helped them find newsprint and advertising. He tolerated, if he did not himself openly conduct, a dangerous appeal to racial animosity. The Roxas forces bitterly attacked the Chinese, Indians, Jews, even Americans—indeed, every foreign element except the Spanish. In September, 1945, Roxas' *Daily News* said: "President Sergio Osmeña is the Chinese puppet leader in the Philippines." His majority in the Senate set up obstacles to every proposal from Malacañan; ratification of the United Nations Charter was held up for weeks on technical excuses. And he constantly ranted against the "tired, inefficient old man" who was President of the Philippines.

All through 1945, he was hot and cold on the Presidency. The Manila newspapers constantly carried conflicting versions of his desires. He would compromise with Osmeña; he would campaign against Osmeña. He would run for the Vice-Presidency, with Osmeña as President, if Osmeña would agree to leave the country until his term ran out; he would have nothing to do with Osmeña. He would join Osmeña in the mission to Washington in search of tangible assistance; he would let Osmeña mishandle it alone. He had, indeed, mastered the secret of political propaganda: Do and say the unexpected, act for action's sake, never be predictable, keep your name on everyone's lips.

As for Osmeña, he kept his own counsel. In his last con-

versation with me before returning to Manila in November, 1945, he said he was tired of public life. He had given his career to the service of his people. Now he wished to rest. He would not enter the political campaign—unless Roxas insisted on running for the Presidency. In that case, Osmeña said, he would consider it his duty to run, and to try to win.

It was not the mood in which a candidate creates a landslide.

II

In January, 1946, the Nacionalista Party split into a "loyalist" Osmeña wing and a "liberal" Roxas wing. On January 19, Roxas was nominated for President, Elpidio Quirino for Vice-President. "Of the sixteen official candidates for Senator on the Roxas ticket," says Hernando J. Abaya, a well-informed Filipino writer, "ten had accepted high positions under the puppet regime, while half of the remaining six engaged in buy-and-sell."

The Roxas platform promised "to prosecute mercilessly those guilty of collaboration," but it insisted that the "mere fact that a man held an office during the Japanese occupation does not *per se* constitute collaboration." One convention speaker, hitting the racist note, attacked Osmeña for his part-Chinese ancestry: "We don't like a president who is a mandarin." Roxas, climaxing the convention, proclaimed "a crusade for democracy, for justice, to lift our prostrate country and bestow on her the blessings of democracy and peace." It was a crusade, he said, "first, for constitutional government; second, for restoration of democratic processes; third, for honesty in government; and fourth, for peace and order."

Two days later, the Osmeña wing held its own convention. The President was renominated, with Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. as his running mate. Convention speakers attacked Roxas for his fascistic tendencies. "Men with this messiah complex," said one speaker, "have ever been the bane of their country and of the world. This is the mentality that produces Hitlers and Mussolinis."

Accepting renomination, Osmeña criticized "the backward economic practices which make the rich richer and the poor poorer," called for "a more equitable sharing of the crop between tenant and landlord." He stressed his friendship for the United States, and by implication his popularity in Washington, and observed: "Fortunately, the help which the Philippines will receive from the United States will be considerable."

The United States Government was now completely "neutral." Its policy was made by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, whose appointment, in the fall of 1945, had come as a shock to Osmeña, for it violated the promise made by Roosevelt at Warm Springs only a few days before his death. The new High Commissioner was familiar with Philippine affairs, in view of his earlier service in Manila. But he was unpopular with many Filipinos, chiefly because of his arrogant attitude and his earlier championing of "re-examination"—by which he meant postponement of Philippine independence. In his new post, McNutt veered more and more toward Roxas. He considered Osmeña more friendly to the United States but less competent as an administrator. Roxas was less acceptable to him for his collaborationist background, but in his opinion more likely to make an efficient President. So he helped Roxas, not openly, but by maintaining a strict hands-off policy.

On February 26, 1946, McNutt declared: "We neither support, directly or indirectly, any candidate, nor do we look with disfavor, directly or indirectly, on any candidate. The U.S. Government will carry out its promised aid to the Philippine people regardless of whom they choose for their next president."

In Washington, Congress postponed action on the trade and war-damage bills until after election. The theory was that delay would take the bills out of Philippine politics, but again American policy favored Roxas. And again the policy was influenced by McNutt, who had come from Manila to steer the bills into law.

Meantime Roxas rampaged up and down the country, attacking "chaos, corruption and Communism." Osmeña stayed

in Malacañan, grimly silent. He made only one speech, just three days before the elections. He did not attack Roxas directly; he did observe that "to systematically find fault, to invent grievances, to foment discontent—that is the work not of true leadership but of demagoguery." He warned against "the big ambitions of little men." He said he had decided not to wage a personal campaign, because that would have forced him "to give second place to my duties as President of the Philippines in the all-important task of laying the foundations of rehabilitation."

Roxas used every act in the political repertory; he raged, orated, promised, threatened, cajoled, needled. Osmeña violated every principle of practical politics; he tended to his duties, maintained his dignity, and placed his faith in the memory and gratitude of his countrymen. Roxas won.

But when the votes were counted his majority was not so great as his supporters had expected. Certified figures gave Roxas 1,333,392 against 1,129,996 for Osmeña. In the Vice-Presidential race, Roxas' running mate, Quirino, received 1,167,721 against 1,051,243 for Rodriguez.

III

With the election behind him, the President-elect could now at last visit the United States. No longer need he fear the wrath of American officialdom. The American High Commissioner himself would "sponsor" Roxas in Washington. On May 8, 1946, Roxas and McNutt set out for the United States, by way of Tokyo.

At Atsugi airfield, in Japan, they were met by General MacArthur. Next day, while their plane was winging over the ocean, the General released an official exoneration of Roxas: "Roxas is no collaborationist. I have known him intimately for a quarter of a century and his views have been consistently anti-Japanese . . . After General Wainwright's surrender, I eventually established contact with Roxas from Australia and thereafter he not only was instrumental in providing me with vital intelligence about

the enemy but was one of the prime factors in the guerrilla movement . . . When he came into our lines in North Luzon early in 1945, in answer to an accusation of collaboration, his case, like that of any other soldier of the Philippine Army, was referred to the Loyalty Board which completely exonerated him . . . The recent election, which selected Roxas for the Presidency, reflected the repudiation by the Filipino people of irresponsible charges of collaboration made in foreign countries by those who lack an adequate knowledge of the circumstances."

Had one of MacArthur's staff officers, during the war, submitted to him an "estimate of the situation" so filled with opinion and assumption as this, the Supreme Commander would undoubtedly have transferred him to some military Siberia. He was offering no new factual evidence; he was merely stating an arbitrary and highly subjective opinion. Against the fact of Roxas' participation in the puppet government, MacArthur pointed to the election returns. Filipino voters, having been confused by the MacArthurs and McNutts, were now to be regarded as final judges in the Roxas case.

The whitewash was continued in Washington by McNutt and his public relations man, Commander Julius Edelstein (who was by this time writing many of Roxas' own speeches). On their arrival in Washington, McNutt said: "I am proud of the opportunity to present to President Truman the choice of the Philippine people." At a luncheon at the National Press Club, he made his only public reference to the collaboration matter:

"There have been many things said about General Roxas. None has denied his courage, his brilliance, his intellectual grasp and ability. He is superbly equipped for the high responsibility he is so soon to assume. A product of the American school system in the Philippines, he is, with others of the younger leadership in the Philippines, a man trained to think in the American mold, in the American idiom. He is just as American in thought and intellectual habit as any university graduate from Texas or Wyoming. He is a brigadier general in the United States Armed Forces of the Pacific, Philippine Army Division, commissioned on the field of battle by General Douglas MacArthur." Then

the High Commissioner quoted from MacArthur's statement in Tokyo, and commented, "General MacArthur, under whose orders Roxas served during the war, has vouched for his military record."

Meantime, quietly but effectively, a systematic public relations program resulted in the publication of editorials in many American newspapers, lauding Roxas and accepting without question the "clearance" he had received. The *New York Times* spoke of "the clean bill of health given Roxas by the late President Quezon and by General MacArthur." The *Congressional Record* bulged with extensions of remarks along the same lines. One, inserted by Representative Karl Stefan of Nebraska, quoted from an article on Roxas: "All during the Japanese occupation, Roxas' status was anomalous, except to those liberty-loving Filipinos who remained true to America and to ideas of freedom and to their compatriots in the guerrilla forces. They always knew where Roxas stood. That is why, when MacArthur came back, although Roxas had actually held position in the puppet government, Roxas could go out to greet the American with clean hands and a pure heart. And because he knew of Roxas' record, MacArthur could (and did) sincerely embrace the little, wiry, half-starved Filipino."

The whitewash had succeeded. To most Americans, who paid at best little attention to details of Philippine affairs, this new Filipino leader was a man with a clean and gallant record, a true friend of the United States. It was almost as though Pierre Laval had been taken to America's heart after the resurrection of France, his wartime record justified and his avowals of loyalty to democratic ideals accepted at face value. The great difference was that the French executed Laval, while the Filipinos elected Roxas as President.

IV

The United States is now confronted with the necessity of co-operating with Manuel Roxas, and, by helping him, of helping his people. Whatever his wartime exploits, it is unlikely that

Roxas will again, of his own accord, turn against the United States. He knows that Philippine salvation can only arise from America. Once again, perhaps for the last time, reform must come from above.

In Washington his chief aim was to secure a loan of \$400,000,000 to meet the urgent financial needs of his government. "It is as much to the eventual interest of the United States as it is to the immediate interest of the Philippines to make our independence succeed," he reminded members of Congress. Obviously, independence would not succeed if the government verged on bankruptcy, unable to perform the normal services which are its responsibility. Roxas estimated that the expenses of his government, in the first year after July 4, 1946, would amount to \$135,000,000, and its revenues to \$20,000,000. The disparity between income and expenditures would be far greater than what Mr. Micawber warned would result in misery.

But Roxas also knew that \$400,000,000—even if added to the money to be paid out for war-damage claims—would not cover the rehabilitation needs of the Philippines. At the National Press Club he said: "It will take years, dollars, and the unstinted energies and sacrifices of all Filipinos to restore what has been damaged, destroyed and stolen. We can import *carabaos* from Indo-China, rice from Siam, and building materials from the United States. But who can estimate the damage when an entire economy is blasted and disrupted, when an inflation has increased the cost of living twelve times, when communications and public health have been set back half a century; when the morals and morale of an entire people have been hideously affected by exposure to the evil climate of Japanese casuistry?"

In answer to his appeal, in July, 1946, the United States Congress authorized a loan to the Philippines. The figure was not \$400,000,000, but \$75,000,000. It was enough only to stave off disaster. And even this was slow in materializing. The American RFC, assigned the job of working out details, had

not yet paid out the money by February, 1947. Roxas would have to keep his administration going by deferring its liabilities and cutting expenses to the bone.

On May 28, 1946, Manuel Roxas took his Presidential oath of office and delivered his inaugural speech before the ruins of the Legislative Building in Manila. It was a ceremony that would be outshone by the independence formalities due five weeks later.

The new administration was starting amid financial problems, economic problems, social problems. It inherited a bankrupt government and a caved-in economy. It inherited the riddle of central Luzon, where tenant farmers were armed and furious, with grievances that were both real and pressing. On inauguration day there was fighting in Pangasinan and Pampanga, with scores of killed and wounded.

The new President announced the membership of his cabinet. It was a disappointment to those who expected a strong team backing him up, for many of his appointees were second-raters, lame ducks, or ex-collaborators.

Vice-President Quirino was appointed Secretary of Finance; after independence, he would head the Foreign Ministry. As Secretary of the Interior, there was José C. Zulueta, who had switched his support from Roxas to Osmeña and back. Zulueta, with years of experience as a legislator, is at best a typical political wheelhorse of the old style. Roman Ozaeta, the Secretary of Justice, is a well-known lawyer who remained as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court under the Japanese, but was nevertheless considered anti-Japanese. He was reappointed to the Supreme Court by President Osmeña, and is probably one of the better men in the Roxas cabinet.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Mariano Garchitoreña, is one of the top Filipino experts on the abaca industry. He refused to work with the Japanese during the occupation, biding his time in the provinces. He was badly defeated in the Senatorial elections, and was obviously chosen by Roxas as a technical man rather than as an important polit-

ical figure. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Ricardo Nepomuceño, is a lawyer and onetime Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, with a clean record during the occupation.

To the key post of Secretary of Public Instruction, Roxas appointed Manuel V. Gallego, a lawyer and educator who has represented the Philippines at many international conferences. He comes from Nueva Ecija, in the Huk country, but rumors of his activity in buying-and-selling rice to the Japanese have made him highly unpopular at home. So far as is known, he has not visited his home province since before the war.

Dr. Antonio Villarama is Secretary of Public Health and Welfare. He is a distinguished physician, with many honors, but during the occupation he was implicated in the buy-and-sell racket. Pedro Magsalin, Secretary of Labor, is a legislator and judge who continued his judicial duties under the puppet regimes, and was a member of the puppet legislature. He too was badly beaten in the Senatorial elections, and his appointment was interpreted as a political gesture to his home province of Rizal.

Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, the Secretary of National Defense, is a professional soldier who rose from the ranks in the Constabulary. He escaped from a Japanese prison camp late in 1942, went to Leyte, and distinguished himself as a guerrilla leader on Samar and Leyte. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for "outstanding courage and resourcefulness." He is not a politician, and was probably appointed as a concession to the guerrillas.

To succeed Quirino as Secretary of Finance when he became Secretary of Foreign Affairs, President Roxas selected Miguel Cuaderno, Jr. Cuaderno was formerly an official of the Philippine National Bank, and during the occupation he held no public office under the puppet regimes. His appointment was non-political.

Taken together, the Roxas cabinet is not much more than a catch-all for men who will carry out the policies of the

President. Like Quezon before him, Roxas clearly intends to run the government himself. Unlike Quezon, he did not pick many outstanding men as his lieutenants.

v

For the heartsick and the angry, the independence ceremonies seemed a little hollow. The historic July day had none of the joy of 1935, nor any of the tense heroism of the second inaugural on Corregidor. It tried to pierce the fog of disbelief and weariness, and it only half succeeded.

Despite the mood of the moment, it was a historic occasion nonetheless. The cheers were forced, perhaps, and the flowery words a trifle overdone. But, behind the raising and lowering of the flags, behind the legalistic wording of President Truman's proclamation, hovering over the cream-and-gold reviewing stand pathetically designed to resemble the prow of the ship of state, there was the greatness of an idea.

The promise made had become, on schedule, the promise kept. The Republic of the Philippines was born. It was a sovereign state. True, it started out with no pattern of lasting prosperity for its citizens. True, it was not built upon a foundation of blameless political leadership. But where was the nation that had such a pattern or such a foundation? There was, at least, the only promise that democracy can offer its adherents—that, if they wish to make progress, they can do so themselves.

And so, on the morning of July 4, 1946, the sirens screamed, the church bells sounded, and the American flag was slowly lowered on Dewey Boulevard. This was a morning for speeches, promises, moralizing. Harry Truman, from Washington, delivered a message of greeting by radio:

"The United States . . . will continue to assist the Philippines in every way possible. A formal compact is being dissolved. The compact of faith and understanding between the two peoples can never be dissolved. We recognize the fact and propose to do all within our power to make Philippine independence effective and meaningful.

"Our two countries will be closely bound together for many years to come. We of the United States feel that we are merely entering into a new partnership with the Philippines—a partnership of two free and sovereign nations working in harmony and understanding.

"The United States and its partner of the Pacific, the Philippine Republic, have already charted a pattern of relationships for all the world to study. Together in the future our two countries must prove the soundness and the wisdom of this great experiment in Pacific democracy."

Paul McNutt, the first American Ambassador to the Philippines, said:

"In proclaiming the independence of the Philippines, we attach no reservations or exceptions. None is asked. None is needed. There will be proclaimed the full, complete and absolute independence of the Philippines. But those words, themselves, are relative to the new conditions we face in the world today. If by independence we mean non-dependence, there is no nation in the world which is independent today. All nations have yielded some of their independence, of their absolute independence, to the airplane, the radio and the atom bomb. There can be no absolute sovereignty, if by absolute sovereignty we mean freedom of action . . .

"America has a mighty stake in the Philippines. It is not an economic stake in the sense that we have an expectation of economic privilege in this land. As a nation the United States expects no profit from this pitifully devastated area. Our stake is our belief in democracy as a way of life. The Philippines are a democracy in our own pattern and design. We planned it that way. We made it that way. Now the chance is afforded us to set an independent and democratic republic on the high road to national success. Whatever effort is required on the part of the United States must not be spared."

Douglas MacArthur, the idol of the Filipinos, who received the greatest ovation of all, said:

"Let history record this event in the sweep of democracy through the earth as foretelling the end of mastery over peo-

ples by power of force alone—the end of empire as the political chain which binds the unwilling weak to the unyielding strong. Let it be recorded as one of the great turning points in the advance of civilization in the age-long struggle of men for liberty, for dignity, and for human betterment.”

Manuel Roxas, first President of the new Philippine Republic, said:

“The Philippines aspires to greatness. We seek, along with all other nations, for glory. We seek eminence among the peoples of the earth. But we will not sacrifice peace to glory. We will not trade the happiness of our people for national fame. We will search for, and I trust we will find, that happy formula for security, for friendship and for dignity that can be combined with the elevation of the economic status of our citizens, and with the preservation of our liberties in a world of peace and equality and unity for all nations.

“We are a troubled people. Our economic goods are destroyed and our homes and buildings are in shambles. We must rebuild a levelled land. Against a background of destruction, we acquire our sovereignty, we receive our national heritage. We must perform near-miracles to bring prosperity to this, our land. The work of two generations was reduced to rubble in the passionate moments of war. Now we must rebuild in months what was enacted in decades . . . To succeed in this imperative, we have the assistance and support of the United States. Without that assurance, our prospects would be bleak and grim.

“In all this we will maintain the implacable substance as well as the noble forms of democracy. We will stay our progress, if it is necessary, to permit time for democratic counsels. We are determined to reflect in the actions of government the will of the majority of the people. . . .

“In our economic life we will continue to embrace, as we have in the past, free but guided enterprise. That is our system. We will defend it against the deceptive allures of communism, of militarism and of fascism. We will not give comfort or countenance to those anti-democratic creeds. Pro-

ponents of those views will be protected in their right to hold and openly to advocate them. They will not be protected in subversive schemes to destroy the structure of this nation or of its free institutions. Alien anti-democratic 'isms' will not be permitted to misuse the priceless privileges of freedom for the systematic destruction of liberty. . . .

"The welfare of all the people must be our primary concern. The toil and sacrifice we have laid out for ourselves must be directed not for the exaltation of the state, but for the elevation of all our citizens, for their greater happiness, for their economic security, for their well-being, for the attainment of greater opportunities for their children. The sweat of the toiler's brow must be fairly and fully rewarded. The products of enterprise must flow in proper measure to those who participate in all the processes of production. There must be neither masters nor serfs in our economic system."

VI

The new-born republic, as Roxas well realized, had many problems, fiscal, economic, international. But the most immediate and newsworthy was the problem of agrarian unrest.

The troubles in central Luzon seemed to epitomize the troubles of all the islands. Yet they were highly localized, at least in the sense that grievances were much more acute here on the Luzon plain than almost anywhere else in the Philippines.

These provinces—Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga—are low-lying, flat regions with a rather fertile soil. They are the rice bowl of the Philippines. They are not far distant from Manila. They are inhabited by Filipinos of the Tagalog group, tillers of the soil, who for generations have inhabited a country which by terrain and location has always been valuable to the people who owned it. Their misfortune was that, since early Spanish days, the farmers did not own the land themselves.

This region has been the hotbed of absentee landlordism. Its inhabitants are tenant farmers. They plant the rice, and

tend the fields, and harvest the crops, but the land itself does not belong to them. They have no money to buy the seed. They have only their own brawn and, in the prewar days, perhaps their own *carabao*.

For seed, for money to tide them through the planting season, they must look to the landlord and the usurer. When the crop ripens for the harvest, they can pay their debts. But by then the debt is so great that it outvalues the crop. In ancient Spanish days, the *hacenderos* may sometimes have preferred to resort to illegal methods of extortion. Today that is not necessary. Everything is perfectly legal. The interest rates demanded by usurers are justified because the farmer is a poor risk. The portion of the crop demanded by the landlord must be great because he has advanced so much to the tenant. And the result is a web of poverty and serfdom from which the farmer can never escape. There are cases where, for every hundred grains of rice he grows, the tenant receives the value of only eight grains of rice. He cannot live thus. He does not want to live thus. And so, in what has come to be known as the Huk country, there has been chronic unrest for as long as men can remember.

Before the war, the people of the Luzon plain looked to all kinds of leaders. They turned to charlatans like Benigno Ramos, the Sakdalista, or to mature Socialists like Pedro Abad Santos. They turned to Manuel L. Quezon when he became President, and he tried to solve their problems, first, by taking over a little of the lands for the Government and next, when that simply replaced landlords with Government agents, by inaugurating a resettlement program.

When war came, the farmers of central Luzon resisted the Japanese. By the end of March, 1942, before Bataan fell, many had joined together in a guerrilla organization known as the Hukbalahap, an abbreviation for Tagalog words which mean "People's Army Against the Japanese." The Huks were angry fighters, led by men who told them that with victory would come the Four Freedoms. It is claimed that, in the three years before Manila was liberated, the Huks fought more than 1,200

engagements and killed some 25,000 Japanese, spies and collaborators. There were towns in central Luzon where the Huks reigned supreme, establishing their own municipal governments, organizing a system of price control, taking over the rice lands. The leaders who emerged were Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, devout followers of the Communist line. The peasants themselves, of course, knew little of Marxism and were probably no more Communistic than the Iowa farmers who stormed courthouses in the early 1930's. They were simply men sick of exploitation and injustice, and they did not care what outsiders called their leaders.

With liberation, the people of central Luzon awaited the promised millennium. But the United States Army had no patience with social-minded guerrillas. Taruc and Alejandrino were detained for seven months by the CIC. The Huks were too political, too radical, for the Army to trust them. Their refusal to turn over control of the towns they ruled was considered dangerous. Their insistence on keeping their weapons, mostly captured from the Japanese, was obviously sinister.

From the beginning there were minor skirmishes and major tensions. The American military police adopted a suspicious, somewhat highhanded policy. By any reasonable standard, "law and order" did not exist in the Huk country. No landowner, who had most likely spent the occupation years in Manila playing buy-and-sell with the Japanese, dared to visit his property; for he knew that he would not return to Manila alive. Clearly, this was not law and order.

But to treat the situation as a mere exercise in law enforcement, as a policing job in a bandit-ridden area, meant ignoring the root causes of the whole trouble. Only agrarian reform would prevent agrarian unrest.

Up to the time of the elections, the unruly tenants held their tempers in check. They raised their red flags in Tarlac and San Fernando, they marched to Manila and trooped peacefully onto the grounds of Malacañan, they told their grievances to President Osmeña and heard his assurance that the Government would take action. They backed Osmeña in the campaign,

attacked Roxas as a tool of entrenched, wealthy fascists who were their enemies. Like all loyal followers of leaders who operated within a Communist Party framework, their discipline was effective. In the Huk country, the vote for Osmeña was overwhelming. But their man lost the election.

From the earliest days of his administration, President Roxas has had trouble with the Huks. Armed clashes are frequent in central Luzon. The Huks are convinced that Roxas is using Filipino troops in behalf of the large landowners.

During the summer of 1946, Roxas held several conferences with Taruc and other Huk leaders. He insisted that the Huks surrender their arms to the Government, but they were afraid that this would place them at the none-too-tender mercies of the Philippine Army and the absentee landlords. Roxas finally issued an ultimatum, setting the end of August as the deadline for surrender of arms. He demanded "immediate termination of lawlessness, banditry and resistance to the peace forces of the Government." Just before the deadline a Huk leader named Juan Feleo was kidnapped, along with several others, and presumably murdered. The incident inflamed the Huks, and more than ever they were adamant. Taruc accused Roxas of establishing a "reign of terror," and Roxas accused Taruc of bad faith, reopening an old and unproved murder charge against him.

By September there was bitter fighting all over the Huk country, with Government troops using light planes, artillery, and tanks. Once again the Huks were impelled to resort to the guerrilla life.

Meanwhile, shrewdly, the President announced a program of social reform: Crops harvested by tenant farmers will be divided more fairly, with 70 per cent of their value going to tenants and 30 per cent to landlords. Usury will be stamped out. The Government will purchase large estates and subdivide them for sale to tenants. Loans will be made to small farmers and tenants, and farm co-operatives encouraged. Resettlement projects will be pushed in sparsely populated areas. Agricultural production will be increased with the aid of scientific

research and development. Life and property will be safeguarded. There will be work projects for the unemployed. The Government will support claims for official recognition of those who served in the resistance movement during the war. Legal aid will be provided to persons presenting claims for war damages. A program of veterans' benefits will be pushed. Small business and industry will be encouraged to furnish seasonal employment.

It was a fine program. But, with all the will in the world, Manuel Roxas could not carry it out. For one thing, his government did not have the money to do it. For another, it was based on a partial acceptance of the Huks' own assumption—which is that a simple change in land ownership will solve the agrarian problem in central Luzon. The socially-unconscious statistics of land areas, use, and population in the Huk country seem to prove that a fair division of land could not possibly provide the farmers with an adequate income. A Filipino farmer and his family can earn a decent living on a farm of about eight hectares. But redistribution of the land would give him only about four hectares.

What was lacking, therefore, in the Roxas program was primary emphasis on large-scale resettlement, on a preliminary large-scale educational campaign to tell the people why they should resettle, and where. It is not easy for a man to leave his familiar *nipa* shack for the far-off stretches of Mindanao.

But without this, promises to abolish usury and to create a fairer division of income from crops are hollow, however sincere they may be. Meantime, the problem of agrarian unrest continues. At present, it is a fight between the Government and the Huks. It could easily involve the United States. For the United States helped put Roxas in power; the United States, by its free trade program, is entrenching the wealthy landed interests whom the Huks hate; and the United States has already shown its unfriendliness to the Huks in the actions of its own armed forces.

In late 1946, agrarian unrest was by far the most widely covered news from the Philippines, so far as the American

press was concerned. There were frequent hints of impending or existing civil war. To set the record straight, it should be pointed out that this is merely the postwar version of a chronic disease in the Philippines; that, in its extreme form, it is highly localized; that, fundamentally, it is part of the basic economic disease of the Philippines and not an isolated infection.

To cure this disease, the farmers of central Luzon, as well as the plain people of all the archipelago, must be assured the peace of mind and the pleasures of life which are the birth-right of every human being.

To cure this disease is the last, and greatest, responsibility of the United States to the people of the Philippines.

XIII

THE SUMMING UP

DMITRI Z. MANUILSKI, head of the Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations, closed the initial debate of the U. N. General Assembly on October 31, 1946. By force of habit, and in accordance with Soviet foreign policy, he was slugging it out wordily with the Western democracies. His speech roved over the world's troubled areas of suspicion and strife, and paused for a moment at the Philippines.

"I must say . . . to the Philippine delegation," he remarked dryly, "that if the question of real independence of the Philippines is raised some day before this Assembly, the delegation of the Soviet Union will support this legitimate right of the Filipino people."

That remark irritated the Philippine delegate, General Romulo, to the point where he rushed over to the Ukrainian delegation and protested with subdued fury. But the American press, and the American public, paid no attention. If people read about it at all, they thought Manuilski's observation strangely illogical and irrelevant.

In truth, it was neither. It was merely a warning which the United States would do well to remember. For the Philippines

might easily join central Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, China, and Korea as a battlefield in the ideological struggle which is the mark of our unhappy era. Unless the basic economic and social problems of the Philippines are solved wisely and fairly, with our help, there will always be the danger that the archipelago will fall within the Soviet orbit—and we will awaken abruptly to our weakness in the very place where we have thought ourselves strong.

On the day the United States Senate ratified the treaty with Spain, acquiring the Philippines without the consent of the Filipinos, we took upon ourselves a responsibility which we cannot easily throw off. One part of this responsibility—assistance toward self-government—was amply fulfilled by 1946. But the world has learned that politics can no longer be practiced in a vacuum, because it is compounded of all the problems confronting human beings in their daily lives—their self-respect, their pocketbooks, their hopes for the future, and their chances for success.

In this broad sense, we have not fulfilled our responsibility to the Philippines. The islands emerged from a destructive war to find themselves shell-shocked and bankrupt. By sheerest accident, it was at this point that they achieved independence, the sovereign symbol of their political maturity. In theory, the American duty is ended. In practice, it is not ended—any more than the duty of a father to his son would end if, on his twenty-first birthday, the son were deathly ill.

Most Americans tend to think of Europe when they think of the world. If they think of the Philippines at all, it is with a sentimental warmth for the people who stood so gallantly against the Japanese, and perhaps with a self-righteous confidence that America has done its duty by the brown brothers. Have we not given them the independence they wanted? Are we not giving them financial help, and valuable trade preferences?

The Filipinos themselves are neither sentimental nor confident now. They are faced with the problem of survival, and

they know that American policy—by omission or commission—will determine their fate.

In a time of despair and devastation, they have looked to the United States for the help they need, were promised, and have earned. Instead, they have received half-measures, highhandedness, and arbitrary actions.

If the Philippine political scene has become confused, it is partly America's fault. If the Philippine economic future is dark, it is partly America's fault. If the principle of sovereign equality has not been maintained, it is partly America's fault. During the loan negotiations with the United Kingdom in 1946, no American official dared to suggest any concession so far-reaching as the equal-rights amendment to the Philippine Constitution. During all the jockeying for strategic bases, no independent nation has been asked to give so much as the United States has asked the Philippines to give. These are the things that Filipinos think about.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the staunchest friends of the United States—the men who, through the most desperate days of the war, were loyal to the democratic ideal—should now be most critical of the United States. It is hardly surprising that the early affection which Filipinos felt toward American troops should by now have turned to resentment and suspicion. It is hardly surprising, even, that a Laurel should have built a structure of personal popularity on the basis of his known anti-Americanism.

Late in 1946, two Filipina women leaders arrived in Washington to complain about the lack of help from America. Since Army relief ended, more than a year earlier, there had been no real assistance to the needy in the Philippines. UNRRA aid totalled only \$12,000,000, and one of the reasons for this parsimony was American insistence that the matter was being handled by the United States Government. "What is wrong with the Filipino children that they get no milk, no vitamins, no clothing?" asked Mrs. Trinidad Legarda. "After all, they suffered as much as the children of Greece and Yugoslavia. We are not envious of those countries, but we do want a little

diverted to the Philippine children who are so thin and spindly now. We who have been so devoted to America should be given a chance along with the European countries in securing such aid."

There is a note of impatience in the Filipino attitude toward the United States—an undercurrent quite different from the alternating moods of begging and of gratitude which marked the attitude in the past. Nerves are too frayed to be satisfied with the amenities, or with American half-measures. The danger is that impatience may develop into outright antagonism—and antagonism into hatred.

If this should happen, American troops stationed in the Philippines might find themselves as unpopular as British troops in the Jewish areas of Palestine. In a tense moment, unpopularity could lead to bloodshed. There is a real possibility—made all the more real because the American public is totally unaware of it—of full-fledged anti-American outbursts in the Philippines.

Such outbursts would undoubtedly raise cries of Filipino ingratitude to America. But it would not be a case of ingratitude at all, for gratitude is a slippery base on which to build a lasting friendship. Rather, it would be a matter of inflamed desperation driving bewildered people into extreme actions without regard to the consequences.

To the United States, these consequences would be grave. American prestige would tumble; the testing-ground to which we have pointed with pride would have exploded in our faces. In a world where the delicate power-balances rest on the intangibles of prestige, we would have lost much ground. Mr. Manuiski and his colleagues would be delighted; and their jibes would no longer seem illogical or irrelevant.

Along with our prestige, America's power position would be threatened. Military, air, and naval bases are hardly safe in a setting of antagonism and unrest.

To a somewhat lesser degree, America's economic strength would also suffer. The Philippines may not be an essential

customer for American exports, but it did reach sixth place among our markets before the war.

As for the Filipinos, the disadvantages of such a deterioration in relations with the United States would be tremendous. Their recovery would be greatly set back. They would be forced to look elsewhere for support, since they cannot yet depend upon their own resources or initiative. They would hardly look to Britain for help, and surely not to China. Their only direction could be toward the Soviet Union. Inevitably, the Russians would do all they could to extend their sphere of influence as far south as Manila. The Philippines would be a rich prize in the struggle for supremacy. Psychologically, Soviet friendship with the Filipinos would have repercussions throughout all Asia. Strategically, it would strengthen the Russian position almost beyond imagination.

The horrendous consequences of a deterioration in Philippine-American friendship could be extended *ad infinitum*. Fortunately, they are quite hypothetical so far. American action can keep them so.

II

Ideally, the islands should evolve a system that is half-socialist, half-capitalist, but entirely fitted to the needs of the Filipino people themselves.

In the rural areas, it should be a nation of small farmers who own their own land. Because farmers are now too closely bunched in areas that cannot possibly support them, because thousands of hectares of fertile lands are waiting for settlers, an ambitious resettlement program should be carried out. And there must be a final, unequivocal breaking-up of all the large landed estates throughout the islands.

From the soil and workshops of the Philippines should come tropical and sub-tropical products which Filipinos consume at home: food, clothing, building materials. New crops should be developed, and a large-scale scientific program should search for means of adapting them to the climate and soil of the islands.

The country need not strive for autarchy; that would be senseless. It should produce what it can for home consumption, and in addition it should produce export crops whose sale would make possible the importation of necessities from abroad. Concentration on sugar production and export should be closely controlled, with a view to the ultimate closing off of most of the free American market. Instead, export crops should be geared to meet the needs of markets other than in the United States.

Thus, with the help of technical advisers, farm co-operatives, government planning, and of socialistic sharing of machinery and marketing methods, the Filipino farmer would continue to work hard but he could be assured of a decent year-round income. His children could receive a better education, his wife some new clothes every once in a while, and the whole family a sense of security, independence, and peace.

This is the only real solution to the agrarian problem, whether in central Luzon or anywhere else, and the only way to get rid of usurers and exploiters. Such a system of mild agrarian socialism would be the salvation of the Philippines.

Meantime, the capitalistic aspect of Philippine economy need not disappear entirely. By its geopolitical position, the country is admirably suited to serve southeastern Asia as a great trading area, a transshipment point, a middleman. Mineral resources are there to support the expansion of light industry; an excellent labor force to furnish the manpower for assembly and sub-assembly plants; a fine, well-located harbor, particularly if a free port is established, to make of Manila one of the world's most important and busiest ports.

But, for the benefit of the Filipino people themselves, the great monopolies must be curbed, if not broken up. It is no longer sensible to accept the stranglehold of the great combines which dominate business and industry in the islands. A little trust-busting would be a healthy thing.

The Philippine solution, in sum, lies in a combination of agrarian reform and of planned industrial expansion. This solution is altogether in line with the traditions of the country,

Most of it has already been talked about, or even promised. It is implicit in the Philippine Constitution and in the laws of the land. Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas have all frequently urged agrarian reform, diversification of crops, expansion of commerce and industry, finding of new markets. They have furthered the semisocialistic program of Government support, through the National Development Company and now through President Roxas' Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, for such enterprises as are in the national interest but are incapable of attracting sufficient private capital.

Thus, the program is not revolutionary at all. It might run into the opposition of those who have a vested interest in old-fashioned *laissez-faire* "free" enterprise. But their opposition cannot be permitted to block what is so obviously in the interests of the people. It is altogether likely that President Roxas himself, despite his obligation to reactionary elements, would throw himself into the program quite sincerely.

With such a plan, the period of controlled free trade with the United States would in truth provide the breathing spell and the temporary alleviation of crisis which is its only excuse. By developing a twenty-five-year plan for the Philippines, the country could approach the end of free trade with an assurance of economic health and a promise of material progress.

To launch this twenty-five-year plan would cost more money than is available to the Philippine Government, and require more specialized talents than the Filipinos themselves can provide. If this program, or something like it, is ever to be carried out, help must come from the United States.

Until recently, the United States paid out practically no money of its own for the development of the Philippines. Its chief expenditures, since the turn of the century, have been for its own advantage—and principally of a military nature. It has, of course, subsidized the Philippines by means of free trade, but it has not lost money in doing so. Since liberation, it has undertaken to continue free trade. It has also undertaken to make up for the damages suffered by Filipinos as a result of

wartime destruction. We have conducted our colonial experiment for peanuts so far; now we must dig into our pockets for dollars.

For one last time, the father-son relationship must be maintained. The Filipinos cannot set out on adult life, to make their way, frail and penniless, without a financial grant from the United States.

It will be noted that the word is "grant," and not "loan." The Philippine economy is not now, nor is it likely to be, capable of paying back a very large loan from the United States. American help, for the last time, must be in the form of an outright gift. It should be worked out on the basis of a twenty-five-year period of reconstruction, with sums to be made available as the needs develop. It should be administered by American and Filipino technicians, under the direction of the President of the Philippines. To insure against maladministration, a series of protective conditions could be set up by prior agreement; and if these are violated, the assistance could be stopped at any point. This much of a concession—though it smells a little of imperialism—might be warranted only by the size of the grant itself. From the Filipino point of view, protection of Philippine sovereignty and initiative could also be made a condition of the entire transaction. The purpose of this grant, it must be realized, would not be to aid American capitalists who wish to invest in the Philippines. It must be, quite simply, to assist the Filipino people in building an economic structure that will last for generations.

As for the exact amount of money the program would require, that is a matter for negotiation. It should be large enough to cover at least these specific purposes:

1. To purchase and redistribute the lands of the great estates.
2. To conduct a large-scale resettlement program.
3. To carry out scientific agricultural research for the purpose of diversifying the crop production of the Philippines.
4. To conduct an intensive adult education program among the rural population, in order to gain acceptance of the resettlement.

ment program and of modern agricultural methods adapted to Philippine conditions.

5. To conduct an exhaustive economic survey of the country, particularly in terms of unexploited resources and their adaptability to new enterprises.

6. To finance or otherwise assist in establishment of new industries producing goods for home consumption, of ship-yards and air depots capable of making the Philippines an effective way-station in the channels of world trade, and of such new industries as may be required for a more diversified export trade.

7. To carry out a scientific study of new export possibilities for the Philippines, and to develop these possibilities quickly.

8. To control and, where necessary, finance the reconstruction of cities, towns, agriculture, and industry.

9. To train Filipinos in business, industry, and other fields where they now have insufficient special skills.

10. To help rehabilitate the educational system of the Philippines.

With a program like this, it is altogether possible that the Filipinos would emerge, a quarter-century hence, as independent economically as they are independent politically—not independent in the strict definition of the term, but in the sense that they can assume their rightful and self-respecting share in the interdependence of nations. Without such a program, they will be forced to flounder from crisis to crisis, either maintaining a colonial hat-in-hand obsequiousness toward the United States or else turning against the United States with the volatile fury of their Malayan-Spanish tradition.

Can we afford to permit our friendship with the Filipinos to deteriorate into antagonism, hatred, and possible bloodshed? Can we afford to say "Good riddance!" to the Filipinos and stand by, bemused, while they stagger in the direction of the Soviet Union?

There is, of course, the question of imperialistic implications in the proposed program. Some will say that we are interfering in the internal affairs of a friendly foreign state.

To a certain extent, that would be true. But there is no reason why we must force the Filipinos to accept our offer if they don't want to—or, if they do accept it, why we must force the Filipinos to operate within a rigid American framework. The chief purpose of this program is quite the opposite; its whole point is that only in this way will it be possible for the Filipinos to rid themselves of their wobbly dependency on the whim of the United States.

III

A twenty-five-year plan will not bring the millennium to the Filipinos. It will not even solve all of their problems. They are no different from other people: their fate, like that of all of us, hinges on the fate of the world. Their chances for a healthy economy depend largely on the chances for a healthy world economy. Similarly, their military safety depends entirely upon the world's safety. If the two great modern ideologies should reach the point of armed conflict, the Filipinos will suffer no less than anyone else. If the world does manage to keep the peace permanently, the Filipinos will benefit no less than anyone else.

This is the background against which to place the recent discussions of American bases in the Philippines. In June, 1944, the United States Congress authorized the President to arrange for such Philippine bases "as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States." President Roosevelt, signing the bill, described it as "an outstanding example of cooperation designed to prevent a recurrence of armed aggression and to assure the peaceful use of a great ocean by those in pursuit of peaceful ends."

After liberation, the Philippine Congress authorized President Osmeña to open negotiations regarding the bases. When President Roxas made his preinauguration visit to Washington, he promised that the new Republic would "cooperate in the defense and security of all bases required for the common protection of the United States and the islands."

American demands were great. They included the Manila Bay area and the entire island of Mactan, near Cebu. The Manila press was outraged, and once again an excuse for anti-American feeling was found. Few Filipinos objected to establishment of American bases in their country. They knew that bases might give them some measure of safety. They suspected that American installations would make it less necessary for their own government to spend money on military requirements. They welcomed the income from American troop payments and Army expenditures. On the other hand, with their new-found independence, they were jealous of their sovereign prerogatives. They objected violently to some of the choice spots on which empire-minded military men had their eye. They disliked the way the armed forces occupied the best of the few remaining buildings in the cities.

Finally in March, 1947, an agreement was signed. It gave the United States ninety-nine-year rights to a series of bases, chief of which were at Clark Field for the air forces, at Fort Stotsenberg for the ground forces, and on Leyte Gulf for the Navy. It was stipulated that there will be no installations in the large cities, and the demand for priorities on the Manila waterfront was overlooked. The pact is based on the principle of joint Philippine-American defense, and bases can be made available to the Security Council for the benefit of all the United Nations.

Thus, presumably, a ticklish problem was settled. In a land war between the United States and her only currently conceivable enemy, the Philippines would not be very significant. In a sea war, in the unlikely event that Russia were to build up her sea power, the Philippines could be vital. In an air-atomic war, any place in the world is important . . . and dangerous.

Safety no longer depends upon the size or location of individual military, air, or naval bases. Today the safety of any nation depends upon the safety of the whole world. So far as the Philippines is concerned, neither the forgotten neutrality provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act nor the establishment of permanent American bases can really guarantee security

from attack. Only international peace can do so. And in this the Philippines is no different from any other nation in the world.

IV

I have stressed help from America as the only way the Filipinos can establish their nation effectively. It is no derogation to them to suggest that they need this help. They need it in the same way that a blind man whose sight has been restored needs help when first he walks into the bright sunlight.

But they must also help others. The Philippine experiment does carry, within itself, a sign of hope for other peoples who have not yet progressed as far as the Filipinos. More than any other man, perhaps, Carlos Romulo has realized this. As the Philippine delegate to the United Nations conference in San Francisco, he battled for the submerged millions who had no other spokesman. In their behalf, he managed to liberalize many of the trusteeship provisions in the United Nations Charter. More recently, he has been energetically promoting closer contact among the nonself-governing peoples, much to the irritation of the British. Romulo, like Quezon, has always believed in the need for some sort of Pan-Malayan federation in south-eastern Asia. Finally, as permanent delegate to the United Nations in New York, he has recognized that the best interests of all small nations hinge upon the loosening of the veto control by the Big Five—and he has offered to give up the theoretical principle of sovereign equality in the General Assembly if it will be replaced by proportionate representation in an Assembly with real powers.

This approach toward foreign policy has been constructive and surprisingly effective. In this sense, General Romulo—as a spokesman for his own people—has become a spokesman for all the colonial peoples of the earth.

But, fundamentally, the Filipinos—who provide the only successful example of peaceful transition from colony to sovereignty—can help others only if they help themselves. As a mature people, they must look to the wellsprings of their

national strength for restoration of the moral values which were so shaken by the war. They must learn, before it is too late, what it means to be truly free.

Out of their soil and cities, out of their national traditions, out of their ordeals and suffering, out of their hopes and dreams, the Filipinos must erect a system which will satisfy their needs and at the same time make them useful members of the world community.

One more time, reform must come from above. After that, it must come from within. And this will be the task of the people themselves.

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